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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three experimental studies that explore how management’s financial
disclosure behavior and security strategies influence the costs associated with cybersecurity
breaches. The first study examines the cost of litigation in connection with cybersecurity
incidents. The purpose of this study is to determine how the characteristics and content of
cybersecurity incidents’ disclosure affects jurors’ liability assessments. Specifically, this study
explores how jurors react to management timeliness in disclosing the incident and the
plausibility of the explanations provided to justify the disclosure strategy. The second and third
studies explore the value relevance of cybersecurity risk management (CRM) assurance. In
particular, the second study examines whether engagement in voluntary assurance over CRM
before the occurrence of an incident affects investors’ reactions after the incident, and whether
these reactions differ based on whether assurance is expected or not expected based on industry
norms. The third study scrutinizes how perceptions of disclosure timeliness affect investor
decisions and explores the use of CRM assurance as a potential tool to mitigate the deleterious
effects of delayed disclosures of cybersecurity incidents. Overall, the results reported in this
dissertation suggest that timely disclosure of a cybersecurity breach reduces liability, improves
management credibility assessments, and results in higher valuation judgments. Moreover, the
findings reveal that CRM assurance further leads to enhanced management credibility
assessments and valuation judgments and that the impact of CRM assurance is particularly
beneficial when not necessarily expected for the industry. In combination, these three studies
address calls for research exploring the costs of cybersecurity and inform regulators currently
engaged in developing both cybersecurity disclosure requirements and voluntary assurance
services designed to address stakeholders’ information needs regarding companies’ cybersecurity
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activities. These studies also add to the literature and theory documenting the link between
disclosure timeliness and litigation risk, and the value of voluntary assurance services.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Cyber-attacks have continued increasing in size, frequency, and cost to companies
(Ponemon 2018). Therefore, regulators, accounting standard setters and practitioners are
interested in understanding how companies are addressing cybersecurity risks and are engaged in
several initiatives to promote the adoption of cybersecurity risk management (CRM) practices in
organizations and to increase voluntary disclosure of CRM and security breach events. The three
studies in this dissertation answer a call for research on the cost of cybersecurity attacks (AAA
2017) and explore the impact of cybersecurity disclosure and CRM assurance on judgments and
decision making in accounting.

This dissertation comprises three experiments that explore the cost of cybersecurity
incidents. Specifically, in the first study I investigate how management’s disclosures and
remedial tactics in connection with a cybersecurity incident impact jurors’ assessment of a
company’s liability. The second and third studies explore how the disclosure of a cybersecurity
incident and a company’s engagement in CRM assurance influence investors’ perceptions and
valuation judgments. The following subsections provide additional detail on the motivation for
each study, the research method employed, the main findings and contributions to practice,
theory, and accounting literature. The overall contribution of this dissertation is discussed in the
last subsection.

Study One: Jurors’ Liability Assessments After Cybersecurity Breaches: The Impact of
Disclosure Timeliness and the Plausibility of Management Justifications
In study one, I explore the impact of a cybersecurity breach disclosure timeliness and the
plausibility of management justifications for the disclosure timing on jurors’ assessments of
1

causal attribution and liability. Studying the cost of liability associated with cyber-attacks is
important given that post-data breach costs, including legal costs, are considered one of the main
cost drivers of cyber-attacks (Ponemon 2018). Research on the impact of disclosure timeliness
suggests that timely disclosures reduce the cost of litigation (Skinner 1994, 1997). Based on this
evidence, timely disclosure of cyber-attacks would be desirable. However, evidence of major
recent breaches (e.g., Yahoo, Equifax) suggests that companies delay the disclosure of cyberattacks (Fung 2017; Haselton and Lee 2017). It is possible that firms elect to delay the disclosure
of cyber-attacks given management career incentives to delay the disclosure of bad news
(Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). However, firms may have valid reasons to delay these disclosures
given the complexities associated with discovering the breach and conducting subsequent
investigations. As such, it is important to explore how the use of plausible and implausible
justification for a cyber-attack disclosure’s timeliness impacts jurors’ judgment and decision
making.
I use a 2 x 3 experiment and manipulate disclosure timeliness (more or less timely) and
the plausibility of management justifications (plausible, implausible, or control) betweensubjects. The dependent variables are participants’ assessment of causal attribution (mediator)
and liability assessments. As predicted, I find that more timely disclosures result in more
favorable assessments of causal attribution and liability. I also find that causal attribution
mediates the relationship between disclosure timeliness and liability assessments. However, I am
unable to find support for the predicted interaction of timeliness and plausibility on causal
attribution. Additional analysis reveals that timeliness of disclosures and participants disclosure
preferences drive perceptions of plausibility.
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This study informs companies and market participants about the cost of delayed
disclosure of cyber-attacks. The findings have implications for regulators and standard setters
interested in developing more disclosure requirements over cybersecurity. This study also
contributes to the literature and theory on the impact of disclosure timeliness and the literature on
remedial tactics to reduce liability by providing initial insights into the importance of disclosing
cyber-attacks on a timely manner and showing that the benefits of remedial tactics, as
documented in prior research, may be context specific.
Study Two: Investors’ Judgments and Decisions After a Cybersecurity Breach: Understanding
the Value Relevance of Cybersecurity Risk Management Assurance
In study two, I investigate how voluntary CRM assurance affects non-professional
investors’ judgments and decisions. The study also examines how the value relevance of CRM
assurance is altered when such assurance violates or conforms to users’ expectations. The
AICPA developed in 2017 a CRM reporting framework and is promoting its use for voluntary
disclosure of cybersecurity. The AICPA is also promoting assurance services through a Systems
and Organization Controls (SOC) for cybersecurity engagement. Although there are known
benefits of engaging in voluntary assurance, prior attempts of the accounting profession to
promote assurance over information technology have largely failed (Gendron and Barrett 2004;
Barett and Gendron 2006; Boulianne and Cho 2009). As such, investigating the impact of CRM
assurance after cyber-attacks and understanding how investors’ expectancies of influence their
judgments and decision could help shed light on the value relevance of CRM assurance.
This study employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment. The independent variables are
CRM assurance (present or absent) and expectancies of assurance (conform to or violate
expectancies). The dependent variables are valuation judgments and management credibility
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assessments (mediator). I predict and find that companies that engage in voluntary CRM
assurance receive higher stock price valuations and more favorable investor assessments of
management credibility. Moreover, I find that investors’ assessments of management credibility
and stock price valuations are more extreme in the presence of positive and negative expectancy
violations. Additional analysis reveals that investors’ perceived benefits of assurance-asinsurance and perceived accountants’ cyber-expertise are important determinants of investors’
decision behavior. Further analysis also sheds light on the benefits and potential penalties
associated with a firm’s in-house CRM practices.
Evidence of the benefits of CRM assurance have implications for regulators, accounting
professionals, and market participants and may help promote the use of CRM assurance to
mitigate the negative impact of cyber-attacks. This study also adds to the literature and theory
exploring the value relevance of voluntary assurance by identifying expectancy violations as a
relevant variable that influences investors’ judgments and decisions.
Study Three: The Impact of Disclosure Timeliness and Cybersecurity Risk Management
Assurance on Investors Judgments and Decisions
Study three explores the impact of a cybersecurity breach disclosure’s timeliness in the
context of investors’ judgment and decision making. This study also explores whether voluntary
CRM assurance could help mitigate the negative impact of delayed disclosures. The market
reaction to disclosure timeliness has been studied in the context of bad earnings news and
restatement disclosure. Research find that the market negatively reacts to delayed disclosure of
restatements (BenYousset and Khan 2016). However, no such negative reaction is found in the
context of delayed disclosure of bad earnings (Givoly and Palmon 1982; Kalay and Loewenstein
1986). These results suggest that the impact of disclosure timeliness is context specific.

4

Therefore, studying the impact of a cyber-attack disclosure’s timeliness on investors’ judgment
and decision making is central to further understand the cost and implications of cybersecurity
breaches.
To conduct this study, I use a 2 x 2 experiment in which disclosure timeliness (more or
less timely) and the CRM assurance (present or absent) are manipulated between-subjects. The
dependent variables are valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility
(mediator). I find that more timely disclosures lead to more favorable valuation judgments and
more favorable assessments of management credibility. I also find that management credibility
mediates the relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments. Nevertheless,
although I find that the interaction of timeliness and CRM assurance is significant and impacts
credibility assessments, the results are in the opposite direction predicted. This finding suggests
that CRM assurance significantly influences credibility assessments only when the breach is
disclosed in a timely manner. Additional analysis reveals that perceptions of disclosure
timeliness are context specific and influenced by users’ perceptions of cybersecurity disclosures.
The findings of this study inform companies and market participants about the negative
implications of delayed disclosure of cyber-attacks, in particular the impact on firm value and
credibility. The results are also relevant for regulators and standard setters promoting CRM
disclosure and assurance and highlights the importance of timely disclosure of security events as
part of a company’s CRM program. This study also adds to the literature and theory on the
market implications of disclosure timeliness by identifying context specific determinants of
perceived timeliness which could help further understand mixed results from prior research.

5

Overall Contribution
The three studies in this dissertation aim to answer a call for research on the cost of
cybersecurity to companies and shareholders (AAA 2017). These studies look at the cost of
litigation and firm value which are important cost drivers after a cyber-attack. Moreover, these
studies investigate the impact of disclosure timeliness and voluntary CRM assurance which
makes the insights from these studies timely and relevant for regulators and standard setters
currently engage in CRM disclosure and assurance initiatives.
Results from the three studies support several of the predictions. Overall, findings from
Study One and Study Three sheds light on the cost of delayed disclosure of cyber-attacks and
show that delayed disclosures increase liability and reduce perceptions of management
credibility and stock price value. The results suggest that disclosure timeliness is a strong
determinant of liability and valuation judgments and that the use of remedial tactics to reduce
liability and voluntary CRM assurance do not effectively mitigate the effects of delayed
disclosure of a cyber-attack. CRM assurance, however, enhances credibility and firm value when
a cyber-attack is timely disclosed. Results from Study Two sheds light on the potential use of
CRM assurance to mitigate the negative market reaction to cyber-attacks and suggests that
market expectancies could help drive the demand for voluntary CRM assurance. Altogether,
these studies help further our understanding of how cybersecurity disclosure and assurance affect
judgment and decision-making and suggest that timely disclosure and voluntary CRM could help
reduce the cost of cyber-attacks.

6
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STUDY ONE: JURORS’ LIABILITY ASSESSMENTS AFTER CYBERSECURITY
BREACHES: THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE TIMELINESS AND THE
PLAUSIBILITY OF MANAGEMENT JUSTIFICATIONS
Introduction
There are competing incentives for companies required to publicly disclose cybersecurity
incidents. The Litigation Reduction Hypothesis suggests that companies may have incentives to
timely disclose bad news to reduce the associated litigation risk and reduce expected legal costs
(Skinner 1994, 1997). On the other hand, companies may also have incentives to strategically
time the disclosure of bad news either due to management's career incentives (Kothari, Li, and
Short 2009) or due to a desire to first collect all the relevant facts, as prior research suggests that
investors reward accurate estimates (Hirst, Jackson, and Koonce 2003; Rupar 2017). Although
prior research shows that timelier disclosures lower the likelihood of litigation (Donelson,
McInnis, Mergenthaler, and Yu 2012), little is known about how the disclosure timeliness
impacts jurors’ liability assessments when remedial tactics are opportunistically employed to
obfuscate managers’ self-serving intentions.
Accordingly, in this study, I explore the impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’
liability assessments in the context of cybersecurity incidents. The purpose of this study is to
determine how the characteristics and content of cybersecurity incidents’ disclosures impact
jurors’ liability assessments. Specifically, this study explores how jurors react to management
forthcomingness (i.e., timeliness) in disclosing the incident and to the plausibility of the
explanations provided to justify the disclosure strategy (i.e., timing). This study is relevant in
light of the increased incidence of cybersecurity attacks and their associated cost 1. Moreover,

1

The 2018 Ponemon Institute report on the cost of data breaches indicates that the average cost of a data breach is
around $3.86 million, about $148 for each lost or stolen record containing sensitive information (Ponemon 2018).
The report shows that the U.S. is the country with the highest average cost of a data breach ($7.91 million). These
costs include detection and escalation costs, notification costs, and post data breach costs (including help desk
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studying the litigation risk associated with companies’ disclosures of cybersecurity incidents is
timely considering recent media attention to high profile cybersecurity incidents, such as the
Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo) and Equifax breaches. For instance, Yahoo is undergoing the first securities
class action lawsuit in connection with two cybersecurity incidents that, Yahoo’s alleges,
occurred in 2013 and 2014 but were discovered and announced in 2016. 2 3 The timeliness aspect
has gained media attention after the SEC announced an investigation into the timing of the
disclosures (Fung 2017). Moreover, early in September 2017, Equifax announced a massive data
breach and the announcement was made six weeks after the breach was discovered. The timing
of the disclosure is being questioned following reports that three Equifax executives, including
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), engaged in insider trading after the breach was discovered but
before the announcement (Haselton and Lee 2017).
Drawing on Skinner’s (1994, 1997) Litigation Reduction Hypothesis, which suggest that
earlier financial disclosures reduce expected legal costs, I predict that more (less) timely
disclosures will decrease (increase) jurors’ liability assessments. Moreover, I further explore the
impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’ liability assessments drawing on Correspondence
Inference Theory (CIT), which posits that individuals assess whether the behavior is intentional
(internal attribution) or accidental (external attribution) based on the most likely alternative, after
weighing all the potential choices. Accordingly, I predict that more (less) timely disclosures

activities, investigative activities, legal expenditure, and identity protection services, among others). The average
cost of detection and escalation costs, notification costs, and post data breach costs in the U.S. are $1.21 million,
$0.74 million, and $1.76 million, respectively. Also, the average lost business costs in the U.S. is $4.20 million; the
U.S. being the country with the highest average notification costs, post data breach costs, and lost business costs.
2
Studying the potential consequences of securities class action litigation is also important considering the spike in
the volume of securities class action cases in 2016. According to a report on recent trends in securities class action
litigation released by NERA Economic Consulting, is the highest number of filings since the 2000 dot-com crash
(NERA Economic Consulting 2017).
3
Yahoo’s shareholders filed a securities class action lawsuit against Yahoo alleging that they failed to disclose that
users' data was not encrypted with an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme.
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result in weaker (stronger) correspondence of inferences about a company’s intention to act
opportunistically, hereafter referred as causal attributions. 4 I also predict that stronger causal
attribution towards a company's intent to act opportunistically lead jurors to generalize their
inferences about the company and, in turn, mediate the relationship between disclosure
timeliness and jurors' liability assessments. Lastly, I predict that the relationship between
disclosure timeliness and causal attributions is moderated by the plausibility of management
justifications for their disclosure strategy.
To test my predictions, I use a 2 x 3 between-subjects experiment in which participants
are required to assess a company’s liability after a cybersecurity incident. The independent
variables of interest are the timeliness of the disclosure (more timely versus less timely) and the
plausibility of management’s justification for the company’s disclosure strategy (plausible,
implausible, and control group with no justification). Specifically, the timeliness of the
disclosure is manipulated by informing participants that the incident was disclosed three days,
for the more timely condition, or three months, for the less timely condition, after the company
became aware of the incident. The plausibility of management’s justifications is manipulated by
including a quote in which the defendant’s attorney justifies the company’s disclosure strategy.
Specifically, in justifying less timely disclosures, plausible justifications include allegations that
the delay was necessary to disclose accurate facts, while implausible justifications include
allegations that the delay was required to disclose accurate facts but the initial facts released
were not accurate. In contrast, in justifying less timely disclosures, plausible justifications
include allegations that the company traded-off accuracy for timeliness and that accurate

4

Correspondence is defined as “the extent that the act and the underlying characteristics or attributes are similarly
described by the inference” (Jones and Davis 1965, 223). Accordingly, in this study correspondence of inference is
operationalized as the degree to which an individual believes that behavior was intentional or unintentional.
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information was provided in subsequent disclosures, while implausible justifications include
allegations that the delay was timely and accurate, which considering the complexities of the
event may be perceived as “too good to be true”. After being provided with the case information,
participants indicate their perceived causal attributions and evaluate the company’s liability
toward the plaintiff.
I find that more (less) timely disclosures decrease (increase) jurors’ liability assessments
and weaker (stronger) assessments of causal attributions. I also find that assessments of causal
attribution mediate the relationship between disclosure timeliness and jurors' liability
assessments. However, the predicted interaction between disclosure timeliness and plausibility is
not significant. Evaluation of participants' assessments suggests that more timely disclosures
result in weaker assessments of causal attributions, regardless of the plausibility of justifications.
Moreover, in contrast with prior research that suggests that the use of remedial tactics results in
lower negligence verdicts (Cornell, Warne, and Eining 2009; Reffett 2010), the results suggest
that in the context of disclosure timeliness justifications have no such effect. Additional analysis
reveal that disclosure timeliness and participants’ preferences (for timeliness or accuracy) drives
perceptions of plausibility and that, in turn, perceived plausibility influences assessments of
causal attribution and liability.
This study has several practical implications. First, results of this study shed light on the
cost of cybersecurity disclosures and inform companies, investors, and analysts. In particular,
this study provides evidence that timely disclosures are desirable and help reduce the cost of
liability associated with cyber-attacks. Evidence from this study is particularly interesting
considering that participants have strong negative reaction to a disclosure delay of three months
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while there are known cases of longer delayed disclosures. 5 This study also informs regulators
that are currently evaluating disclosure requirements over cybersecurity. In particular, although
the findings suggest that justifications are not helpful in reducing liability assessments for
companies that delay the disclosure of cyber-attacks, the findings also indicate that jurors are
unable to detect when timely disclosures are implausible.
This study adds to the accounting literature on the use of justifications to reduce legal
liability and shows that the benefits of justifications are context specific and are not helpful in
reducing liability associated with delayed disclosures of cyber-attacks. Last, this study
contributes to the literature and theory that documents the link between disclosure timeliness and
litigation risk. In particular, this study uses an experimental approach to test and build on the
Litigation Reduction Hypothesis and help address limitations from prior archival research that
relied on various proxies for timeliness given the lack of concrete data available regarding the
timing of bad news disclosures (e.g. Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994; Skinner 1994;
Skinner 1997; Donelson, Mc Innis, Mergenthaler, and Yu 2012). An experimental setting
provides the means for a cleaner operationalization of this important variable and helps further
our understanding of the implications of disclosure timeliness, such as the link of disclosure
timeliness and perceived plausibility, causal attributions, and liability.
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. The next section includes a discussion
of the background and the theoretical motivations driving the predictions. Section III discusses
the methods, including a description of the participants, the task, and the main variables in the

5 There are known high-profile cyber-attacks for which disclosures were delayed for over a year (e.g. Yahoo, Uber).
Also, I obtained data from Audit Analytics from 169 cyber-attacks disclosed between 2007 to 2018. On average
disclosures of cyber-attacks are delayed for 55 days. The delay in disclosure range from zero (0) to 1,104 days.
About 20% of the disclosure in the data set were disclosed over 60 days after learning about the attack.
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analysis. Section IV discusses the results of the hypotheses, and additional analysis and Section
V concludes.
Background, Theory, and Hypothesis
Information Security Disclosures
The requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 for companies to establish
and maintain an adequate system of internal controls, which includes the identification and
testing of relevant information technology controls, contributed to the increased voluntary
disclosure of information security activities by organizations (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and
Sohail 2006). Research in this area shows that voluntary disclosures concerning information
security are positively associated with a company’s market value and that disclosures of
proactive security measures have the greatest impact (Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail 2010).
More recent debates about the threat of cybersecurity incidents as a national security
concern have motivated further actions from the U.S. Congress. For instance, in March 2017 the
U.S. Senate Bill 536 (2017) was introduced to create the Cybersecurity Disclosure Act of 2017.
This Act will require disclosure of cybersecurity expertise on the board of directors and the
nature of such expertise or, in the absence of this expertise in the board, companies should
disclose steps that are taken to incorporate a cybersecurity expert onto the board. Further
regulation has been enforced at the state level, such as New York State’s Cybersecurity
Requirements for Financial Service Companies (NYSDFS 2017). This regulation requires
financial service companies to implement a cybersecurity program based on the entity's
assessment of cybersecurity risks, and that is designed to detect and prevent incidents. The
regulation also requires these companies to submit a certification of compliance with the New
York State's Department of Financial Services. Companies are also required to maintain a
13

written cybersecurity policy, to appoint a CISO, to evaluate the qualifications of cybersecurity
personnel and provide relevant training, and to maintain and test relevant controls for
cybersecurity.
Despite these efforts to promote more transparency regarding how companies manage
and control cybersecurity risks and recent efforts to enforce more transparency regarding
companies’ cybersecurity practices, there is little guidance and concrete requirements regarding
disclosure of actual cybersecurity incidents. Although enforcement has not been released by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), their “Corporate Finance Disclosure Guidance:
Topic No. 2” (U.S. 2011) provides guidance on the disclosure of cybersecurity risks and
cybersecurity incidents by highlighting other mandated disclosures that may require a discussion
of cybersecurity. For instance, requirements of Regulation S-K Item 503(c) for risk factor
disclosure would apply to the disclosure of cybersecurity if the risks make an investment
speculative or risky (SEC 2011). Furthermore, cybersecurity risks or incidents should be
disclosed in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the annual report in
instances in which the costs or consequences represent a material event. The SEC also highlights
other areas for companies to determine whether disclosures are necessary, such as in the
registrant's "Description of Business," the disclosure of "Legal Proceedings" when applicable,
and as part of the disclosures to the financial statements. The SEC’s “Corporate Finance
Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2” also provides a reference to applicable accounting standards
for guidance on the proper recognition of losses and estimates in the event of a cyber incident.
Still, the guidelines furnished by the SEC do not specifically address critical aspects of the
disclosure of cybersecurity incidents, such as the timeliness of disclosures.
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Current regulatory enforcement that refers to the timeliness of disclosures is only
applicable to the disclosure of incidents that result in the breach of personally identifiable
information. This is further complicated by the fact that there is not a set of uniform compliance
requirements as associated laws are individually enacted by the states. In general, U.S.
companies are allowed to delay the disclosure of cybersecurity incidents. In most states, the
wording of data breach notification laws, as it relates to time limits and allowed reporting delays,
is ambiguous as it prompts for reasonableness at the time of selecting a disclosure strategy. For
instance, Arizona requires the disclosure to be made “in the most expedient manner possible, "
and Texas requires it "as quickly as possible." Even the compliance requirements in the state of
California, which is known for the severity of penalties regarding privacy and consumer
protection laws, do not specify time limits. To illustrate, the requirements of the article 7,
1798.29 in the California Information Practices Act of 1977 requires that “the disclosure shall be
made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the
legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision (c), or any measures necessary
to determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system.”.
Consistent with regulations from other states, California allows for delayed disclosure when this
is requested by enforcement agencies: “(c) The notification required by this section may be
delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that the notification will impede a criminal
investigation. The notification required by this section shall be made after the law enforcement
agency determines that it will not compromise the investigation”.
Disclosure Timeliness and Litigation Risk
The lack of time limit requirements for the disclosure of cybersecurity incidents creates
an opportunity for companies to strategically delay such disclosures considering the decision is,
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most of the time, at a company’s discretion. Nonetheless, unreasonable delays in disclosing
cybersecurity incidents may have significant liability implications. Prior literature on voluntary
disclosures of bad news finds that these disclosures have an impact on a company’s stock market
returns and identifies the timeliness of disclosure as a relevant factor that may explain the market
behavior (e.g., Skinner 1994). This body of literature documents the potential consequences of
delaying the disclosure of bad news and also identifies competing incentives. For instance,
sudden stock price declines on earning announcement days may lead investors to perceive that
management failed to disclose the bad earnings news promptly and this may result in litigation
and loss of reputation (Skinner 1994). Skinner (1994) argues that although timelier disclosures
may not prevent litigation, these will undercut the plaintiff arguments about management's
failure to disclose the news promptly and will result in a smaller plaintiff class as there will be
fewer investors completing transactions during the non-disclosure period. In contrast, there is
also an argument that weighs the potential incentives for managers to delay the disclosure of bad
news due to career concerns (e.g., performance-based compensation tied to annual results) or
given concerns about disruptions in operations (e.g., impact on seasonal sales).
There is archival evidence supporting the legal liability argument about managers'
incentive to pre-disclose bad news early. Skinner (1994) reported that companies voluntarily
disclose bad news to a greater extent than good news which suggests that management prediscloses bad news to alleviate liability concerns. This finding is consistent with subsequent
research that revealed that managers have a strong tendency to pre-disclose bad news and that
more timely disclosures of bad earnings news resulted in lower settlement amounts (Skinner
1997). Similarly, evidence from a sample of securities class-action lawsuits disclosing bad news
showed that more timely disclosure of bad news deterred litigation (Donelson et al. 2012).
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Despite the apparent evidence suggesting that managers have an incentive to pre-disclose bad
earnings, there is conflicting evidence that contradicts the liability argument for voluntary
disclosure of bad news given a lack of evidence that companies disclose bad earnings news
before the formal earnings announcement date (Francis at al. 1994).
In this study, I draw on the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis (LRH) to develop baseline
expectations regarding the impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’ liability assessments.
Skinner’s (1994, 1997) LRH uses two main arguments to establish that timelier disclosures
reduce expected legal costs. First, the LRH explains that timelier disclosures shorten the
nondisclosure period and result in a smaller class period. This suggests that there is an economic
component to the relationship between disclosure timeliness and litigation risk and that a larger
economic impact, given the size of the class period, results in higher litigation risk. Second, LRH
explains that timelier disclosures weaken arguments regarding management's failure to disclose
on time. This second component of the relationship between disclosure timeliness and litigation
risk suggests there is a process by which individuals assign blame or responsibility and that this,
in turn, influences the assessment of a company’s legal liability. Thus, LRH posits that,
regardless of the context of the lawsuit and the arguments of the plaintiff (e.g., regardless of the
motivations for the lawsuit), disclosure timeliness will influence jurors’ liability assessments.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to a greater (lower)
likelihood that jurors will find the company liable.
Causal Attribution and Generalization of Inferences
To complement the assumptions of LRH, Jones and Davis’ (1965) CIT develops
additional expectations that aid in better understanding the relationship between disclosure
timeliness and litigation risk as depicted in Figure 1. CIT is a theory within the body of
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attribution theories which describes two conditions in the inference process: the assumptions
about the actor's (1) knowledge and (2) ability to execute an action. These two conditions help an
individual judge whether an act was intentional or whether it was accidental or incidental (also
referred to as internal or external attributions, respectively). Correspondence is defined as “the
extent that the act and the underlying characteristic or attribute are similarly described by the
inference” (Jones and Davis 1965, 223). For instance, in the context of delayed disclosure of bad
news, the most correspondent inference may be that which assumes with high confidence that the
delayed disclosure is a result of the inherent uncertainty of the event (external attribution).
Alternatively, the most correspondent inference may be that which assumes with high confidence
that the delayed disclosure is a result of management’s intention to behave opportunistically
(internal attribution). In this study, the term causal attribution refers to a participant’s
correspondence of inference about the cause of behavior, such that if a behavior is perceived as
intentional (incidental or accidental) the assessment of causal attribution will be higher (lower).
CIT posits that individuals make inferences based on expectations about the behavior of
an average person in the same circumstances and that in the existence of competing explanations
(intentions) for behavior, an individual will indicate extreme confidence in the causal attribution
when one of the intentions is perceived to be much more likely than others (Jones and Davis
1965). I argue that perceiving the delayed disclosure of a cybersecurity incident as an intentional
act is more than likely. Prior research shows that managers have career incentives to obfuscate
the disclosure of bad news and to strategically time such disclosures (Kothari, Li, and Short
2009). Moreover, the delayed disclosures of high-profile cybersecurity incidents, such as the
Target and Neiman Marcus data breaches, have been highlighted in media articles and the media

18

suggests that these disclosures may have been strategically timed to maintain sales over the
holiday’s season (e.g., Freifeld 2014).
Consistent with CIT, in the context of delayed disclosures, I argue that jurors will
perceive the plaintiff inferences as highly correspondent with the company’s behavior and will
assume with high confidence that the delayed disclosure is a result of management’s intention to
behave opportunistically. Accordingly, I expect that less timely disclosures will lead to extreme
assessments of causal attribution. Besides, CIT establishes that if the consequences of an act are
positive (negative), a perceiver will have more favorable (unfavorable) dispositions toward the
actor. Accordingly, I argue that causal attributions should mediate the relationship between
disclosure timeliness and liability assessments, such that stronger (weaker) jurors’ assessments of
causal attribution will increase (decrease) jurors’ liability assessments. Based on the above
discussion, the second set of hypotheses are stated as:
H2a: Less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to stronger (weaker)
jurors’ assessments of causal attribution.
H2b: Jurors liability assessments will increase (decrease) as jurors’ assessment of causal
attribution is stronger (weaker).
The Plausibility of Justifications
Considering the complexity of cybersecurity incidents and the challenges that companies
face to be able to disclosure accurate and comprehensive information on a timely manner, I argue
that companies may be able to use remedial tactics to mitigate the potential negative impact of
their disclosure strategy. The literature on the use of justifications for reducing jurors' liability
assessments suggests that jurors are less likely to issue negligence verdicts when the defendant
apologizes or uses first-person justifications as a remedial tactic (Cornell et al. 2009). Prior
literature suggests that remedial tactics may be used to mitigate the negative impact of jurors’
affective reactions toward negative outcome information (Reffett 2010). Nevertheless, this
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literature also highlights that the use of remedial tactics is only effective when they are perceived
as credible (Grenier, Pomeroy, and Reffett 2012). Grenier et al. (2012) studied the credibility of
remedial tactics by manipulating the source of internal inspections used as remedial tactics in
cases of undetected fraud. The broader theoretical concept of interest is the plausibility of the
justifications as a source of credibility.
Plausibility refers to “the credibility or believability of an assertion within the context of
a larger argument” (Mitroff and Mason 1983, 199). Prior research suggests that companies’
stakeholders are able to identify instances in which management uses self-serving disclosure and
blame poor performance on external factors (Barton and Mercer 2005; Kimbrough and Wang
2014). Specifically, Barton and Mercer (2005) in an experimental study found that plausible
explanations result in higher analyst’s earnings forecast while implausible explanations harm
management reputation and result in lower earnings forecast. Moreover, using archival data,
Kimbrough and Wang (2014) document that investors use consensus industry and companyspecific information to assess the plausibility of management explanations and that companies
that provide implausible (plausible) explanations experience significant market penalties
(rewards).
From a theory perspective, Kelley's (1973) attribution theory (that extends CIT) explains
that one’s internal causes (desirable behaviors) are discounted when there is high external
justification for an action. Thus, a plausible justification about a company’s disclosure strategy
should moderate the impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’ assessments of causal attribution
such that a plausible justification mitigates the negative impact of less timely disclosure. In
contrast, an implausible justification should “backfire” and lead to stronger negative assessments
of causal attribution (Barton and Mercer 2005). This leads to the third hypothesis:
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H3: The plausibility of justifications moderates the strength of the effect of the timeliness
of disclosure on jurors’ assessment of causal attribution, such that implausible (plausible)
justifications lead to stronger (weaker) jurors’ assessment of causal attribution.
Methods
This study employs a 2 x 3 experimental design in which the timeliness of the disclosure
(more timely versus less timely) and the plausibility of management’s justification for the
company’s disclosure strategy (plausible, implausible, and no justifications) is manipulated
between-participants. Using a sample of jury-eligible participants as a proxy for jurors, I test
whether the timeliness of disclosures and the plausibility of justifications impact jurors perceived
causal attribution and liability assessments.
Participants
To test the hypotheses, participants that represent jury-eligible individuals who represent
eligible jurors in an actual court case similar to that used in the experiment are desired. As such, I
recruited 168 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 6 Prior research using
MTurk workers have found them to be a good proxy for actual jurors (Grenier, Pomeroy, Stern
2014; Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2015; Grenier, Lowe, Reffett, and Warne 2015; Brasel et
al. 2016; Maksymov and Nelson 2017). Research generally finds that MTurk workers are
demographically diverse and are a source of reliable data (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis
2010; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011). Screening procedures were conducted to assure
participants meet basic criteria for juror eligibility such as being at least 18 years of age and a

6

The desired sample size was 180 (30 participants per cell) participants. To achieve equal cell sizes, the Qualtrics
survey was set-up to randomly assign participants to one of the six experimental conditions and a quota was set-up
in Qualtrics to stop collecting data once the desired cell-size was achieved for each experimental condition. There
were 432 attempts to complete this study. From the 432 attempts, there were 168 usable responses (28 per cell), 95
incomplete surveys, 82 surveys in which participants failed to meet the qualification criteria, 55incomplete surveys
given that participants failed to pass the review questions, and 32 surveys with either a duplicate IP address or Mturk
ID.

21

United States citizen. Also, Grenier, Reffett, Simon, and Warne (2017) encourage the use of
additional screening to ensure that the participants are appropriate. Thus, additional screening
excluded participants that may have a potential bias toward the case facts including participants
that have worked for an insurance company or health provider, lawyers or employees in a law
firm, and individuals that have suffered financial loss due to identity theft.
Participants were compensated $2.50 for completing the 20 to 25 minutes task 7; however,
only those that answer all the review questions (including the attention check question)
accurately were allowed to complete the study. Access to the experimental materials is restricted
to avoid duplicate responses from the same Mturk ID and the same IP address to alleviate issues
of repeated participation (Arnold and Triki 2017). 8 As an additional control measure for the
quality of the participant pool, only MTurk workers with the “Masters” 9 designation were
recruited for this study.
On average, participants are 29 to 38 years old, with slightly liberal political views, and
full-time employed. About 52 percent of the participants are female, 99 percent of participants
have at least a high school degree and about 50 percent of the participants have at least a
bachelor’s degree. About 17 percent of the participants have previously served on a jury, 16
percent of participants have been a victim of a cybersecurity attack, and 50 percent of the
participants have made personal investments in the common stock of a company.

7

Compensation is deemed reasonable, considering MTurk workers’ average wage of $3.00 (Rennekamp, Rupar, and
Seybert 2015).
8
Consistent with suggestions provided by Arnold and Triki (2017), a reminder about the importance of scientific
research was also be presented to discourage participants from participating a second time.
9
MTurk “Masters” have higher approval rates and low number of abandoned HITs (Farrell et al. 2017).
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Task
The experimental materials follow the format used in prior research examining jurors’
assessment of auditor’s liability. Specifically, consistent with Brasel et al. (2016), participants
are first provided background information to educate them on disclosures of cybersecurity risks
and practices along with review questions on the material. 10 Participants subsequently received
general information about the defendant, Aplus Insurance, which is portrayed as a successful and
leading health and well-being company headquartered in California, together with general case
facts, such as the date of the data breach, the date the company became aware of the breach, the
extent of the breach, the impact of the breach on the company’s stock price, and information
about an investigation announced by the SEC into the timing of the breach disclosure. 11
After the provision of summarized case facts, I present the case allegations and the
defendant’s arguments. The allegations against the defendant resemble those that Yahoo is
currently facing. Specifically, the plaintiff arguments claim that the defendant made false and
misleading statements by failing to disclose the lack of appropriate encryption of its customers’
information. Participants are also informed that the plaintiff presented evidence to support their
allegations, which shows that the lack of encryption was not disclosed, and that the timeliness of
the disclosure is brought as an allegation of negligence, as it took them eight months to uncover
the breach and an additional three months to disclose the breach (only for the not-timely
condition). Participants are informed about the defense arguments and evidence provided about

10

Brasel et al. (2015) also provide background information on additional concepts, such as material misstatements,
reasonable assurance, auditor negligence, critical audit matters, and due professional care, relevant to their study.
However, my experimental materials are adapted to fit the context of this study such that only background
information about financial statements and additional information regarding cybersecurity is presented to
participants.
11
Participants are informed that the attacker gained access to personal information from customers and employees,
such as names, birthdays, social security numbers, street addresses, email addresses, and employment information.
This is consistent with information frequently targeted by attackers.
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actions taken to notify about the breach and to protect affected customers and employees. Also,
as part of the arguments from the defense, the defendant’s apologies are displayed followed by
the defendant’s justification for the timeliness of the disclosure. After receiving the judge’s
instructions, participants are required to answer case questions and to complete a demographics’
survey. The case materials were subjected to review and validation by a lawyer with experience
in this area of business law.
Independent Variables

The first independent variable is the timeliness of the disclosure. Timeliness is
operationalized as the difference between the date when the company learned of the breach and
the date the breach was disclosed. Participants are informed about the timeliness of the
disclosure when provided with the case facts and the arguments from the plaintiff. Participants in
the more timely condition are notified that the company disclosed the incident in three days,
while in the less timely conditions participants are notified that the company disclosed the
incident in three months.
The second independent variable is plausibility. Plausibility is operationalized as the
extent to which the defendant’s attorney justifications are more or less plausible. As illustrated in
Figure 2, this variable is manipulated at three levels: 1) plausible, 2) implausible, and 3) no
justification. Given that the plausibility of an assertion is assessed within the context of a larger
argument (Mitroff and Mason 1983), I operationalize plausibility in the context of other relevant
case facts and manipulate the accuracy of management disclosures between-subjects to build
plausible and implausible conditions. 12 Specifically, given that the case facts state that the

12

The company, industry, the details about the company’s financial condition, and facts about the breach, such as
the economic impact and the breach data and discovery date, are fixed between participants. This is consistent with
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breach was discovered eight months after the event, it is plausible that the investigation would be
complicated and will impede companies’ ability to release accurate information about the impact
of the breach in a timely manner. In justifying less timely disclosures, plausible justifications
include allegations that the delay was necessary to disclose comprehensive and accurate
information about the extent of the breach. In contrast, implausible justifications for less timely
disclosures, include allegations that the delay was required to disclose all relevant facts but also a
caveat to notify that it was later determined that the magnitude of the incident was greater than
what was initially disclosed. Participants in the less timely condition are also presented with a
timeline of the disclosure timelines that shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to
disclose a cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude and argues that the disclosure was made
44 days later than the average disclosure.
Plausible justifications for more timely disclosures include allegations that the company
released the news in a timely manner to notify customers and employees about the breach, so
they could take actions to protect their identities, and that accurate facts were subsequently
disclosed. In contrast, implausible justifications for timely disclosures take the position that the
breach was disclosed promptly and that all the facts released were accurate. Considering the
complexity of the event and that it went unnoticed for eight months, the timely and accurate
release of information may be perceived as “too good to be true.” Also, participants in the timely
condition are presented with a timeline of the disclosure timelines that shows that on average, it
takes 47 days for a company to disclose a cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude and argues
that the disclosure was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure. See Figure 3 for details.
Prior research suggests that it is difficult for unsophisticated users to detect when companies

Barton and Mercer’s (2005) operationalization of plausibility in which they manipulated the location of an incident
to convey a plausible and an implausible condition.
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behave opportunistically (Koonce, Williamson, and Winchel 2010). Similarly, jurors may be
unable to detect implausible explanations on their own, and the plaintiff may need to highlight
such allegations. Thus, within each experimental condition I include an argument in which the
plaintiff implies that the justifications provided by the defendant are not plausible.
Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable of interest is the jurors' liability assessments. In this study,
the primary measure of liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant
liable using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “extremely unlikely” (equal to 1) to
“extremely likely” (equal to 7). 13
The second dependent variable is causal attribution. Causal attribution represents the
participants’ level of confidence in their assessment of causal attribution. The measure of causal
attributions is adapted from Koonce et al. (2010). In assessing the causal attribution, participants
are first informed about two potential reasons for the timing of the disclosure: 1) that the delay
was caused by the company’s intent to strategically disclose the cyber-attack to portray the
company in a favorable light, or 2) that the delay was caused by the company’s difficulty in
estimating the extent of the breach due to the inherent uncertainty of the event. Then, participants
are required to assess the causal attribution using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from
“completely incidental” (equal to 1) to “completely intentional” (equal to 7) and then to indicate
their level of confidence in their assessment using a 7-point, fully labeled, confidence scale that
ranges from “not confident at all” (equal to 1) to “very confident” (equal to 7). Causal attribution

13

Eutsler and Lang (2015) find that a fully labeled 7-point scale provides the greatest benefits to researchers. They
argue that labeling results in many benefits, such as reduced response bias, maximization of variance, maximization
of power, and minimization of error. They provide evidence that variance is maximized when using 7-point scales.
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then equals the points allocated to the causal attribution question times the participant’s level of
confidence in their assessment. 14
Results
Manipulation Checks and Review Questions
To test the effectiveness of the manipulation of disclosure timeliness, I ask participants about
their agreement with the following statement: "Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach in a timely
manner.”15 I find that participants in the timely condition (mean=5.71) agree to a greater extent
that Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach in a timely manner, (F=236.800, p<0.001) compared to
participants in the not timely condition (mean=2.07). In addition, to test the manipulation of
plausibility, I ask participants about their agreement with the following two statements: “Aplus
Insurance’s justification for the timing of the disclosure is credible” and “Aplus Insurance’s
justification for the timing of the disclosure is believable”. I find that participants in the not
timely/not plausible condition perceived justifications as less plausible (mean=2.89) that
participants in the not timely/plausible condition (mean=3.125) but the difference between
conditions is not statistically significant. Likewise, participants in the timely/plausible condition
assessed justificantions as more plausible (mean=5.375) than participants in the timely/not
plausible condition (5.214) but the difference between groups is not statistically significant. This
analysis suggest that participants perceived timely disclosures as more plausible and less timely
disclosures as less plausible, regardless of the context of justifications (plausible/implausible)
manipulated between participants.

14

The measure of causal attribution is scaled by seven (7) to use 7-point scales in the analysis consistently.

15

The participants use a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” (equal to 1) to “strongly agree” (equal
to 7).
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Testing of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
H1 predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to a
greater (lower) likelihood that jurors will find the company liable. Panel A of Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for the participant's liability assessments. I tested H1 using analysis of
variance (ANOVA), and the results are tabulated in Panel B of Table 1.
As indicated in Table 1, I find support for the hypothesized relationship between
disclosure timeliness and liability assessments. Consistent the predictions, liability assessments
are lower in the timely condition than in the not timely condition (F=28.161, p<0.001). Two
additional measures of liability assessments are also captured. The first measures a juror’s
verdict, which is a dichotomous variable equal to one (1) if participants assess the defendant as
liable, and that otherwise equals zero (0). The second measures the percentage of imposed
damages on the company after the participant is informed that a majority of the jury found the
company liable and therefore a determination of damages to be awarded needs to be made. The
amount of potential damages to be awarded ranges from zero (0) percent to one-hundred (100)
percent of the $10 Billion alleged loss. The result of the ANOVA (untabulated) using the two
additional measures of liability assessments are qualitatively similar and consistent with the
results of the main analysis.
Hypothesis 2
H2a predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to
stronger (weaker) jurors’ assessments of causal attribution. I present descriptive statistics for
participants’ assessments of causal attribution in Panel A of Table 2. The results of the analysis
of variance (ANOVA), tabulated in Panel B of Table 2, support the hypothesized relationship
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and indicate that delayed disclosure of a cyber-attack lead to stronger jurors assessments of
causal attribution (F=42.118, p<0.001).
H2b predicts that jurors’ liability assessments will increase (decrease) as jurors’
assessments of causal attribution are stronger (weaker). Results of the mediation analysis,
following Hayes (2017) process analysis are tabulated in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3. 16 As
shown in Panel A of Table 3, I find a positive and significant relationship between delayed
disclosures and assessment of causal attribution (t=2.541, p=0.060) and between assessments of
causal attribution and liability assessments (t=8.506, p<0.001). Moreover, inspection of bootstrap
confidence intervals for the analysis of indirect effects, included in Panel B of Table 3, confirms
the hypothesized mediation. 17
Hypothesis 3
H3 predicts that the plausibility of justifications moderates the strength of the effect of
the timeliness of disclosure on jurors’ beliefs about a company’s intention to act
opportunistically, such that implausible (plausible) justifications lead to stronger (weaker) jurors’
beliefs about a company’s intention to act opportunistically. I present descriptive statistics for
participants’ assessments of causal attribution in Panel A of Table 2. As shown in Panel B of
Table 2 and Panel B and Panel C of Table 3, the results of ANOVA (F=0.128, p=0.440) and
conditional Process analysis (t=-0.082, p=0.467) does not support the predicted interaction
between disclosure timeliness and plausibility of justifications.

16

I use Hayes (2017) Process model 7 to test moderated mediation.
The analysis of bootstrap confidence interval does not include zero which denotes statistical significance (Hayes
2017).
17
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Additional Analysis
Perceived Plausibility
Given the results, I conducted additional analysis to examine whether an ANOVA would
be feasible by creating an alternative binary variable using the median cut-off of participants
perceived plausibility. The analysis results in cell-sizes of 40 participants in the timely-plausible
condition and 43 participants in the non-timely-implausible condition. In contrast, there are only
16 participants in the timely-implausible and 13 participants in the non-timely-plausible
condition. The results suggest that disclosure timeliness is driving participants’ perceived
plausibility. The results of Chi-square test of independence are statistically significant (Chisquare=25.016, p<0.001) and confirm that perceptions of timeliness and plausibility are not
independent.
Mercer’s discussion of the impact of inherent plausibility on the credibility of
management disclosures suggest that perceived plausibility is not objective and may not be
necessarily related to the actual plausibility or credibility of a disclosure. In contrast, Mercer
suggests that perceived plausibility depends on the extent to which information deviates from
expectations and prior believes. As such. I conducted additional analysis to determine whether
disclosure timeliness and jurors’ preferences impact perceived plausibility and, in turn, jurors’
assessments of causal attribution and liability. In particular, I collected data about participants’
preference for accuracy (Prefer_Accuracy). Participants indicated their agreement with the
following statement: “Aplus Insurance’s should have emphasized more on disclosing
comprehensive and accurate information about the cyber-attack than in disclosing the
information on a timely manner”. Then, I conducted mediation analysis using disclosure
timeliness as the independent variable, plausibility, preference for accuracy, and the interaction
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of plausibility and preference for accuracy with timeliness as covariates, perceived plausibility
and causal attribution as mediators, and liability assessment as the dependent variable.
Descriptive statistics reveal that on average, participants have more preference for
timeliness than for accuracy (mean=3.74). As shown in Panel A of Table 4 and as illustrated in
Figure 4, I find that delayed disclosures and preference for accuracy lead to lower assessments of
plausibility (t=-6.368, p<0.001 and t=-2.598, p=0.005, respectively). However, evidence of a
negative and statistically significant interaction (t=5.245, p<0.001) between preference for
accuracy and timeliness (delayed disclosures) confirms that participants preferences drive
perceptions of plausibility. Specifically, this significant interaction suggests that participants in
the more timely condition with higher preference for accuracy, over timeliness, perceived
justifications as more plausible. The analysis also shows that higher perceptions of plausibility
lead to lower assessments of causal attribution (t=-11.543, p<0.001). However, in contrast with
the results of the main analysis, the relationship between causal attribution and liability
assessments is only marginally significant (t=1.268, p=0.103). This finding, together with
evidence from bootstrap analysis, as shown in Panel B of Table 4, suggest that the impact of
timeliness on liability assessments is mediated by jurors’ perceptions of justifications
plausibility.
Perceived Timeliness
I collected additional data to capture how participants beliefs and expectations influence
their perceptions of timeliness. First, I developed a four-item formative construct to capture
participants’ perceptions that delayed disclosures of cyber-attacks are acceptable
(Delay_Acceptable). Using 7-point scales participants indicated their agreement with the
following statements: 1) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the
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increased sophistication of hacking techniques”, 2) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is
acceptable given the complexity of determining the scope of the breach”, 3) “delaying the
disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations”, 4) “delaying the
disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable even when there is loss of identifiable information from
customers and employees”. 18 Principal components analysis (PCA) confirms that all items load
on the same construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978). Moreover, I
confirmed that the VIF is below 3.3 (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006) for all items. 19 As such,
I use the average value of the four items as a single Delay_Acceptable measure for the analysis.
Moreover, to capture participants perceptions of companies’ incentives to delay disclosure
(Delay_Incentive) participants indicated their agreement with the following statement:
“managers have more incentives to disclose bad news on a timely basis than incentives to delay
the disclosure of bad news”.
Evaluation of the single items individually and the Delay_Acceptable formative construct
reveal that the timeliness of disclosure is driving participants’ perceptions that delayed
disclosures of cyber-attacks are acceptable and perceptions of companies’ incentives to delay
disclosure. Specifically, timely disclosures lead to higher assessments that delayed disclosures
are acceptable (mean=3.714) and that companies have more incentives to disclose bad news on a
timely basis (mean=4.024), compared to delayed disclosures with means of 2.632 and 2.940,
respectively. Although the additional data was collected to explore other potential determinants
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I developed this construct with formative items. In contrast with reflective constructs, in a formative construct
causality flows from the items to the construct (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). The four items included
measure whether delayed disclosures in the context of cybersecurity breaches are acceptable based on context
specific complexities of cyber-attacks or personal preferences.
19
For formative constructs, Petter, Strub, and Rai (2007) suggest using PCA, rather than traditional EFA, to assess
construct validity and to assess collinearity (i.e., VIF < 3.3) to evaluate the construct's reliability.
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of perceived timeliness, Chi-square test of independence (untabulated) is significant and shows
that disclosure timeliness is not independent from perceptions that delayed disclosures of cyberattacks are acceptable (Chi-square=37.55, p=0.021) and perceptions of companies’ incentives to
delay disclosure (Chi-square=19.222, p=.004).
Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of disclosure timeliness and the
plausibility of management justifications on assessments of causal attribution and liability. I
predict and find that more timely disclosure lead to more favorable assessments of causal
attribution and liability and that assessments of causal attribution mediates the relationship
between disclosure timeliness and liability. However, I was unable to find evidence that the use
of justifications (plausible or implausible) help reduce liability.
This study has relevant implications for companies, investors, and analysts interested in
understanding the cost of cybersecurity. In particular, the findings of this study suggest that a
company’s forthcomingness in disclosing the breach, even without disclosing all the facts, could
help reduce the liability associated with cybersecurity breaches. Studying the cost of litigation in
the context of cyber-security is pertinent considering that post data breach costs, including legal
expenditures, represent one of the main cost drivers of cybersecurity incidents in the U.S.
(Ponemon 2018). Having a broader understanding of the cost of cybersecurity could help
companies to manage their cyber-risks effectively and help inform analysts and non-professional
investors decisions. Also, this study provides evidence that suggests that jurors have difficulty
assessing when justifications are plausible and implausible, and as such, justifications could be
used opportunistically by companies trying to reduce their litigation risk. This finding is relevant
for regulators and standard setters interested in promoting timely disclosure of cybersecurity.
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This study also add to the literature on the use of remedial tactics to reduce litigation and
provide evidence that such remedial tactics are not necessarily useful in reducing liability
associated with delayed disclosure of cyber-attacks. Moreover, this study contributes to theory
via the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis by developing and testing a more comprehensive model
for explaining jurors’ judgment and decisions making (JDM) processes. Specifically, I provide
evidence of the significant influence of disclosure timeliness and perceived plausibility, based on
participants beliefs and preferences, on assessments of causal attribution leading to final liability
assessments.
The results should be evaluated in light of the inherent limitations. For instance, a
limitation in studying the cost of litigation, using jurors’ liability assessments, is that many times
the plaintiff and the company try to reach a settlement. However, it is still important to study
jurors’ judgment and decision making given that the settlement outcomes are many times
influenced by the potential outcomes of jury trial (Maksymov, Pickerd, Lowe, Peecher, and
Reffett 2017). Moreover, it is possible that the results of this study may not be generalized to
other type of participants, such as investors and analysts, given the differences in background
and knowledge and individual preferences. As such, future research could explore the impact of
disclosure timeliness in other contexts, such as judgments and decisions of financial statement
users.
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STUDY TWO: INVESTORS’ JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS AFTER A
CYBERSECURITY BREACH: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE RELEVANCE OF
CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE
Introduction
Cyber-breaches have drawn increased scrutiny due to their increasing frequency and
magnitude of occurrence, and the associated financial impact on companies and investors. In
response to these concerns, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is
proposing new voluntary assurance services to address the information needs of users regarding
company’s cybersecurity activities and aiming to standardize associated reporting frameworks.
Because use of the proposed services and the associated framework developed by the AICPA is
voluntary, organizations’ decision to engage in cybersecurity risk management assurance (CRM)
is primarily risk-based. The AICPA acknowledges that it is the organization and its stakeholders
who would drive the adoption of these services (AICPA 2017a). Prior research suggests that
companies’ underinvestment in cybersecurity may be a result of limited evidence regarding the
benefits of such investments (Gordon, Loeb, Lycyshyn, Zhou 2015b). Consequently, this study
answers a call for research by the AICPA (AAA 2017) to better understand the cost of cybersecurity breaches, users’ associated information needs, and how and why CRM assurance may
be feasible and desirable for an organization.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, I examine whether knowledge about a firm’s
engagement in voluntary CRM assurance, prior to a cyber-breach, affects non-professional
investors’ judgments and decisions, after the breach. Second, I investigate whether the changes
in investors’ judgments and decisions differ in magnitude depending on whether CRM assurance
violates or conforms to industry norms. Although prior accounting research that explore the
benefits of voluntary assurance document greater stock price assessments (Brown-Liburd and
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Zamora 2014) and lower cost of capital (Dhaliwal, Zhen Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011), some
studies suggest that the benefits of assurance are context specific and are only significant when
the assured information is positive (Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff 2009) and relevant to the
company (Cheng, Green, and Chi Wa Ko 2015). Thus, the value relevance of voluntary
assurance in the context of cybersecurity is a very different proposition given that cyberbreaches, to some degree, are believed to be unavoidable. As such, I aim to explore whether the
benefits of voluntary assurance hold in the context of CRM assurance when assurance fails to
prevent liability. Moreover, in contrast with recent research that explores the effect of joint or
separate provisioning of CRM assurance and cyber-breaches on investors’ willingness to invest
(Perols and Murthy 2018), I take a step back and assess the value relevance of voluntary CRM
assurance in isolation by exploring investors’ decision behavior given the presence or absence of
assurance in light of market expectations.
The theoretical underpinnings for this study are drawn from Wallace’s (1980) work on
the economic demand for audits in free markets and the associated Insurance Hypothesis. The
Insurance Hypothesis posits that the demand for audit services is driven by their use as a tool to
manage a company's liability exposure. Drawing on the Insurance Hypothesis, I predict that
CRM assurance is positively associated with investors' valuation judgments. Moreover,
consistent with prior studies on investor judgment and decision making, I also predict that
assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of CRM assurance on investors’
valuation judgments.
A fundamental aspect affecting the value of assurance that is not captured in the
voluntary assurance literature is the market expectations for assurance which may differ based on
industry norms or other such characteristics creating expectations. Thus, I draw on Expectancy
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Violations Theory (EVT) in predicting that the relationship between CRM assurance and
assessments of management credibility will be stronger when expectations of a company
engaging in assurance services are violated (do not conform to industry norms). Specifically, I
predict that investors’ assessments of management credibility will be more favorable for
companies that engage in voluntary CRM assurance and are not expected to do so compared to
companies that engage in voluntary CRM assurance as expected. In contrast, investors’
assessments of management credibility will be less favorable for companies that do not engage in
voluntary assurance and are expected to do so compared to companies that do not engage in
voluntary assurance, but for which this is the norm.
I test the predictions using a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment in which participants are
required to make valuation judgments and to assess the credibility of management after a cyberbreach. The independent variables of interest are the presence or absence of CRM assurance and
the expectancies regarding whether the company should engage in CRM assurance. Specifically,
the presence of assurance is manipulated by informing participants that the company has a CRM
program in place and operating effectively, and that the company engaged in voluntary assurance
over their CRM program and received a clean opinion from the auditors. In contrast, participants
in the no-assurance condition are informed that, although the company has not engaged in
assurance over their CRM program, the company has a CRM program in place and operating
effectively. 20 Moreover, the expectation on whether the company should engage in CRM
assurance is operationalized by informing participants that engagement in CRM assurance is
expected or not expected based on the behavior of other companies in the same industry. To test
the predictions, participants assess the company’s stock price value and management’s

20

This design is chosen after examining the trend of current cyber-breach disclosures. We noted that companies
usually disclose that they have controls in place and operating effectively.
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competence and trustworthiness (the two components of management credibility documented in
prior research (e.g., Clor-Proell 2009; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; Rennekamp 2012)).
Consistent with the predictions, I find that voluntary CRM assurance, prior to the
occurrence of a cyber-breach, results in more favorable investor valuation judgments after a
cyber-breach is disclosed. I also find that this relation is mediated by management credibility
assessments. The results also support the predicted moderated mediation and provide evidence
that the indirect effect of assurance on valuation judgments, through assessments of management
credibility, is conditional on whether firms’ practices violate or conform-to-expectancies.
Additional analyses explore how investors’ perceived benefits of assurance-as-insurance
(AAI) and perceived accountants’ cyber-expertise (ACE) impact investors’ decision behavior. I
find that the direct effect of CRM assurance is associated with higher valuation judgments only
when users perceived higher benefits of AAI. Moreover, I find that expectancy violations only
influence decision behavior for participants that perceived higher accountants’ cyber-expertise.
Using additional data collected to explore the impact of disclosure of companies’ cyber-risk
management practices, I find that investors reward (penalize) companies with (without) formal
CRM programs in place.
This study has several relevant practical implications. The AICPA is promoting the use of
the Trust Services Framework and Criteria, which was recently updated to address cyber-risk
management, and is encouraging accounting professionals to use this framework to provide
voluntary assurance over CRM. However, prior efforts in promoting similar voluntary assurance
services, such as the WebTrust seal of assurance, have largely failed or as in the case of SysTrust
morphed into primarily internal services for management (i.e., SOC II reports). As such, a more
in-depth understanding of the potential reaction by investors to new assurance services over an
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entity’s cybersecurity activities is timely in providing additional evidence to the AICPA that may
assist in maximizing the benefit of their cybersecurity initiatives. Moreover, the results of this
study provide evidence of the perceived value of CRM assurance and shed light on the need for
and benefit of such assurance. This evidence informs regulators (such as the SEC) and financial
statement stakeholders, trying to promote further disclosure and assurance over companies’
cyber-risk practices (AAA 2017; AICPA 2017a; Cohn 2018). The findings of the study suggest
that organizations’ stakeholders may be able to drive the demand for voluntary CRM assurance,
particularly if voluntary CRM assurance becomes expected for specific industries. As such, to
create the demand that justifies the cost of voluntary CRM assurance the profession may need to
effectively market and promote SOC II and III CRM assurance services.
This study contributes to the literature on investor judgment and decision making.
Specifically, this study addresses investors’ judgments and decisions after cyber-breaches and
adds context to the archival literature on cybersecurity events by aiding in understanding the
underlying drivers behind investors decision-making. For instance, this study provides evidence
that, in general, market participants value voluntary CRM assurance-as-insurance but the extent
of the impact of CRM assurance depends on investors’ perceived benefits of assurance-asinsurance and perceived cyber-expertise of auditors. Moreover, although prior research addresses
investors’ reactions to other types of negative news, these studies generally limit their focus to
disclosures of negative financial performance (e.g., bad earnings news). In contrast, using the
context of non-financial disclosures (such as cyber-breaches) sheds light on the factors likely
driving market reaction towards other types of negative events and disasters.
I also add to the literature and theory that documents the demand for voluntary assurance
(Wallace 1980). This study contributes to theory by examining Wallace’s (1980) insurance
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hypothesis within the investor JDM context. The context of this study enables testing of the
insurance hypothesis and supports this theorized explanation of the demand for voluntary
assurance in high litigation risk settings. Moreover, this study further contributes to theory by
integrating EVT into the theoretical model underlying the insurance hypothesis. The theoretical
model developed in this study highlight the role of market expectancies, based on industry
norms, in explaining the magnitude of demand for voluntary assurance
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background
and explains the theoretical motivations driving the predictions. Section III discuss the methods
by providing a description of the participants, the task, and the main variables in the analysis.
Section IV discusses the results of the hypotheses, and additional analysis and Section V
concludes.
Background, Theory, and Hypothesis
The Cost of Cybersecurity Breaches
The incidence of cybersecurity incidents during the late 1990s and early 2000s and the
conflicting views of their economic impact motivated early event studies to determine the cost of
security breaches. Some of these event studies examine the impact of specific types of attacks,
(such as Ettredge and Richardson 2003), while other studies consider a broader set of incidents
(e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou 2003 and Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2004).
Ettredge and Richardson (2003) focused on a single event, the DOS attack of internet companies
in 2000, to study the market reaction to cybersecurity incidents. Interestingly, they found that
there was an adverse market reaction toward companies that were attacked but also toward
similar companies (within the same industry and size) that were not attacked. Other evidence
gathered in the late 1990s from US corporations that disclosed an information security breach
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suggest that there is a negative stock market reaction to cybersecurity incidents in general
(Campbell et al. 2003). However, further analysis revealed that the negative market reaction was
only associated with breaches that involved unauthorized access to confidential data (Campbell
et al. 2003). The findings provide evidence that the nature of an event is a relevant piece of
information for market participants. Those results are consistent with the results of Cavusoglu et
al. (2004). Cavusoglu et al. (2004) reported an average 2.1 percent decrease in companies'
market value within the two days surrounding the disclosure of a data breach. Additional crosssectional analysis revealed that smaller companies and internet companies were more penalized
than their counterparts and that the significant adverse market impact had been increasing over
the years.
To reconcile mixed findings reported in early event studies regarding the impact of cybersecurity
incidents on stock market returns and to explore a potential shift of investors' assessments over
time, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011) analyzed evidence of stock returns over the 1995-2007
period. This study confirmed prior findings of significant negative stock market returns for
companies that experienced a security breach, regardless of the type of breach. Also, their study
found evidence of a downward shift in the impact of security breaches on stock market returns
following the 9/11/2001 attacks. Two possible explanations may explain this downward shift:
"1) more effective remediation and disaster recovery and 2) a perceived decrease in the tendency
of customers to refrain from doing business with companies experiencing an information security
breach" (Gordon et al. 2011, 33).
Cyber-risk Management
Concerns about the continued growth of cybersecurity incidents and the perceived failure
of companies to adequately invest in cybersecurity, motivated the early accounting research on
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cyber-risk management. These events and concerns lead to the development of economic
models to determine the optimal investment in information security. For instance, the Gordon
and Loeb (2002) model was developed to determine the optimal level of investment and
resources that companies should allocate to secure their information. Their model proposed that
increased vulnerability to data loss increases the optimal investment in information security;
however, the model also acknowledged that for extreme levels of vulnerability the benefit of
information security investment is minimal as the cost may overweight the benefits of the
investment. Accordingly, the model established that the optimal investment in information
security should be determined by evaluating the reduction in expected loss and not necessarily
considering the vulnerability alone. Overall, the model proposed that the optimal investment in
information security should not exceed 37% of the expected loss. The model was later extended
as the authors acknowledged the importance of considering the cost of externalities to determine
the optimal investment in information security (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Zhou 2015a).
Additional research on the economic aspects of preventing security breaches considers
the use of cybersecurity insurance and information sharing in the discussion of information
security investment practices. Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail (2003) discussed the importance of
cyber-risk management to assess the optimal investment in information security but included the
use of cybersecurity insurance as a relevant piece of information to be utilized for the costbenefit analysis necessary to determine the optimal investment in cybersecurity following the
Gordon and Loeb model. Gordon et al. (2003b) posited that to conduct this analysis requires
companies to determine the dollar value of their information security risk exposure, after
considering information security controls in place to reduce such exposure, and then to assess
insurance coverage. Other factors to reduce the cost of preventing data loss were also examined.

46

For instance, Gordon, Loeb, and Lucyshyn (2003) documented the potential benefits of the
federal government initiative, back in the early 2000s, of information sharing between companies
about threats to computer security and the incidence of security breaches. Their analysis showed
that information sharing lowered the cost of information security; however, the lack of incentives
for companies to share information prevented the realization of such potential benefits (Gordon
et al. 2003).
Models to determine the optimal investment in information security do address the
qualitative factors and non-financial criteria that should be considered in evaluating the optimal
information security investment. To illustrate, Bodin, Gordon, and Loeb (2005) proposed the
use of an analytic hierarchy process as a tool to evaluate and compare relevant criteria for
information security decisions. Bodin et al. (2005) emphasized the role of the Certified
Information Security Officer (CISO) in evaluating the qualitative factors and non-financial
criteria. Subsequently, Bodin, Gordon, and Loeb (2008) introduced a new risk metric to
complement the analytic hierarchy process tool earlier proposed by Bodin et al. (2005). Over
time, researchers have continued using new techniques to develop models to help companies
assess their cybersecurity insurance needs (e.g., Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti, and
Sadhukhan 2013).
More recent literature highlights the top management team composition and their
compensation structure as a relevant aspect of cyber-risk management. For instance, Kwon,
Ulmer, and Tawei (2013) showed that the involvement of an IT executive in the top management
team and the amount of compensation (fixed and variable) for the IT executive is negatively
related to the incidence of information security breaches. This finding stresses the importance of
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the involvement of IT experts for strategic decision making and cyber-risk management in
organizations.
This body of research has significantly contributed to the development of risk management
practices which are relevant to IT governance decision making (Debreceny 2013) and for
compliance with regulatory requirements to disclose significant risk factors (SEC 2011, 2018).
Furthermore, the objectives behind the early developed economic models for information
security investment are still being applied and are consistent with current best practices, as well
as the principles of risk assessment and risk response in the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)
framework developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations’ (COSO).
Assurance over Information Security
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) act of 2002 requires management of public companies to
assess the effectiveness of internal controls and requires auditors, under SOX section 404, to
attest on management's assessment of internal controls (US 2002). Auditing Standard No. 5
(AS5) provides guidance for auditors to conduct an audit of management’s assessment of the
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) and establishes that, as part of
the audit of internal controls, auditors should understand and evaluate the effectiveness of
information technology general controls (PCAOB 2007). Accordingly, in connection with the
audit of a company’s ICFR, auditors are required to understand and evaluate controls over
information security, such as controls to ensure that logical access to critical applications is
restricted to only authorized users. Although there is an overlap between information security
and cybersecurity controls, the scope of an audit of internal control is limited to controls relevant
to financial reporting, as required by AS5, regardless of whether an application beyond the scope
of the audit hosts critical data that could be the target of a cyber-breach.
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Recent initiatives are being promoted to standardize the disclosure of companies'
cybersecurity risk management and controls. For instance, early in 2017, the AICPA released an
updated edition of the Trust Services Principles and Criteria (TSPC) and a newly developed
cybersecurity risk management reporting framework. The TSPC was revised to better address an
organization’s cybersecurity risks and to align the prior version of the TSPC with the Committee
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s (COSO’s) Internal Control
Framework updated in 2013. The TSPC provides a mechanism for CPAs interested in
performing attestation over the security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and
privacy of information systems in an organization. 21
The cybersecurity risk management reporting framework was developed by the AICPA
as a means for communicating relevant information about a company's cyber-risk management
practices to stakeholders. CPAs are expected to use the framework to evaluate an organization’s
cyber-risk management practices and to report on the effectiveness of controls. The ultimate goal
of this initiative is to promote the use of a uniform reporting framework and to increase
stakeholders’ confidence in a company’s cybersecurity disclosures. In particular, the AICPA is
promoting the use of a system and organization control (SOC) reporting framework for
cybersecurity (AICPA 2017a). A SOC is an examination engagement that should be performed
in accordance with AICPA attestation standards. The use of this reporting framework provides a
uniform set of criteria for disclosure and the assessment of the effectiveness of a company’s
cyber-risk management practices. According to the AICPA (2017a), this reporting framework is
meant to be voluntary and flexible to be suitable for organizations of varying sizes and

21

More details of the AICPA cybersecurity initiative, the revised Trust Services Principles and Criteria, and the
SOC over cybersecurity is provided at the AICPA’s cybersecurity resource center.
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/FRC/AssuranceAdvisoryServices/Pages/cyber-security-resource-center.aspx
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industries. The AICPA is also developing other CRM assurance products, such as a SOC for
cybersecurity specific for vendor supply chains (AICPA 2017b).
Despite the development of a new assurance framework to specifically focus on
cybersecurity risks, it is not the first time that the accounting profession has tried to address
concerns about the security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy of
information systems. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the AICPA and the Canadian
Institute of Charter Accountants (CICA) developed SysTrust and WebTrust, which are a set of
principles and criteria to assure the reliability of information systems and e-commerce
transactions, respectively (Gendron and Barrett 2004). In contrast with current motivations
associated with the increased incidence and magnitude of cyber-breaches, the development of
SysTrust and WebTrust was motivated by the demand for assurance services to address system
reliability (McPhie 2000) and the emergence of the internet and online transactions (Barett and
Gendron 2006). SysTrust was initially designed to provide assurance over systems that support
business activities and to focus specifically on the principles of availability, security, integrity,
and maintainability (McPhie 2000). In contrast, WebTrust was developed to specifically address
electronic commerce transactions and to focus on the principles of security, availability, business
practices, and transaction integrity (Elliott 2002). The SysTrust and WebTrust principles and
criteria were later merged into a single framework, the Trust Services Principles, and Criteria.
This framework evolved into a more comprehensive framework that covers the principles of
security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy and it is currently used by
auditors to issue SOC 2 and SOC 3 reports. 22

22

There are three types of SOC reports. SOC 1 reports are used by auditors to provide assurance over internal
controls over financial reporting (ICFR) to user organizations. In contrast, SOC 2 and SOC 3 are used to provide
assurance over, all or any combination of, the Trust Services framework principles. The difference between the SOC
2 and SOC 3 reports is that SOC 2 reports are for restrictive use while SOC 3 reports are intended to meet the needs
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The development of Web assurance services, in particular, the WebTrust seal, motivated
early research on voluntary third-party assurance. 23 Overall, researchers found that Web
assurance positively influenced consumers intentions to purchase online (Kovar, Burke, and
Kovar 2000; Kaplan and Nieschwietz 2003) and that consumers could differentiate the quality of
Web assurance seals (Lala, Arnold, Sutton, and Guan 2002). Although these initial findings seem
to suggest that consumers valued third-party assurance, subsequent research failed to support the
notion that external assurance results in incremental benefits for consumers. Specifically,
Mauldin and Arunachalam (2002) found that Web assurance is only associated with higher
intentions to purchase when consumers do not observe disclosures about internal assurance and
are less familiar with the product. Bahmanziari, Odom, and Ugrin (2009) extended these
findings, showing that external Web assurance did not impact consumers' trust or purchase
intentions, neither on its own nor when interacting with internal assurance activities.
Although WebTrust was initially expected to be successful (Elliot 2002), the rate of
companies engaging in Web assurance was lower than expected (Barrett and Gendron 2006).
This triggered intrigue regarding the profession’s behavior and researchers in accounting began
to study WebTrust through the lenses of the professionalization of accounting (Gendron and
Barrett 2004; Barett and Gendron 2006) and managerial decision-making (Boulianne and Cho
2009) to further develop an understanding of the factors that contributed to the development,
adoption, and, eventually, the perceived failure of the WebTrust seal of assurance. By
conducting field study research, Gendron and Barrett (2004) found that accountants perceived
that organizations were skeptical about the potential of WebTrust to provide additional comfort

of users who desire assurance on the controls of a service organization but do not have the need of a SOC 2 report.
(Singleton 2011).
23
Companies that received an unmodified opinion in their WebTrust report were allowed to display the WebTrust
seal on their websites.
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and increase consumers trust. This finding was mainly attributed to the existence of competing
products sponsored by large technology organizations and available at a lower cost. Further
evidence revealed that the profession failed to properly allocate marketing resources to promote
their proposed Web assurance service and companies perceived that the benefits were not
sufficient to justify the necessary marketing cost (Boulianne and Cho 2009). Other researchers
questioned whether the accounting profession was misguided to focus on assurance targeted to
individual consumers (Sutton and Hampton 2003) and argued for a focus on business-to-business
and supply chain related activities where accounting professionals had reputational advantages
(Khazanchi and Sutton 2001; Sutton and Hampton 2003). The challenges faced by the
accounting profession in establishing a reputation and demand for Web assurance resulted in the
transformation of WebTrust into a set of principles and criteria (in particular, first used together
with SysTrust and eventually merged with SysTrust into a single framework, the Trust Services
principles and criteria) to be used for advisory and business-to-business assurance services
(Gendron and Barrett 2004; Barret and Gendron 2006).
Theoretical Model
The theoretical model in this study is based on Wallace's (1980) Insurance Hypothesis
and EVT ((Burgoon and Hale 1988; Burgoon 1993). The insurance hypothesis addresses why
organizations may desire assurance irrespective of regulatory demands and provides a conceptual
foundation for exploring sources of the demand for voluntary assurance over cybersecurity. The
Insurance Hypothesis particularly argues that users value and demand voluntary assurance as an
alternative to traditional insurance products used to control for litigation risk. As illustrated in
Figure 5, the model predicts that CRM assurance is positively associated with investors’
valuation judgments and that this relation is mediated by investors' perceptions of management
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credibility. Then, drawing on EVT, I propose that expectancies should influence the strength of
the demand modeled in the Insurance Hypothesis. In particular, I predict that expectancies of
assurance will alter the strength of the relationship between voluntary assurance and perceived
management credibility, which flows through to impact investors’ valuation judgments. The
theoretical model presented in this study incorporates these considerations to better explain why
investors might expect a company to engage in such services and how these expectancies alter
investors' assessments of management credibility and related valuation judgments.
Voluntary Assurance and the Insurance Hypothesis
Wallace (1980) explains the reasonableness behind using assurance services as insurance,
relative or as a complement of using traditional insurance policies with four main arguments.
First, the perceived need for auditors to substantiate professional care, which may be beneficial
to argue against allegations of negligence in a litigation setting. These effects should also carry
over to other company stakeholders that may have concerns related to perceptions of due care.
Second, Wallace highlights how clients benefit from the auditors' sophisticated legal expertise
which allows the use of the auditor as a powerful codefendant. Third, the client and auditor’s
shared interest and concern about their reputations ensures proper consideration of the impact of
litigation. Last, Wallace argues that by engaging in assurance services companies can shift a
portion of the blame and liability toward the auditor, as auditors are generally perceived as the
guarantors of the accuracy of audited financial and non-financial information.
Findings from prior research show that voluntary assurance results in higher stock price
assessments (Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2014) and lower cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011).
In contrast, other research documents that the benefits of assurance are context specific. For
instance, Coram et al. (2009) find that assurance of non-financial performance indicators
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influence stock price estimates only when presenting positive indicators and Cheng et al. (2015)
find that assurance of sustainability indicators increase willingness to invest when assured
information is relevant to the company. I argue that the demand for CRM assurance, in the
context of this study, is primarily motivated by Wallace's (1980) Insurance Hypothesis as among
the main concerns regarding cyber-breaches are the litigation risks, company reputation, and the
associated costs. 24
In developing the baseline expectations, I consider the arguments that justify the use of
voluntary assurance to mitigate potential legal damages and prior findings on the positive impact
of voluntary assurance. As such, theoretically, companies that report a cyber-breach, but have
previously engaged in voluntary CRM assurance, should receive less negative investors’
valuation judgments. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), prior to the occurrence of a cyber-breach,
will result in less negative (more negative) investor valuation judgments after the
disclosure of a cyber-breach.
Voluntary Assurance and Management Credibility
Findings from prior research suggest that companies engage in voluntary assurance
services, mainly, to enhance their credibility and reputation (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua
2009). For instance, Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett (2011) find that assurance increased the
credibility of CSR reports. I predict that management engagement in CRM assurance will result
in more favorable assessments of management credibility, after the disclosure of a cyber-breach,

24

We argue about the Insurance Hypothesis as the more likely source of demand for cybersecurity assurance
considering the nature of cybersecurity threats. In particular, given the sophistication of cyber-breaches, companies
may be unable to reduce the risk and potential loss associated with a cyber-breach through the implementation of
internal controls alone. As such, the use of cybersecurity insurance is a likely resource that firms can use to share
their cyber-risk, either as an alternative or complement to other potential controls to reduce or avoid cyber-risks.
Besides, we expect that the information regarding the presence or absence of assurance after a cyber-breach will
impact investors’ judgments as the expected future loss will be lower given the use of assurance as insurance.
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given two main reasons: 1) prior research establishes that audited disclosures are more credible
than unaudited disclosures (e.g., Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Mercer
2004), and 2) the benefits of using CRM assurance-as-insurance may lead to more favorable
assessments of management competence given investors beliefs that management's decisions are
in their best interest. Moreover, I predict that management credibility assessments will, in turn,
impact valuation judgments. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses:
H2a: Voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), before the occurrence of a cyberbreach, will result in less negative (more negative) investors' assessment of management
credibility after the disclosure of a cyber-breach.
H2b: Assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of CRM assurance on
investors’ valuation judgments.
Expectancy Violations Theory
Another aspect relevant to understanding the demand for CRM assurance is whether
investors take into consideration the consensus use of such services (whether assurance is
expected or not expected) by peer companies within the same industry. Prior research suggests
that investors' evaluation of a company depends on whether the company’s accounting choices
conform to the industry norms (Clor-Proell 2009; Koonce, Miller, and Winchel 2015). Moreover,
Mercer (2004, 192) argues that "a disclosure that deviates significantly from investors'
expectations will be less credible than one that does not." This effect is conceptualized in
expectancy violations theory (EVT) (Burgoon and Hale 1988; Burgoon 1993) which provides a
theoretical basis for understanding why voluntary CRM assurance would have similar effects
when engaging in such assurance services is considered an industry norm.
EVT establishes that individuals develop expectancies to assess communication
outcomes and that these expectancies are influenced by the communicator characteristics,
relationship factors, and context characteristics (Burgoon and Hale 1988; Burgoon 1993).
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Expectancies are violated when the communication outcomes are not in conformity with
expectations or preferences about social norms and known idiosyncrasies (Burgoon and Hale
1988). EVT posits that the impact of a violation depends on the violation valence, such that
positive violations produce favorable communication consequences while negative violations are
detrimental compared to outcomes that conform-to-expectancies. As such, it is expected that the
arousal that is triggered by the violation results in an intensification of evaluations of the
communicators.
As such, consistent with EVT, I predict that violation of expectancies will result in more
extreme assessments of management credibility (see Figure 5, Panel B for predictions), such that
positive violations (presence of assurance when it is not expected) result in more extreme
positive assessments of management credibility and negative violations (absence of assurance
when assurance is expected) result in more extreme negative assessments of management
credibility. Moreover, I predict that investors' assessments of management credibility, based on
whether the company violates or conforms to the expectations, will mediate the relationship
between the presence (absence) of assurance and investor’s assessments of future stock prices.
This leads to the third set of hypotheses (as illustrated in Figure 5):
H3a: The effect of CRM assurance on users’ assessment of management credibility is
more extreme in the presence of expectancy violations.
H3b: Assessments of management credibility mediate the expectancies moderated effects
of CRM assurance on investors’ valuation judgments.

Methods
To test the research model, I use a 2 x 2 experimental design in which assurance
(assurance versus no-assurance) and investors’ expectations of the presence of assurance
(violate-expectancies versus conform-to-expectancies) are manipulated between-participants. A
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sample of non-professional investors are recruited to complete the experimental case in order to
observe decision behavior. The focus of the experimental study is on how investor decision
making changes in light of the presence or absence of assurance based on when company
practices violate or conform-to-expectancies.
Participants
Participants are 168 individuals recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in
exchange for either $1.00 or $2.50, based on their qualifications. 25 26 27 Participation is limited to
MTurk workers that have completed at least 500 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) and with at
least a 95 percent approval rate, or alternatively to participants designated as "Masters. 28
Research finds that MTurk workers are a source of reliable data (Buhrmester, Kwang, and
Gosling 2011) and that it is an appropriate participant source for research on nonprofessional
investors (Koonce et al. 2015).

25

Data for the main analysis was collected concurrently with the data for additional analysis. Initially, I conducted a
pilot test using Mturk participants that have at least 500 completed HITs and 95 percent approval rate. The initial
desired sample size for pilot testing was 120 (20 participants per cell) participants. After eliminating invalid attempts
to complete the survey, the total usable responses was 106. Then, I collected data intended to be used for the main
analysis and participants were required to have the Mturk “Masters” qualification. The desired sample size was 180
(30 participants per cell) responses from Mturk Masters. However, I collected 146 usable responses. Given the
failure to meet the desired sample size, I merged the responses from the pilot test and the main data collection and
setup a Qualtrics quota to achieve equal cell sizes. There were 1,406 attempts to complete this study. From the 1,406
attempts, there were 252 usable responses (42 per cell), 274 incomplete surveys, 497 surveys in which participants
failed to meet the qualification criteria, 343 incomplete surveys given that participants failed to pass the review
questions or manipulation checks, and 38 surveys with either a duplicate IP address or Mturk ID.
26
On average, participants spent about 12 minutes to complete the experiment. As such, compensation is deemed
reasonable, considering MTurk workers’ average hourly wage of $3.00 (Rennekamp, Rupar, and Seybert 2015).
Compensation is based on the participant’s Mturk qualifications as participants with more HITs completed and with
higher approval rates are expected to receive greater compensation considering that these participants have higher
approval rates and a low number of abandoned HITs (Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby 2017). Only participants who
successfully completed the study and accurately answered all the review questions (including the attention check
questions) and manipulation checks were compensated.
27
The experiment in this study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Participants.
28
" Specifically, 85 participants in the sample have at least 500 completed HITs and 95 percent approval rate and 83
participants that hold the Mturk “Masters” qualification. Amazon grants the “Masters” qualification to workers that
consistently demonstrate a high degree of success in performing a wide range of HITs across a large number of
requesters. All participants, regardless of their Mturk qualification, are required to meet the additional screening
requirements. Participants’ demographics are not significantly different between groups, including the time to
complete the survey, and the inferences of the study are unchanged when controlling for participant’s qualifications
as a covariate in the analyses.
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I conducted screening procedures to select only participants at least 18 years of age,
United States citizens, and that are native English speakers. Also, consistent with prior research
that uses MTurk as a source for non-professional investors (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Koonce et al.
2015; Asay, Elliot, and Rennekamp 2017), participants are required to have taken at least two
accounting or finance classes and have experience reading financial statements. On average,
participants are 29 to 38 years old and full-time employed. About 60 percent of the participants
are male, 72 percent of the participants have at least a bachelor’s degree, and 90 percent of the
participants have investment experience. 29
Only participants who successfully completed the study and accurately answered all the
review questions (including attention checks) and manipulation checks were compensated. In
addition, to alleviate issues of repeated participation, access to the experimental materials is
restricted to avoid duplicate responses from the same IP address (Arnold and Triki 2017). 30
Task
The experimental task requires participants to evaluate a company, based on the
information that is available. First, participants are provided with a brief description of the
company. I use Aplus Auto Care to resemble a company in the car warranty and related solutions
industry. After reading the description of the company, participants are required to make an
initial valuation of the company’s stock price.
Participants then receive a press release in which the company announces a data breach,
along with information regarding the extent of the breach and a link to resources provided by the
company to remediate the impact of the breach (e.g., dedicated Website, credit monitoring

29

65 percent of the participants have over three years of investment experience.
Consistent with suggestions provided by Arnold and Triki (2017), a reminder about the importance of scientific
research was also presented to discourage participants to participate a second time.
30
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services). The format and content of the press release are consistent with press releases used to
announce known data breaches, such as the Home Depot, TJ Maxx, and Target breaches.
Participants also receive selected financial information about the company, background
information on assurance over cybersecurity, and information about the presence or absence of
assurance (manipulated between participants). After being provided with all the relevant case
facts, participants updated their initial valuation of the company’s stock price, answer additional
case questions, answer manipulation check questions, and provide demographic information.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable is assurance. Assurance is operationalized by notifying
participants whether the company engaged or not in CRM assurance for the fiscal year prior to
the breach. For the assurance condition, participants learn that the company has a cybersecurity
risk management program in place, controls are operating effectively, the company engaged in
voluntary assurance over cybersecurity, and the auditors issued a clean audit opinion. In contrast,
for the no-assurance condition participants will be notified that, although the company has not
engaged in assurance over cybersecurity, the company has a cybersecurity risk management
program in place and that controls are operating effectively. Before participants are informed
about the presence or absence of CRM assurance, they receive general information about the risk
of cyber-breaches and cyber-risk management and assurance. In particular, participants are
notified about the AICPA initiative to develop a cybersecurity risk management program and are
provided with a description of what a SOC for cybersecurity implies.
The second independent variable is expectancies of the presence or absence of assurance.
Expectancy is operationalized by providing participants with information on whether the
company’s decision to engage (or the decision not to engage) in CRM assurance is consistent or
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inconsistent with industry practices. This manipulation was adapted from Clor-Proell’s (2009)
work on expected and actual accounting choices and tailored to the context of CRM assurance.
Consistent with Clor-Proell (2009), participants are first provided with information about the
industry expectancies and then they receive information about the firm choice to engage or not
engage in CRM assurance. Together, these two manipulations (assurance and expectancies)
result in two violate-expectancies (there is assurance and assurance is not expected, or there is
no-assurance and assurance is expected) and two conform-to-expectancies (there is assurance
and assurance is expected, or there is no-assurance and assurance is not expected) conditions.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable of interest is investors’ perceived value of a company stock price
(valuation judgments). The measure of valuation judgments is consistent with the measure used
by Asay et al. (2017) that asks for participants’ initial valuation judgments (before the
manipulations) and for updated valuation judgments after participants are presented with
additional information and the manipulations. 31 Valuation judgments are measured using a 7point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 32
As such, valuation judgment represents a participant’s updated valuation judgment using the
initial valuation judgment as a covariate.
Management credibility is a mediator in the theoretical model. Consistent with prior
research (e.g., Clor-Proell 2009; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; Rennekamp 2012), management
credibility is measured using participants’ assessment of management competence and
trustworthiness, the two components of management credibility. To measure participants’

31

Consistent with Asay et al. (2017), participants are anchored on the scale's mid-point to be able to use the initial
valuation as a baseline to measure investor's reactions to the manipulations.
32
Fully labeled 7-point scales are used consistent with recommendations from Eutsler and Lang (2015).
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assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, I use a 7-point, fully labeled, scale
that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and from
“very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively. In order to
confirm the validity and reliability of the management credibility construct, I first conducted
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and generated the construct Cronbach’s alpha. The results of
EFA confirmed that assessment of management competence and assessment of management
trustworthiness loads into a single construct with factor loadings of 0.790 and 0.784,
respectively, while the construct’s Cronbach’s alpha is 0.934. 33 As such, I use the average value
of these two measures as a single measure of management credibility for the analysis.
Results
Manipulation Checks and Comprehension Questions
The experimental materials were pre-tested with a similar participant pool to confirm the
success of the study manipulations. Then, the final version of the experiment was released with
three main manipulation check questions, three review questions, and one attention check. Only
participants who answered all the main manipulation check questions, review questions, and
attention checks were allowed to complete the experimental materials.
The two main manipulation check questions to test the manipulation of the presence or
absence of assurance asks participants whether or not Aplus Auto Care engaged in CRM
practices and CRM assurance, respectively, based on the case information. The main
manipulation check question to test the manipulation of expectancies of assurance asks
participants whether or not most firms in the industry choose to engage in CRM assurance

33

Factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha were all above the recommended threshold of 0.50 and 0.70, respectively
(Nunnally 1978).

61

practices, based on the case information. An additional question to test the manipulation of
expectancies of assurance is included and asks participants about their agreement with the
following statement: "Aplus Auto Care was expected to engage in CRM assurance before the
data breach”.34 I find that participants in the assurance-expected condition (mean=5.11) agree to
a greater extent that Aplus Auto Care was expected to engage in CRM assurance (t=-4.090,
p<0.001) compared to participants in the assurance-not-expected condition (mean=4.05).
Review questions are included to ensure that participants understand the information
provided in the case. One review question is designed to confirm that participants understand the
instructions and two review questions are included to ensure that participants understand the
selected financial information presented. An attention check question is also included to ensure
that participants are actively engaged in the task.
Testing of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
H1 predicts that voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), prior to the occurrence of a
cyber-breach, results in less negative (more negative) investor valuation judgments after the
disclosure of a cyber-breach. Panel A of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the
participant's final valuation judgments adjusted for initial valuation judgments (initial valuation
is a covariate in the model). 35 I tested this prediction using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA),
and the results are graphically presented in Figure 6 and tabulated in Panel B of Table 5.
As indicated in Table 5, I find support for the hypothesized relationship between
assurance and valuation judgments. Although I do not hypothesize an interaction of assurance

34

" The participants use a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” (equal to 1) to “strongly
agree” (equal to 7).
35
Unadjusted means are not significantly different and in the same direction as adjusted means.
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and expectancies, the analysis considers this interaction to determine the significance of the
direct effect from assurance to valuation judgments. Consistent with the predictions, participants
in the assurance condition assessed a higher stock value than participants in the no-assurance
condition (F=15.817, p<0.001).
Hypothesis 2
H2a predicts that voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), before the occurrence of a
cyber-breach, will result in less negative (more negative) investors' assessments of management
credibility after the disclosure of a cyber-breach. I present descriptive statistics for participants’
assessments of management credibility in Panel A of Table 6. The results of the analysis of
variance (ANOVA), tabulated in Panel B of Table 6, support the hypothesized relationship and
indicate that assurance is positively associated with assessments of management credibility
(F=54.489, p<0.001). Moreover, H2b predicts that management credibility mediates the
relationship of assurance and valuation judgments. Results of the mediation analysis, following
Hayes (2017) process analysis, are graphically presented in Figure 7 and tabulated in Panel A
and Panel B of Table 7. 36 Inspection of bootstrap confidence intervals for the analysis of indirect
effects, included in Panel B of Table 7, confirms the hypothesized mediation. 37 The results
suggest that the relationship of Assurance and Valuation Judgments is fully mediated by
Management Credibility, as the coefficient of Assurance on Valuation Judgments is not
significant (p=0.797) when including Management Credibility in the model.

36

We use Hayes (2017) Process model 4 to test mediation.
The analysis of bootstrap confidence interval does not include zero which denotes statistical significance (Hayes
2017).
37
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Hypothesis 3
H3a predicts that the effect of CRM assurance on users’ assessment of management
credibility is more extreme in the presence of expectancy violations. As shown in Panel A of
Figure 8, the graphical representation of the interaction of assurance and expectancy violations
on management credibility is consistent with the predicted pattern. I present descriptive statistics
for participants’ assessments of management credibility in Panel A of Table 6. The results of the
ANOVA, as presented in Panel B of Table 6, shows a significant interaction between assurance
and expectancy violations (F=9.820, p<0.001). As such, I derive contrast weights to test the
predicted disordinal interaction. The results of planned contrast analysis, as presented in Panel C
of Table 6, confirm that assessments of management credibility are more extreme in the presence
of expectancy violations for, both, positive and negative violations. In particular, contrast
Weights to test the effect of positive violations on assessments of management credibility (0 for
no assurance when assurance is expected, 0 for no assurance when assurances is not expected, -1
for assurance when assurance is expected, and +1 for assurance when assurance is not expected)
is marginally significant (t=1.562, p=.061). Moreover, contrast weights to test the effect of
negative violations on assessments of management credibility (-1 for no assurance when
assurance is expected, +1 for no assurance when assurances is not expected, 0 for assurance
when assurance is expected, and 0 for assurance when assurance is not expected) is significant
(t=2.747, p=.004). Overall, the results support H3a and confirm that investor's expectancies
moderate the effect of assurance on assessments of management credibility.
H3b predicts a moderated mediation in which expectancy violations moderate the effects
of CRM assurance on investors’ valuations through management credibility as a mediator. A
graphical representation of the model is included in Panel 2 of Figure 8. To test the model, I
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follow Hayes (2017) approach for conditional process analysis. 38 Results of the model estimation
are consistent with the ANOVA conducted to test H1 and H2. In particular, there is evidence of a
significant positive effect of assurance and the interaction of assurance and expectancy violations
on management credibility, as shown in Panel A of Table 8. Inspection of bootstrap confidence
intervals for the analysis of conditional indirect effects and the index of moderated mediation,
included in Panel B and Panel C of Table 8, confirms the hypothesized moderated mediation. 39
Specifically, the analysis reveals that the effect of management credibility on valuation
judgments is larger when expectancies are violated (effect = 0.8970) compared to when
Assurance conforms to expectancies (effect = 0.3624) and that the difference in these effects is
positive and significant.
Additional Analysis
Perceived Benefits of Assurance-as-Insurance – The Insurance Hypothesis
As discussed earlier, I use the Insurance Hypothesis to theoretically motivate the
predicted effect of CRM assurance on investors’ valuation judgments. This conceptualization is
based on Wallace’s four arguments for the insurance hypothesis to explain the demand for
voluntary assurance as an alternative to traditional insurance products used to control for
litigation exposure. Accordingly, I conducted additional analysis to test whether the perceived
benefits of using CRM Assurance-as-Insurance (AAI) influence investors’ behavior.

38

Specifically, following Hayes (2017), the first stage moderation mediation is estimated to assess 1) the direct
effect of assurance and the interaction of assurance and expectancy violations on management credibility (the
mediator), and 2) the total effect of assurance and management credibility on valuation judgments (the dependent
variable). Then, the conditional indirect effect is assessed as the product of the effect of assurance and the effect of
the moderation of assurance and expectancy violations on management credibility and the effect of management
credibility on valuation judgments, controlling for assurance. The difference between the conditional indirect effect
at different values of the moderator (i.e., violate or conform to expectancies) represents the index of moderated
mediation used to test the hypothesized relationship. We use PROCESS model 8.
39
The analysis of bootstrap confidence interval does not include zero which denotes statistical significance (Hayes
2017).
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First, I developed a four-item formative construct for participants’ alignment with the insurance
view of assurance, denoted AAI, based on a review of Wallace’s (1980) arguments for the
demand for assurance as posited through the insurance hypothesis. In particular, I ask
participants about their agreement with beliefs that 1) “cybersecurity audits are necessary to
substantiate professional care”, 2) “cybersecurity audits are beneficial as they allow the auditor
to be used as a codefendant”, 3) “cybersecurity audits are beneficial as the auditor and the
company shares an interest to protect both of their reputation in case of litigation”, and 4)
“cybersecurity audits are beneficial as the auditor shares a portion of the company’s legal
responsibility”. To validate the construct’s validity and reliability, I conducted principal
components analysis (PCA) and tested the items for multicollinearity.40 PCA corroborates that
all items load on the same construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978).
Also, test for multicollinearity shows that VIF is below 3.3 (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006)
for all items. Thus, I use the average value of the four items as a single measure of AAI.
I find that, on average, participants agree that CRM assurance is beneficial and can be
used as an alternative for traditional insurance (mean=5.338). I used a median split based on the
median value (5.375) of the AAI variable to generate a Hi/Low AAI dichotomous variable and
then I split the sample and re-run all the hypotheses test for each group (Hi and Low perceptions
group) to explore the impact of higher (versus lower) perceived benefits of AAI. I present the
results, graphically, in Panel A and Panel B of Figure 9. The results of the ANCOVA,
untabulated, shows that CRM only results in higher valuation judgments when investors have
higher perceptions of the benefits of AAI. In contrast, CRM assurance is positively associated

40

In contrast with reflective constructs, formative indicators do not reflect the same underlying constructs and as
such multicollinearity is not desirable (Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted 2003). Petter, Strub, and Rai (2007) suggest
using PCA, rather than traditional EFA, to assess construct validity and to assess collinearity (i.e., VIF < 3.3) to
evaluate the construct's reliability.
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with investors’ assessments of management credibility for, both, the higher and lower AAI
perception groups. On average, valuation judgments are higher for the Hi-AAI assurance
(mean=4.37) group than for the Low-AAI assurance (mean=4.15), but not statistically
significantly different (t=0.687, p=0.217). However, valuation judgments are significantly higher
(t=3.340, p<0.001) for the Low-AAI no assurance (mean=3.93.) group than for the Hi-AAI no
assurance group (mean=3.20). In addition, only negative violations remain significant for both
groups. Last, the results (untabulated) of the mediation analysis and the mediated moderation
analysis hold for both groups.
Altogether, the results suggest that investors’ perceptions about the benefits of AAI
influences valuation judgments. In particular, results of the ANOVA and inspection of mean
valuation judgments between groups, suggest that investors with higher perceptions of the
benefits of AAI reward firms that engage in voluntary CRM assurance and penalize firms with
no assurance. Also, the results suggest that within these subgroups negative violations result in
stronger negative reactions compared to the positive reaction of positive violations.
Perceived Accountant’s Cyber-expertise
Prior studies (e.g., Gendron and Barrett 2004) reveal that the perceived accountants’ lack
of technology expertise may have contributed to the failure of the AICPA and CICA’s Web
assurance initiatives in the early 2000s. Therefore, I conducted additional analysis to explore
participant’s perceptions of accountant’s cyber-expertise (ACE) and to explore how lower and
higher perceptions of ACE affect the main analyses.
Accordingly, I developed a four-item formative construct, denoted ACE, adapted from
Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) work on auditor’s accounting information systems (AIS) expertise.
Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) constructs include five items and is intended to capture aspects of
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domain particular-experience and training, which are believed to be the main determinants of
auditor expertise (Bonner 1990). While the items in Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) construct were
developed as a self-reported measure of auditors’ AIS expertise, in general, I adapted their items
to capture participants’ perceptions of accountant’s specific cyber-expertise.41 In particular, I
ask participants about their agreement with beliefs that 1) “accountants have significant
experience auditing information security and cybersecurity controls”, 2) “accountants spend a
significant portion of their time auditing information security and cybersecurity controls”, 3)
“accountants receive significant combined informal and formal training in relation to information
security and cybersecurity controls”, and 4) “accountants have a high level of information
security and cybersecurity controls expertise”. Consistent with the analysis to test the validity
and reliability of the AAI construct, I conducted PCA and confirmed that all items load in the
same construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978) and also confirmed
that VIF is below the 3.3 threshold (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006) for all items. Thus, I use
the average value of the four items as a single ACE measure for the analysis.
The analysis reveals that, on average, participants disagree that accountants have the
sufficient level of domain particular-experience and training necessary to be considered cyberexperts (mean=3.770). I use a median split based on the median value (3.750) of the ACE
variable to generate a Hi/Low ACE dichotomous variable and then I split the sample and re-run
all the hypotheses test for each group (Hi and Low ACE) to explore the impact of higher (versus
lower) perceptions of accountant’s cyber-expertise. I present the results, graphically, in Panel A
and Panel B of Figure 10. The analysis (untabulated) shows that assurance is positively
associated with valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility, regardless of
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All items in Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) AIS expertise construct were included, except for an item that captures
auditor’s self-reported AIS experience (time) relative to peer auditors.
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the level of perceived ACE. Nevertheless, I find that valuation judgments are significantly higher
(t=2.109, p=0.018) when participants have higher perceptions of ACE and have assurance
(mean=4.51) compared to valuations from the Low-ACE assurance group (mean =4.02). Further,
assessments of management credibility for the Hi-ACE assurance group (mean=5.45) are
marginally significantly higher (t=1.511, p=0.068) than for the Low-ACE assurance group
(mean=5.14) but are not significantly different between the Hi and Low-ACE no assurance
conditions. Moreover, the result of planned contrast analysis shows that the interaction of
assurance and expectancy violations (both positive violations and negative violations) is only
significant for the Hi-ACE group. Finally, the results of the mediation analysis (untabulated)
hold for both groups, but the hypothesized mediated moderation is only significant for the HiACE group.
Overall, the results indicate that perceived ACE explains investors’ decision behavior when
evaluating a firm’s value and credibility, in light of information about the presence or absence of
assurance and industry expectancies. In particular, the analysis suggests that in evaluating a
firm’s value and management credibility, participants place more Iight on their own perceptions
of the ACE than on the industry consensus (peer firms behavior).
Disclosure of Cyber-risk Management Practices
I also conducted additional analysis to test whether disclosure of the existence (or lack) of
management’s CRM provides incremental rewards (penalties). In order to explore the value of
management’s CRM, I collected data for an additional experimental condition in which
participants are informed that there is no risk management program and no assurance (84
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additional participants were recruited through Mturk). 42 Given that in the main analysis
participants in the assurance condition are notified that the firm engaged CRM and CRM
assurance, and the participants in the no assurance condition are notified that the firm only
engaged in CRM, the additional data collected yields a 3 x 2 experimental design with
assurance/risk management (CRM assurance, CRM-only, and no-CRM) and expectancy
violations manipulated between groups.
Mean values are graphically illustrated in Panel A and Panel B of Figure 11. Results of
contrast Weights (untabulated) support that investors reward firms that disclose the existence of
a CRM program. In particular, participants in the CRM-only conform-to-expectancies condition
provided higher management credibility ratings (mean=4.40), compared to participants in the noCRM conform-to-expectancies condition (mean 3.94) and also participants in CRM-only violateexpectancies condition provided higher management credibility ratings (mean=3.65), compared
to participants in the no-CRM violate-expectancies condition (mean 3.34). 43 Although on
average, valuation judgments for the CRM-only condition are higher than for the no-CRM
condition, results do not support that there is a statistically significant difference in valuation
judgments between groups in the CRM-only and no-CRM conditions.
Conclusion
This study provides theoretical and empirical evidence of the cost and benefits of
voluntary CRM assurance. Specifically, I find that companies engagement in CRM assurance
results in more favorable assessments of management credibility, leading to higher stock price
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Participant qualifications and screening are performed consistent with the main experiment. Also, participants
were required to answer all the review questions (including the attention check questions) and manipulation checks
to be allowed to complete the task.
43
Contrast weights are significant (p=.027) for the assurance expected condition (-1,1,0,0,0,0) and marginally
significant (p=.099) for the assurance not expected condition (0,0,-1,1,0,0).
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valuations. Moreover, this study finds evidence of positive violations, such that investors reward
companies that engage in CRM assurance when assurance is not expected, and negative
violations, such that investors penalize companies that do not engage in CRM assurance when
assurance is expected, in the context of assurance.
This study has relevant implications. First, this study is particularly informative to the
AICPA as it provides evidence that investors knowledge about whether assurance is expected or
not expected, based on industry norms, may help drive the demand for the proposed CRM
assurance services. Moreover, additional analyses conducted highlights the importance of users
perceptions of the benefits of assurance-as-insurance and their perceptions of accountant’s cyberexpertise. These results provide insights to regulators expecting that the market will drive the
demand for CRM assurance and CRM disclosures. Specifically, the results suggest, in general, it
is users with higher perceived benefits of assurance and higher perceptions of accountant’s
cyber-expertise that primarily reward and penalize companies as initially hypothesized. As such,
the results of this study may help better shape the underlying requirements of the AICPA
proposed services and may provide insights on relevant aspects to address, such as marketing
initiatives to inform users.
Second, this study informs financial statement stakeholders about the cost and incentives
associated with voluntary CRM assurance. In addition to the results of the main analysis,
additional analysis sheds light on the benefits of CRM disclosures. In particular, I provide
evidence of the incentives associated with CRM practices as companies that disclose the
existence of a CRM program receive more favorable investors’ assessments of management
credibility and stock price valuations, compared to companies that do not have a CRM program
in place and operating effectively.
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Third, this study contributes to the literature and theory on investor judgment and
decision making and provides insights on the factors that explain the market reaction toward
negative events and disasters, such as cyber-breaches, and the potential use of voluntary
assurance to mitigate the damage on firms’ value and credibility. In particular, this study
provides evidence consistent with Wallace’s (1980) insurance hypothesis and supports the
benefits of voluntary assurance as a tool to control for litigation outcomes after negative events.
The results should be evaluated in light of the inherent limitations, which provide
opportunities for future research. First, in order to explore how users’ expectancies impact
decision behavior, I operationalized expectancies by providing information about whether the
firm’s CRM assurance practices violate or conform-to-expectancies. However, whether investors
are able to form expectancies, based on the industry cyber-risk, is a question beyond the scope of
this study. As such, future research could explore whether the results hold without providing
information about expectancies but instead by manipulating the type of industry (using industries
with different levels of cyber-risk). Moreover, while in this study I hold constant the information
provided about the source of the breach, recent research suggests that management responsibility
acceptance influences investor’s reactions to external breaches (Tan and Yu 2018). Thus, future
research could further explore how managements’ internal and external attributions influence the
variables in the models and impact decision behavior.
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STUDY THREE: THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE TIMELINESS AND
CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE ON INVESTORS
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS

Introduction
As cyber-attacks become more sophisticated, companies increasingly struggle not only to
prevent attacks but also to detect and disclose them in a timely fashion. After a cybersecurity
incident is discovered, managers face competing incentives to delay or release bad news.
Although managers have incentives to release bad news on a timelier basis to lower litigation
costs (Skinner 1994, 1997), managers also have financial incentives to delay or obfuscate the
disclosure of bad news (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). In light of these competing incentives, it is
important to understand the factors affecting how investors react to the timeliness of
management disclosures. Moreover, one of the main cost drivers of cybersecurity incidents in the
U.S. are the post data breach costs, including legal expenditures (Ponemon 2018). As such,
understanding investors’ reactions to the timeliness of disclosures is even more significant
considering that the change in share value, in connection with the disclosure of bad news, is one
of the main factors that influences litigation outcomes (Skinner 1994, 1997).
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, I aim to scrutinize how disclosure timeliness
impacts investor’s judgments and decisions. Second, I explore the use of voluntary
cybersecurity risk management (CRM) assurance as a potential tool to mitigate the deleterious
effects of delayed disclosures of cybersecurity incidents. This study helps further our
understanding of how investors incorporate their perceptions of management’s efforts to address
complex disclosures in their investment decisions. This understanding is central to studying the
impact of cybersecurity disclosures considering that the complexities of addressing cybersecurity
breaches may impede company’s ability to disclose a breach in a timely manner, and companies
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may seek remedial tactics to mitigate potential adverse reactions toward both management and
the company for their disclosure strategy. Moreover, this study is important as regulatory
bodies, such as the SEC and the AICPA, are actively engaged in developing disclosure
guidelines and CRM assurance products to address the increased risk of cyber-attacks.
Understanding the value relevance of CRM assurance may help these regulatory bodies to
understand and promote the related benefits.
The Litigation Reduction Hypothesis posits that timely disclosures are associated with a
lower risk of litigation as a direct result of a reduced economic impact, given a shorter class
period that results in a smaller class action, and also indirectly weakens any argument that
management delayed the disclosure (Skinner 1994, 1997). Accordingly, drawing on the
Litigation Reduction Hypothesis, I predict that the timeliness of disclosures is positively
associated with investors' valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Clor-Proell 2009; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; Rennekamp
2012), I also predict that assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of disclosure
timeliness on investors’ valuation judgments. Further, I also draw on the Insurance Hypothesis,
which explains the demand for assurance as an alternative to traditional insurance (Wallace
1980), to predict that voluntary CRM assurance moderates the effect of disclosure timeliness on
investors’ assessment of management credibility.
I use a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment, in which participants are required to make
valuation judgments and to assess the credibility of management after a cybersecurity incident, to
test the research model. The independent variables of interest are the timeliness of disclosure of
a cybersecurity incident and the presence or absence of CRM assurance. The timeliness of the
disclosure is manipulated by informing participants that the incident was disclosed three days
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(for the more timely condition) or three months (for the less timely condition) after the company
became aware of the incident. The presence of CRM assurance is manipulated by informing
participants that the company engaged in voluntary assurance over CRM and received a clean
opinion from the auditors. In contrast, participants in the no CRM assurance condition are
informed that, although the company has not engaged in assurance over CRM, the company has
a CRM program in place and operating effectively. To test the predictions, I collect participants
valuations of the company’s stock price and their assessment of management’s competence and
trustworthiness, the two components of management credibility documented in prior research.
Consistent with the predictions, I find that more timely disclosures lead to more favorable
assessments of management credibility and more favorable valuation judgments. Moreover, I
find that the relationship of disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments is mediated by
perceptions of management credibility. Although I find a significant interaction between
disclosure timeliness and CRM assurance, the analysis shows that the positive effect of CRM
assurance on credibility assessments and valuation judgments is only significant when a breach
is disclosed in a timely manner. Additional analysis reveals that perceptions of disclosure
timeliness, in the context of cybersecurity breaches, is mainly driven by the actual timing of the
disclosure. These perceptions are also influenced, however, by participants’ perceptions of
whether delayed disclosure of cybersecurity breaches is acceptable.
The results of this study inform regulators weighing appropriate mechanisms for
cybersecurity risk management and disclosure. Specifically, this study sheds light on how the
characteristics of cybersecurity disclosures, specifically the information about a company’s
disclosure timing strategy, is used by investors to assess stock price value. These findings shed
light on the benefits of timely disclosures and could help regulators promote timely disclosures
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of cybersecurity breaches. The results are also informative to the AICPA and assurance
practitioners currently engaged in promoting System and Organization Controls (SOC) for
Cybersecurity engagements. The results provide evidence that an important part of
management’s CRM process should include how communication of an identified breach will be
made public to investors in a timely fashion. Thus, assurance practitioners should carefully
consider this aspect of management’s CRM process when providing CRM assurance.
This study contributes to the literature on market reactions to disclosure timeliness. The
results of prior archival research suggest that companies successfully control for the reaction of
market participants by delaying the disclosure of bad news and spreading the impact on stock
prices over a longer period. Based on these findings researchers imply that, given the efficiency
of markets, delayed news is not new information as investors are able to aggregate the
information from other more timely sources. This study adds another component to this body of
research by examining investors’ reaction to the timeliness of disclosures when the facts about
the timing are clearly disclosed. This study also contributes to the disclosure timeliness theory
by testing both the litigation reduction hypothesis and the insurance hypothesis within the
context of investors JDM.
The next section provides background, theory, and hypotheses. Section III discusses the
methods by providing a description of the participants, the task, and the main variables in the
analysis. Section IV discusses the results of the hypotheses, and additional analysis and Section
V concludes.
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Background, Theory, and Hypothesis
Disclosure Timeliness and Investment Decisions
The literature provides mixed evidence regarding the market reaction to the timeliness of
disclosures. For instance, Givoly and Palmon (1982) found a stronger market reaction associated
with earlier earnings announcements than the reaction to late announcements which suggests a
decrease in the information content of delayed disclosures. Likewise, in studying the market
reaction to dividend announcements, Kalay and Loewenstein (1986) report that delayed
disclosures of bad news had a smaller price effect, compared to earlier disclosures of bad news.
The authors suggest that market participants appear to set expectations about dividend
announcements and then gradually adjust the price downward.
On the other hand, evidence suggests that the market imposes penalties on companies
with delayed disclosures. BenYousset and Khan (2016) found that companies with longer
restatement disclosure lags experience significantly stronger negative market reactions than
companies with shorter disclosure lags. Moreover, research exploring whether managers delay
disclosure of bad news, use the magnitude of the stock price reaction to proxy reporting
timeliness under the assumption that there is a stronger negative reaction toward companies that
withhold negative news (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009).
Although the archival literature provides some evidence of the impact of disclosure
timeliness, only a handful of experimental studies indirectly address the market reaction
associated with the timing of disclosures. Mercer (2005) establishes the timeliness of the
disclosure as an important predictor of investors’ perceived disclosure forthcomingness. Mercer
(2005) provided evidence that management forthcomingness in disclosing bad news is positively
associated with investors’ assessments of management credibility. Libby and Tan (1999)
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similarly report results that suggest that management forthcomingness, operationalized by
warning participants about unexpected earnings, is positively associated with analysts’
assessments of management credibility. Together these studies provide some evidence that
suggests that more forthcoming, and perhaps more timely, disclosures may result in positive
market reactions.
Further research is needed to explore gaps in the literature. Given that prior literature
suggests that management credibility is positively associated with investment decisions,
additional research could provide insight on how disclosure forthcomingness (i.e., timeliness)
impacts investors’ valuation judgments. These insights would add to the cumulative knowledge
on disclosure forthcomingness by capturing the effect of disclosure timeliness. Isolating the
effect of disclosure timeliness may shed light on how investors evaluate a company’s disclosure
strategy and provide clarity to the mixed findings reported in prior archival studies.
Disclosure Timeliness and the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis
Prior research on bad earnings news indicates that more timely disclosures are associated
with lower settlement amounts (Skinner 1997) and overall lower incidences of litigation
(Donelson, McInnis, Mergenthaler, and Yu 2012). These findings are attributed to the litigation
reduction hypothesis which suggests that "more timely disclosure of bad news leads to lower
expected legal costs" (Skinner 1997, 251). The legal rationale for this phenomena is explained,
in the context of bad earnings news, using the SEC disclosure requirements which mandate
prompt announcements of material facts regarding a company’s financial condition and the
timely disclosure of any material fact regarding a previous disclosure that has become
misleading (Skinner 1997). Accordingly, the more timely disclosure of bad news is expected to
deter litigation motivated by allegations of non-compliance with SEC-mandated disclosures.
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Skinner (1997) challenges conflicting evidence reporting that pre-disclosure of bad
earnings news does not deter litigation (Francis 1994) and finds that the timeliness of disclosures
reduces the likelihood of stockholder litigation and for companies that undergo litigation, the
magnitude of litigation outcomes is negatively related to the timeliness of disclosures. Skinner
(1994, 1997) claims that timely disclosure of bad earnings news shortens the nondisclosure
period and weakens the arguments that management failed to disclose the news resulting in
fewer potential plaintiffs and legal damages and lower settlement cost. Further, pre-disclosure of
poor performance is believed to reduce litigation risk considering that timelier disclosures
"spread the stock price decline over multiple dates" (Healy and Palepu 2001) before the earnings
announcement date; in turn, litigation motivated by a sudden stock price decline is less likely.
Consistent with federal securities laws, public companies are required to disclose timely,
comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events relevant to an investment
decision (SEC 2011, SEC 2018). Although there are no specific disclosure requirements that
address cybersecurity incidents, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) “Corporate
Finance Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2” (U.S. 2011) highlights other mandated disclosures,
such as the disclosure of significant events in the Management Disclosure and Analysis
(MD&A) section of the annual report, that may require companies to disclose cybersecurity
incidents if the cost and consequences represent a material event. As such, consistent with prior
literature on timely disclosure of bad earnings news and considering that similar disclosure
requirements will be applicable, I argue that more timely disclosure of cybersecurity incidents
will deter litigation, leading to lower expected legal costs. The delayed disclosure of
cybersecurity incidents should put investors at greater risk due to increased exposure to legal
liability; in turn, the perceived failure of management to contain the damage results in investors'
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lower performance expectations and lower valuation judgments. This leads to the first
hypothesis:
H1: More (less) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident, will result in more
favorable (less favorable) investors’ valuation judgments.
Disclosure Timeliness and Management Credibility
Prior research suggests that the observed negative impact of announcements of
cybersecurity incidents on a company’s market value may be due to investors' perceptions about
the loss of reputation and consumer confidence. These expectations impact investors’ estimation
of future cash flows (Cavosuglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2004). Investors’ perceptions of
management forthcomingness may also explain prior findings that support the litigation
reduction hypothesis. For instance, prior research documents a positive relationship between
perceptions of disclosure forthcomingness and assessment of management credibility (Libby and
Tan 1999; Mercer 2005). Libby and Tan (1999) examined disclosure forthcomingness by
warning (or not warning in the case of less forthcomingness) analysts about adverse earnings; in
their sample, analysts presented with more forthcoming disclosures assessed higher levels of
management integrity compared to analyst presented with less forthcoming disclosures. Mercer
(2005) similarly examined management forthcomingness and reported higher investors’
assessments of management competence and trustworthiness when management is more
forthcoming about bad news. Although the timeliness of disclosure was not a focus of the study,
Mercer (2005) identifies disclosure timeliness as one of the factors, along with disclosure
completeness and accuracy, which influence investors' perceptions of management
forthcomingness. Accordingly, more timely disclosures of cybersecurity incidents should lead to
more favorable investor assessment of management credibility.

86

The assumption that “timely disclosure may enhance managers’ perceived competence or
credibility, engendering a less severe negative stock price reaction” (Donelson et al. 2012, 1970)
suggests that the timeliness of disclosures should impact investors’ valuation judgments through
investors' assessment of management credibility. As predicted in the first hypothesis, disclosure
timeliness is expected to have a direct effect on investors' valuation judgments, but I also expect
that investors' assessments of management credibility will mediate the relationship between
disclosure timeliness and investors' valuation judgments. This leads to the second set of
hypotheses:
H2a: More (less) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident, will result in more
favorable (less favorable) investors’ assessment of management credibility.
H2b: Investors' assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of disclosure
timeliness on investors’ valuation judgments.

Voluntary Assurance and the Insurance Hypothesis
The baseline hypotheses predict that the timeliness of disclosures will be positively
associated with investors' assessments of management credibility and valuation judgments; these
predictions are mainly motivated given the negative legal consequences of delayed disclosures of
bad news which leads to investors' lower performance expectations and management credibility
assessments. Management has competing incentives to delay or accelerate the disclosure of bad
news. Although management may have a legitimate reason to delay the disclosure of a
cybersecurity incident, research consistently highlights the deleterious impact of this practice.
Findings from prior research suggest that companies engage in voluntary assurance services,
mainly, to enhance their credibility and reputation (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009). This
is explained theoretically by viewing the use of assurance as a remedial tactic. I build on
Wallace's (1980) insurance hypothesis to explore the potential usefulness and value of voluntary
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assurance as a mitigating factor that may help offset the negative impact of delayed disclosures
of bad news.
Wallace (1980) provides four main reasons that explain the demand for audit services as
a form of insurance: 1) the need for auditors to substantiate professional care, 2) the use of the
auditor as a codefendant, considering the expertise that companies have developed to deal with
liability suits, 3) the shared interests between the auditor and the client to protect both of their
reputation and to lower any associated legal cost, and 4) the perception that auditors are the
guarantor of the information release to investors, which shifts a portion of a company’s legal
liability to the auditor. Considering these factors, I argue that engaging in voluntary CRM
assurance services may be even more valuable in the event of a cybersecurity incident.
Considering the unique characteristics of these incidents, such as the complexity to assess
damages and the uncertainty around these events, companies may find it challenging to disclose
accurate and comprehensive information promptly.
Accordingly, although assurance over CRM should be valuable in any disclosure scenario
(regardless the timeliness of disclosure), CRM assurance services should be even more valuable
in circumstances where management is unable to make timely disclosures, as the higher the
litigation risk, the more the need for insurance. Hence, perceptions about management
competence in making decisions on behalf of investors that arise through prior acquisition of
voluntary CRM assurance should result in more favorable management credibility assessments
and will mitigate the negative impact of delayed disclosures of cybersecurity incidents. This
leads to the third hypothesis (See Figure 12):
H3: CRM assurance will have a more (less) positive effect on investor perceptions of
management credibility in the presence of less (more) timely disclosures.
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Methods
A 2 x 2 experimental design is used in which the timeliness of disclosure (more timely
versus less timely) and CRM assurance (assurance versus no assurance) are manipulated
between-subjects. A sample of non-professional investors is recruited to observe participants’
decision behavior. Specifically, this study investigates how the timeliness of disclosure of a
cybersecurity incident and the presence or absence of CRM assurance impact investors’
valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility.
Design and Participants
I recruited 144 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Prior research suggests
that MTurk workers are a source of reliable data (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011) and
that the participants drawn from this source are appropriate for research on nonprofessional
investors judgment and decisions (Koonce et al. 2015). 44 As an additional control measure for
the quality of the participant pool, only MTurk workers that have completed at least 1,000
human intelligence tasks (HITs) and have at least 98% approval rate over their HITs were
recruited to complete the study. Also, additional screening was used to select only participants at
least 18 years of age, United States citizens, fluent English speakers, that have taken at least two
accounting or finance classes and have experience reading financial statements. These screening
procedures are consistent with prior research that surveys non-professional investors’ recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Koonce, Miller, and Winchel 2015;

44

Initially, the desired sample size was 120 (30 participants per cell) participants. To achieve equal cell sizes, the
Qualtrics survey was set-up to randomly assign participants to one of the four experimental conditions. After
gathering the data and eliminating invalid attempts to complete the survey, valid responses yield unequal cell-sizes.
As such, I setup a Qualtrics quota to achieve equal cell sizes. There were 393 attempts to complete this study. From
the 432 attempts, there were 144 usable responses (36 per cell), 35 incomplete surveys, 141 surveys in which
participants failed to meet the qualification criteria, 65 incomplete surveys given that participants failed to pass the
review questions, and 8 surveys with either a duplicate IP address or Mturk ID.
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Asay, Elliot, and Rennekamp 2016). To alleviate issues of repeated participation, responses
were screened to avoid duplicate responses from the same IP address or the same MTurk ID
(Arnold and Triki 2017). 45
On average, participants are 29 to 38 years old and full-time employed. About 62 percent
of the participants are male, 80 percent of the participants have at least a bachelor’s degree, and
91 percent of the participants have some investment experience.
Task
Participants are instructed to evaluate a company for stock price valuation, based on the
information available. First, participants receive information about Aplus Insurance, described
as a leading corporation in the health and well-being industry. After being provided with a brief
description of the company, participants are instructed to make an initial valuation of the
company’s stock price. Participants then review a press release that announces a data breach.
The press release includes information about the disclosure timeliness, the extent of the breach,
and resources dedicated to help victims of the attack. Selected financial information and
information about the presence or absence of CRM assurance is presented next. Participants are
asked to reconsider their initial valuation judgments, and to answer additional case and
demographic questions.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable of interest is disclosure timeliness. Timeliness is
operationalized as the difference between the date when the company learned of the breach and
the date the breach was disclosed. The information about the disclosure timeliness is presented

45

Consistent with suggestions provided by Arnold and Triki (2017), a reminder about the importance of scientific
research will be presented to discourage participants to participate a second time.
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as part of the press release. Participants in the more timely condition are notified that the
company disclosed the incident within three days, while in the less timely conditions participants
are notified that the company disclosed the incident three months after discovery. Moreover,
participants are informed whether the disclosure was considered timely or not timely, based on
disclosure of similar cyber-attacks.
The second independent variable of interest is voluntary CRM assurance. In both
conditions (assurance and no assurance), participants learn that the company has a CRM program
in place and that controls are operating effectively. This variable is operationalized by notifying
participants whether the company engaged or did not engage in CRM assurance in the fiscal year
prior to the incident. Prior to the operationalization of this variable, participants receive
information about the benefits of cybersecurity risk management, and are informed about the
AICPA cybersecurity risk management guidelines and SOC for cybersecurity engagements.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable is investors’ perceived value of a company’s stock price
(valuation judgments). This variable is captured as participants’ valuation judgments after they
receive a description of the company but before the manipulations, and then again after the
additional information is presented (after the manipulations). 46 The measure of valuation
judgments is represented by the participant’s updated valuation judgments, while their initial
valuation judgment serves as a covariate. Valuation judgments are measured using a 7-point,
fully labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 47

46

This is consistent with Asay et al.’s (2016) measure of investors’ perceived value of a company’s stock.
Eutsler and Lang (2015) find that using a fully labeled 7-point scale result in reduced response bias, maximization
of variance, maximization of power, and minimization of error.
47
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Management credibility is a mediator in the model. Management credibility represents
participants’ assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, the two components of
management credibility. Participants’ assessment of management competence and
trustworthiness are measured using 7-point, fully labeled, scales that range from “very
incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and from “very untrustworthy” (equal
to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively. The average value of these two measures is
used to assess the measure of management credibility.
Results
Manipulation Checks
To test the effectiveness of the disclosure timeliness manipulation, I gathered
participants’ perceptions of disclosure timeliness by asking participants to indicate the extent to
which they agree that the company disclosed the breach on a timely manner using a 7-point, fully
labeled, scale that ranges from “extremely disagree” (equal to 1) to “extremely agree” (equal to
7). I find that participants assessment of disclosure timeliness are higher for participants in the
timely condition (mean=6.29) than for participants in the not timely condition (2.62). This
difference is statistically significant (F=289.077, p<0.001) which confirms that timeliness was
successfully manipulated between participants. Moreover, to confirm the successful
manipulation of CRM assurance, I asked participants to indicate whether or not Aplus Insurance
engaged in CRM assurance. Only participants that passed the manipulation check were allowed
to complete the experiment.
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Testing of Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1
H1 predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to more
(less) favorable investors judgments. Panel A of Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for
participant’s final valuation judgments. I tested H1 using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the
results are presented in Panel B of Table 9. The results support the hypothesized relationship
between timeliness and valuation judgments (F=29.426, p<0.001) and suggest that more timely
disclosures lead to more favorable investor valuation judgments.
Hypothesis 2
H2a predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to more
(less) favorable assessments of management credibility. Panel A of Table 10 presents descriptive
statistics for participant’s assessments of management credibility. The results of the ANOVA, as
shown in Panel B of Table 10, support H2a, and indicate that disclosure timeliness is positively
associated with management credibility assessments (F=41.118, p<0.001). The results are
graphically presented in Figure 13.
H2b predicts that management credibility mediates the relationship between disclosure
timeliness and valuation judgments. The results of the PROCESS mediation analysis, as shown
in Panel A and Panel B of Table 11, confirm the results of the ANOVA and indicate that
disclosure timeliness is positively associated with management credibility assessments (t=3.487,
p<0.001) and confirms my expectation that more favorable assessments of management
credibility leads to higher valuation judgments (t=7.872, p<0.001). Moreover, the analysis of the
indirect effect of disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments, in particular the evidence from
bootstrap confidence interval shown in Panel C of Table 11, confirm that management credibility
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mediates the relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments. This result
supports H2b.
Hypothesis 3
H3 predicts that a more (less) positive effect on investor perceptions of management
credibility in the presence of less (more) timely disclosures. As shown in Panel A of Table 10,
the mean management credibility assessments in the not timely/CRM assurance condition
(mean=4.21) is higher than the mean in the not timely/not CRM assurance condition
(mean=3.90) and the mean management credibility assessments in the timely/ CRM assurance
condition (mean=5.64) is higher than the mean in the timely/no CRM assurance condition
(mean=4.94). However, visual inspection of the interaction plot, as shown in Panel B of Figure
13, suggest that assurance has a greater positive impact on the favorability of credibility
assessments for the timely condition than for the not timely condition. The simple effects
analysis, reported in Panel C of Table 10, confirms a disordinal interaction between timeliness
and CRM assurance but the moderation effect of the interaction is in the opposite direction of the
hypothesis (t=2.594, p<0.005). Moreover, while the difference in management credibility
assessments between the timely/CRM assurance and timely/no CRM assurance conditions is
statistically significant (t=2.547, p=0.006), management credibility assessments are not
statistically significantly different (t=1.121, p=0.132) between the not timely/CRM assurance
and not timely/no CRM assurance. These results do not support H3 and suggest that CRM
assurance enhances management credibility only when a breach has been timely disclosed.
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Additional Analysis
Perceived Timeliness
To further the understanding of the determinants of perceptions of timeliness in the
context of cybersecurity, I collected supplementary data to capture participants’ 1) perceptions
that delayed disclosures are acceptable (Delay_Acceptable), and 2) participants perceptions of
the benefits of timely disclosures (Timely_Benefits). To gather participants perceptions that
delayed disclosures are acceptable, participants indicated their agreement with the following
statements: 1) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the increased
sophistication of hacking techniques”, 2) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable
given the complexity of determining the scope of the breach”, 3) ‘delaying the disclosure of a
cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations”, 4) “delaying the disclosure of a
cyber-attack is acceptable even when there is loss of identifiable information from customers and
employees”. Moreover, to gather participants perceptions of the benefits of timely disclosures, 1)
“timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of litigation”, 2) “timely disclosure
of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of lost business”, and 3) “timely disclosure of a
cybersecurity incident is the right thing to do”. Principal components analysis (PCA) confirms
that the Delay_Acceptable and the Timely_Benefits are two different constructs and that all
items load on a single construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978).
Moreover, as expected for formative constructs, all items have a VIF below 3.3 (Diamantopoulos
and Siguaw 2006). 48 As such, I created a Delay_Acceptable and a Timely_Benefits variable
using the average of all items for each construct.

48

PCA is desirable for formative constructs to assess construct validity (Petter, Strub, and Rai 2007).
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I used the disclosure timeliness manipulated variable, the Delay_Acceptable variable, the
Timely_Benefits variable, and their interaction with disclosure timeliness to explore how these
variables impact perceptions of disclosure timeliness. The results of regression analysis, as
shown in Table 12, show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between
disclosure timeliness (t=3.333, p<0.001) and perceptions that delayed disclosures are acceptable
(t=8.755, p<0.001) with participants’ perceptions that the breach was disclosed in a timely
manner. Moreover, a significant and negative interaction of disclosure timeliness and perceptions
that delayed disclosures are acceptable (t=-6.681, p<0.001) suggests that delayed disclosures are
considered more timely when perceptions that delayed disclosures are acceptable are higher.
Overall, the analysis suggests that although the timing of the disclosure is the main determinant
of perceived timeliness, there are context specific perceptions that also influence investors
disclosure of timeliness and, in turn, influence investors judgments and decisions. 49
Conclusion
This study explores the impact of the timeliness of cybersecurity breach disclosures and
CRM assurance on investors’ valuation judgments and management credibility assessments. I
predict and find that more timely disclosure of a cybersecurity breach increases management
credibility assessments and result in more favorable stock price valuations. I also find that the
relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments is mediated by management
credibility assessments.
The results of this study are important considering the evidence of the increasing cost of
cybersecurity breaches and in particular the negative market reaction to cyber-attacks. My findings
suggest that timely disclosures could help mitigate the negative stock price reaction associated

49

I used the perceived timeliness variables as a disclosure timeliness measure for the main analysis and the results
are consistent and qualitatively similar to the results using the manipulated variable for timeliness.

96

with the disclosure of cyber-attacks and that a combination of timely disclosure and prior CRM
assurance provide the highest benefits. These results are relevant for companies interested in
reducing the cost of cyber-attacks and also inform regulators and standard setters, such as the SEC
and the AICPA, interested in promoting and developing guidance for cybersecurity disclosures.
I also find that CRM assurance leads to more favorable assessments of management
credibility and valuation judgements only when the breach is disclosed in a timely fashion. This
finding adds to the literature and theory on voluntary assurance and is relevant for the AICPA
and audit practitioners given their current efforts to promote the SOC for cybersecurity. This
study highlights the importance of management’s ability to communicate a breach in a timely
fashion as part of its CRM process and suggests that auditors should be attuned to this need when
providing assurance over CRM processes.
Altogether, this study contributes to the literature and theory on the market reaction to
disclosure timeliness. While prior archival research argues that there is not a negative market
reaction to the timeliness of disclosures given the lack of information content of delayed
disclosures (Givoly and Palmon 1982; Kalay and Loewenstein 1986), I provide evidence that
timely disclosures are a strong signal that significantly impact investors judgments and decisions.
Moreover, evidence from additional analysis suggest that there are context specific perceptions
and expectations that drive perceptions of timeliness. This may help explain mixed findings
documented in prior research on the market reaction to disclosure timeliness.
This study also brings opportunity for future research to further the understanding on
remedial tactics for delayed disclosures. For instance, recent research suggests that management
responsibility acceptance influences investor’s reactions to external breaches (Tan and Yu 2018).
Moreover, results from additional analysis suggest that perceptions that delayed disclosures are
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acceptable influence perceptions of timeliness. As such, although the use of management
justifications for their disclosure timing strategy is beyond the scope of this study, future research
could explore whether management explanations and justifications could help influence
perceptions of timeliness and in turn help mitigate the negative impact of delayed disclosures.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
The three studies in this dissertation explore the impact of cybersecurity disclosure and
assurance. Study One investigates how jurors react to the timeliness of a cyber-attack
announcement and to the plausibility of the explanations provided to justify the disclosure
timing. In Study Two I explore whether voluntary CRM assurance, prior to a cyber-breach,
affects non-professional investors’ judgments and decisions, after the breach, and investigate
whether the changes in investors’ judgments and decisions differ when CRM assurance practices
violate or conform to expectancies, based on industry norms. Study Three explores how
disclosure timeliness and voluntary CRM assurance affect investor’s assessment of management
credibility and valuation judgments.
Findings from Study One confirm the prediction that more timely disclosure leads to
more favorable assessments of causal attribution and liability and that assessments of causal
attribution mediate the relationship between disclosure timeliness and liability. However, I was
unable to find evidence that the use of justifications as a remedial tactic helps reduce liability.
Additional anaysis reveals that more timely disclosures lead to greater beliefs that disclosures are
plausisible and that perceptions of the acceptability of delayed disclosures also influence
plausibility assessments and in turn affect causal attribution and liability assessments.
Evidence of the legal cost of delayed disclosure of cybersecurity breaches, as shown in
Study One, informs companies and market participants. Moreover, these findings inform
regulators and standard setters interested in promoting timely cybersecurity disclosures. Study
One adds to the literature and theory on the use of remedial tactics to reduce litigation and
suggests that the benefits of remedial tactics may be context specific. Moreover, this study
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contributes to theory via the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis by developing and testing a more
comprehensive model for explaining jurors’ judgment and decision making (JDM) processes.
Study Two finds that CRM assurance results in more favorable assessments of
management credibility and stock price valuations. Moreover, this study finds that investors
reward companies that engage in CRM assurance when assurance is not expected and that
investors penalize companies that do not engage in CRM assurance when assurance is expected.
Evidence from additional analysis provides additional insights on the benefits of having a CRM
program, even without the assurance component.
Study Two has relevant implications to practice as it informs the AICPA by providing
evidence that investors’ knowledge about whether assurance is expected or not expected, based
on industry norms, may help drive the demand for voluntary CRM assurance, as currently being
promoted with the SOC for cybersecurity engagements. This study also informs companies and
shareholders about the cost and incentives associated with voluntary CRM assurance. Study Two
also contributes to the literature and theory on investor judgment and decision making by
providing insights consistent with Wallace’s (1980) insurance hypothesis and is consistent with
the usefulness of voluntary assurance as insurance to mitigate the damage to firms’ value and
credibility after a cyber-attack.
Findings from Study Three show that more timely disclosure of a cybersecurity breach
leads to more favorable management credibility assessments and stock price valuations and that
the relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments is mediated by
management credibility assessments. I also find that CRM assurance increases credibility
assessments and valuation judgments when a breach has been disclosed in a timely manner.
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However, I am unable to support the prediction mitigating effect of CRM assurance on delayed
disclosures.
The results of Study Three inform companies interested in reducing the cost of cyberattacks by providing evidence that timely disclosures mitigate the negative stock price reaction
associated with the announcement of a cyber-attack. These results are also relevant for regulators
and standard setters currently working on cybersecurity disclosure guidance. The findings of Study
Three close a breach in the accounting literature on disclosure timeliness by documenting context
specific perceptions and beliefs that impact investors’ perceptions of timeliness and may help
explain mixed findings from prior research.
In summary, the results of the three studies have several implications for practice and for
the accounting literature and theory. The findings of the thesis shed light on desirable CRM
practices and mechanisms that can help reduce the cost of cyber-attacks. This evidence could be
used by regulators and standard setters promoting cybersecurity disclosure and assurance.
Altogether, these studies contribute to the judgment and decision making in accounting and
provide initial insights into the impact of context specific aspects of cybersecurity that influence
jurors’ and investors’ judgments.
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Panel A: Theoretical Model

Panel B: Predicted Interactions

Figure 1 - Study 1: Model Predictions
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Plausible

Implausible

No Justification

Timely
disclosed
Inaccurate Data

Timely
disclosed
Accurate Data

Timely

Not Timely
disclosed
Accurate Data

Not Timely
disclosed
Inaccurate Data

Not Timely

Breach Occurrence and Discovery
*The gray area represents fixed conditions between-subjects.

Figure 2 - Study 1: Experimental Conditions
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Financial Condition

Economic Impact

Company and Industry

Timely

Defendant's Arguments

Plaintiff Arguments

Case Information

Plausible

Not Timely
Implausible

Plausible

Implausible

On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in
November of 2015 hackers executed a sophisticated
attack …
The Class Period begins on February 2016, when
Aplus Insurance filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K
with the SEC, announcing the Company’s financial and
operating results for the year ended December 31, 2015
(the “2015 10-K”).

On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in
August of 2015 hackers executed a sophisticated attack
…
The Class Period begins on November 2015, when
Aplus Insurance filed a Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
with the SEC, announcing the Company’s financial and
operating results for the quarter ended September 30,
2015 (the “Q3 2015 10-Q”).

The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus
Insurance’s disclosures. The plaintiff presented
evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016,
issued by Aplus Insurance in which the company
acknowledges that the breach was discovered three
days before the announcement, almost eight months
after the attack.

The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus
Insurance’s disclosures. The plaintiff presented
evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016,
issued by Aplus Insurance in which the company
acknowledges that the breach was discovered three
months before the announcement, almost eight
months after the attack.

The defendant establishes that the incident was
disclosed three days after it was discovered, in the
most expedient time possible, and without unreasonable
delay, as required by the regulations of the state of
California.

The defendant establishes that the incident was
disclosed three months after it was discovered, in the
most expedient time possible, and without unreasonable
delay, as required by the regulations of the state of
California.
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Timely

Plaintiff Closing Statement

Plausible

Not Timely
Implausible

Plausible

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes
47 days for a company to disclose a cybersecurity
breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast
with other firms that have disclosed a cyber-attack,
Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days.
The disclosure was made 44 days earlier than the
average disclosure.
The plaintiff questions
The plaintiff questions
Aplus Insurance’s
Aplus Insurance's
disclosure timing as,
disclosure timing as it is
despite the incident being unlikely that a company
disclosed three days after would be able to gather
it was discovered, it took comprehensive and
them another three
accurate information and
months to release
disclose the information
comprehensive and
within three days of
accurate information
discovery.
about the extent of the
breach.
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Implausible

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes
47 days for a company to disclose a cybersecurity
breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast
with other firms that have disclosed a cyber-attack,
Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three
months. The disclosure was made 44 days later than
the average disclosure.
The plaintiff questions
The plaintiff questions
Aplus Insurance's
Aplus Insurance's
disclosure timing as it took disclosure timing as it took
them three months to
them three months to
disclose the incident and disclose the incident and it
to release comprehensive took them another three
and accurate information months to release
about the extent of the
comprehensive and
breach.
accurate information
about the extent of the
breach.

Timely
Plausible

Not Timely
Implausible

Plausible

Defense Closing Statement

The attorney states that the The attorney states that the
Company made every effort Company made every
to gather all the relevant
effort to gather all the
facts of the impact of the
relevant facts of the impact
breach.
of the breach.
A press release was issued A press release was issued
quickly to notify customers, quickly to notify
so they could take actions to customers, so they could
protect their identities.
take actions to protect their
identities.

The attorney states that the The attorney states that the
Company made every
Company made every effort
effort to gather all the
to gather all the relevant
relevant facts of the impact facts of the impact of the
of the breach.
breach.

Given the initial
uncertainties, management
was unable to release
accurate information about
the extent of the breach
when the breach was
discovered.
However, a press release
was issued in the most
expedient time possible to
notify customers, so they
could take actions to
protect their identities.
Given the initial
uncertainties, management
was unable to release
accurate information about
the extent of the breach at
the time of the
announcement.
A dedicated website was
established for customers to
access additional
information.
After gathering all the
The press release included
information, three months comprehensive and
after the breach was
accurate information about
disclosed, the company
the extent of the breach.
issued additional press
releases that included
comprehensive and accurate
information about the extent
of the breach.
A dedicated website was
established for customers
to access additional
information.

Given the initial
uncertainties, management
was unable to release
accurate information about
the extent of the breach
when the breach was
discovered.
However, a press release
was issued in the most
expedient time possible to
notify customers, so they
could take actions to protect
their identities.

A dedicated website was
established for customers to
access additional
information.
The press release included After gathering all the
comprehensive and
information, three months
accurate information about after the breach was
the extent of the breach. announced, the company
issued additional press
releases that included
comprehensive and accurate
information about the extent
of the breach.
A dedicated website was
established for customers
to access additional
information.

Figure 3 - Study 1: Operationalization of Plausibility
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Implausible

ᵃ Bold arrows are significant at the 0.10 level.
Variable definitions:
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their
assessment of causal attribution.
Perceived plausibility is the average of participants agreement that the justification is 1) plausible and 2) believable.
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0)
otherwise.
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there
is no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.

Figure 4 - Study 1: Additional Analysis
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Table 1 - Study 1: Test of H1
Liability Assessments
Panel A: Cell Means
Timeliness
Plausibility
Plausible
Control
Implausible

n
28
28
28

Timely
mean
4.500
4.321
4.000

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance
Source
Timeliness – H1
Plausibility
Timeliness * Plausibility
Error

S.D.
1.905
1.949
1.769

d.f.
1
1
1
162

n
28
28
28

Not Timely
mean
5.750
5.429
5.607

M.S. F-value
73.339 28.161
1.595 0.613
0.929 0.357
2.604

S.D.
1.236
1.451
1.449

p-valueᵃ
<0.001
0.543
0.701

ᵃ Reported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
Variable definitions:
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0)
otherwise.
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there is
no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.
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Table 2 - Study 1: Test of H2a and H3
Assessment of Causal Attribution
Panel A: Cell Means
Timeliness
Plausibility
Plausible
Control
Implausible

n
28
28
28

Timely
mean
2.490
2.674
2.740

S.D.
1.547
1.793
1.919

n
28
28
28

Not Timely
mean
S.D.
4.388
1.788
4.301
1.965
4.694
1.901

Panel B: Analysis of Variance
Source
Timeliness – H2a
Plausibility
Timeliness * Plausibility – H3
Error

d.f.
1
1
1
162

M.S. F-value p-valueᵃ
140.121 42.118 <0.001
1.236 0.371
0.345
0.427 0.128
0.440
3.327

ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
Variable definitions:
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their
assessment of causal attribution.
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0)
otherwise.
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there
is no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.
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Table 3 - Study 1: Test of H2b and H3

Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analysis
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects
Causal Attribution
Coefficient
p-valueᵃ
1.883
0.060
(2.541)
-0.125
0.303
(-0.515)

Variable
Timeliness
Plausibility
Timeliness * Plausibility

-0.028

Liability Assessment
Coefficient
p-valueᵃ
0.427
0.034
(14.153)

0.467

(-0.082)
Causal Attribution
Constant

2.884
(5.506)

<0.001

0.490
(8.506)
2.983
(8.506)

<0.001
<0.001

Panel B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Timeliness on Liability Assessments
Mediator
Implausible
Control
Plausible

Expectancy
1
2
3

Effect
0.9085
0.8948
0.881

Boot SE
0.2881
0.2087
0.2461

BootLLCI
0.3937
0.5309
0.4549

BootULCI
1.5180
1.3357
1.4052

Index
-0.0137

Boot SE
0.1681

BootLLCI
-0.3582

BootULCI
0.3162

Panel C: Index of Moderated Mediation
Mediator
Plausibility

ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant.
Variable definitions:
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their assessment of causal
attribution.
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) otherwise.
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there is no
justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.
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Table 4 - Study 1: Additional Analysis
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects
Perceived Plausibility
Variable
Timeliness
Plausibility
Timeliness * Plausibility
Prefer_Accuracy
Prefer_Accuracy * Timeliness
Perceived Plausibility
Causal Attribution
Constant

Causal Attribution

Coefficient

t-stat

p-valueᵃ

Coefficient

t-stat

p-valueᵃ

-5.123
0.099
0.057
-0.261
0.712

-6.368
0.487
0.200
-2.598
5.245

<0.001
0.313
0.421
0.005
<0.001

0.192
-0.056
-0.026
-0.127
-0.051
-0.751

0.258
-0.331
-0.110
-1.498
-0.420
-11.543

0.398
0.371
0.456
0.068
0.338
<0.001

6.2121

10.601

<0.001

7.281

11.536

<0.001

Liability Assessments
Coefficien
t-stat p-valueᵃ
t
0.141
0.212
0.416
0.309
0.151
0.021
-0.154
-0.722
0.236
0.023
0.303
0.381
-0.042
-0.388
0.349
-0.620
-7.871
<0.001
0.090
1.268
0.103
6.652
8.701
<0.001

Panel B: Analysis of Indirect Effects Assessments
Indirect effect
Total
Timeliness -> Perceived Plausibility ->Liability Assessment
Timeliness -> Causal Attribution -> Liability Assessment
Timeliness -> Perceived Plausibility -> Causal Attribution -> Liability Assessment

Effect
3.5386
3.1770
0.0172
0.3444

Boot SE
0.6082
0.8190
0.0963
0.3990

BootLLC BootULC
I
I
2.3769
4.7595
1.9084
5.0790
-0.2416 0.1674
-0.3056 1.2740

ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
Bold confidence intervals are significant.
Variable definitions:
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their assessment of causal attribution.
Perceived plausibility is the average of participants agreement that the justification is 1) plausible and 2) believable.
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) otherwise.
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there is no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are
plausible.
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Panel A: Theoretical Model

Expectancy
Violations

Management
Credibility

Valuation
Judgments

Assurance

Panel B: Interaction between CRM assurance and Conformity with Expectancies on
Management Credibility

Figure 5 - Study 2: Model Predictions
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Average Valuation Judgments

Figure 6 - Study 2: Test of H1
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Mediation Analysis

Management
Credibility

Valuation
Judgments

Assurance

*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.001, respectively.
Variable definitions:
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that
ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy”
(equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that
ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7).

Figure 7 - Study 2: Test of H2
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Panel A: Average Management Credibility Assessment – H3a

Panel B: Results of Mediated Moderation Analysis – H3b

Assurance
X
Expectancy
Expectancy
Management
Credibility

Assurance

Valuation
Judgments

*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.001, respectively.
Variable definitions:
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance practices and zero (0)
otherwise.
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that
ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy”
(equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that
ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7).

Figure 8 - Study 2: Test of H3
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Perceived Benefits of Assurance-as-Insurance
Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments

Panel A: Average Management Credibility Assessments

Figure 9 - Study 2: Additional Analysis
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Perceived Accountants Cyber-Expertise
Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments

Panel A: Average Management Credibility Assessments

Figure 10 - Study 2: Additional Analysis
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Disclosure of Cyber-risk Management Practices
Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments

Panel B: Average Management Credibility Assessments

Figure 11 - Study 2: Additional Analysis
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Table 5 - Study 2: Test of H1
Average Valuation Judgments
Panel A: Cell Means

Assurance
Assurance
No Assurance

Assurance Expectancies ᵃ
Conform-to-expectancies
Violate-expectancies
n
mean
S.D.
n
mean
S.D.
42
4.170
1.048
42
4.329
0.825
42
3.679
1.289
42
3.489
1.212

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance
Source

d.f.

M.S.

Assurance – H1
Expectancy
Assurance * Expectancy
Initial Valuation
Error

1
1
1
1
163

18.378
0.010
1.285
2.229
1.162

Fp-valueᵇ
value
15.817
<0.001
0.009
0.926
1.106
0.148
1.918
0.084

ᵃReported means are adjusted by initial valuations (mean=4.10). Unadjusted means are not significantly different and
in the same direction.
ᵇReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
ᶜThe values attached are -1, 1, 0, 0 for the negative violation test; and 0, 0, -1, 1 for the positive violation test.
Variable definitions:
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully
labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7).
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance
practices and zero (0) otherwise.
Initial Valuation is the participant’s valuation judgment before being presented with the manipulations.
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Table 6 - Study 2: Test of H2a and H3a

Average Management Credibility Assessments
Panel A: Cell Means

Assurance
Assurance
No Assurance

Assurance Expectancies
Conform-to-expectancies
Violate-expectancies
n
mean
S.D.
n
mean
S.D.
42
5.131
1.048
42
5.452
0.825
42
4.405
1.289
42
3.655
1.212

Panel B: Analysis of Variance
Source

d.f.

Assurance – H2a
Expectancy
Assurance * Expectancy – H3a
Error

1
1
1
164

Fp-valueᵃ
value
66.881 54.489
<0.001
1.929 1.571
0.212
12.054 9.820
<0.001
1.227

d.f.
164
164

M.S. t-value p-valueᵃ
0.750 2.747
0.004
0.321 1.562
0.061

M.S.

Panel C: Test of Simple Effects – H3a
Simple effectsᵇ
Negative Violation
Positive Violation

ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
ᵇ The values attached are -1, 1, 0, 0 for the negative violation test; and 0, 0, -1, 1 for the positive violation test.
Variable definitions:
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance
practices and zero (0) otherwise.
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured
using a scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that
ranges from “very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.
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Table 7 - Study 2: Test of H2b

Mediation Analysis
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects

Variable
Assurance

Management
Credibility
Coefficie
p-valueᵃ
nt
1.251
<0.001
(7.064)

Management
Credibility
Initial Valuation
Constant

Updated Valuation
Coefficie
nt
0.0417
(0.257)
0.499

0.100
(0.561)
3.624
(4.939)

0.575
<0.001

(7.998)
0.178
(1.243)
0.839
(1.332)

p-valueᵃ
0.797
<0.001
0.216
0.185

Panel B: Indirect Effects of Assurance on Valuation Judgments
Mediator
Management
Credibility

Effect

Boot SE

BootLLCI

BootULCI

0.624

0.131

0.3903

0.8945

ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant.
Variable definitions:
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a
scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from
“very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled,
scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7).
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
Initial Valuation is the participant’s valuation judgment before being presented with the manipulations.
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Table 8 - Study 2: Test of H3b
Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analysis
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects
Management Credibility
Coefficient
p-valueᵃ
0.726
0.002
(3.004)
-0.750
0.002
(-3.102)
1.071
0.002
(3.134)

Variable
Assurance
Expectancy
Assurance * Expectancy
Management Credibility
Initial Valuation
Constant

4.405
(25.766)

<0.001

Updated Valuation
Coefficient p-valueᵃ
0.042
0.797
(0.257)

0.499
(7.998)
0.178
(1.243)
0.839
(1.332)

<0.001
0.216
0.1846

Panel B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Assurance on Valuation Judgments
Mediator
Management Credibility
Management Credibility

Expectancy
0
1

Effect
0.3624
0.897

Boot SE
0.1419
0.1666

BootLLCI
0.1156
0.5849

BootULCI
0.6825
1.2407

Index
0.5347

Boot SE
0.1825

BootLLCI
0.2012

BootULCI
0.9209

Panel C: Index of Moderated Mediation
Mediator
Management Credibility

ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant.
Variable definitions:
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that
ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy”
(equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that
ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7).
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance practices and zero (0)
otherwise.
Initial Valuation is the participant’s valuation judgment before being presented with the manipulations.
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Panel A: Theoretical Model
Assurance

Management
Credibility

Valuation
Judgments

Timeliness

Panel B: Interaction between CRM Assurance and Disclosure Timeliness on Management
Credibility

Figure 12 - Study 3: Model Predictions

131

Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments

Panel B: Average Management Credibility Assessments

Figure 13 - Study 3: Test of H1 and H3
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Table 9 - Study 3: Test of H1

Average Valuation Judgments
Panel A: Cell Means

Timeliness
Timely
Not Timely

n
36
36

CRM Assurance
Assurance
No Assurance
mean
S.D.
n
mean
S.D.
4.472
0.971
36
3.917
1.052
3.389
1.178
36
3.278
1.210

Panel B: Analysis of Variance
Source

d.f.

M.S.

Timeliness – H1
Assurance
Timeliness * Assurance
Initial Valuation
Error

1
1
1
1
139

22.415
4.988
2.705
11.120
1.154

Fp-valueᵃ
value
19.426
<0.001
4.323
0.020
2.344
0.064
9.638
0.001

ᵃ Reported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
Variable definitions:
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully
labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7).
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company discloses the breach in three days and zero (0) if the
company discloses the breach in three months.
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
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Table 10 - Study 3: Test of H2a and H3

Average Management Credibility Assessments
Panel A: Cell Means

Timeliness
Timely
Not Timely

n
36
36

CRM Assurance
Assurance
No Assurance
mean
S.D.
n
mean
S.D.
5.639
0.825
36
4.944
1.241
4.208
1.197
36
3.903
1.303

Panel B: Analysis of Variance
Source

d.f.

Timeliness – H2a
Assurance
Timeliness * Assurance – H3
Error

1
1
1
140

Fp-valueᵃ
value
55.007 41.118 <0.001
9.000 6.727
0.005
1.361 1.017
0.157
1.338

d.f.
140

M.S. t-value p-valueᵃ
1.338 2.594
0.005

M.S.

Panel C: Planned Contrast
Contrastᵇ
Assurance

ᵃ Reported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
ᵇ The values attached are -1, 1, -1, 1.
Variable definitions:
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured
using a scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that
ranges from “very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company discloses the breach in three days and zero (0) if the
company discloses the breach in three months.
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
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Table 11 - Study 3: Test of H2b and H3

Moderated Mediation Analysis
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects
Variable
Timeliness
Assurance
Timeliness * Assurance
Initial
Valuation

Management Credibility
Coefficient
p-valueᵃ
2.355
<0.001
(3.487)
0.295
0.137
(1.098)
0.473
0.108
(1.241)
0.379

0.028

(2.321)
Management Credibility – H2b
Constant

2.355
(3.395)

136

<0.001

Valuation Judgments
Coefficient
p-valueᵃ
0.185
0.125
(1.073)

0.264
(2.002)
0.518
(7.872)
4.716
(13.834)

0.024
<0.001
<0.001

Panel B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Timeliness on Valuation Judgments
Mediator
Plausibility
Management Credibility
0
Management Credibility
1

Effect
0.4902
0.7351

Boot SE
0.1651
0.4344

BootLLCI
0.1921
0.4344

BootULCI
0.8250
1.0690

Index
0.2449

Boot SE
0.2085

BootLLCI
-0.1417

BootULCI
0.6737

Panel C: Index of Moderated Mediation
Mediator
Management Credibility – H3

ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.
T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant.
Variable definitions:
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to
“very high” (equal to 7).
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to
1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company discloses the breach in three days and zero (0) if the company discloses the breach in three months.
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.
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Table 12 - Study 3: Additional Analysis

Regression Analysis for Determinants of Perceived Timeliness
Perceived Timeliness
Coefficient t-stat p-value
4.642
3.333 <0.001
0.769
8.755 <0.001
-0.858
-6.681 <0.001
0.181
1.302 0.195
0.238
1.124 0.263
-0.641
-0.698 <0.001

Variable
Timeliness
Delay Acceptable
Delay Acceptable * Timeliness
Timely Benefits
Timely Benefits * Timeliness
Constant
Observations
R-Squared

144
0.797

Variable definitions:
Perceived timeliness is participants agreement that the disclosure of the breach was made on a timely manner..
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) otherwise.
Delay Acceptable is participants perceptions that delayed disclosures of cyber-attacks are acceptable due to 1) the increased
sophistication of hacking techniques, 2) the complexity of determining the scope of the breach, 3) need to conduct required
investigations, 4) even when there is loss of identifiable information from customers and employees.
Timely benefits is participants perceptions that timely disclosure of cyber-attacks: 1) reduces the risk of litigation, 2) reduces the
risk of lost business, and 3) is the right thing to do.
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APPENDIX G: STUDY ONE EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
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Comments to reviewers are made in Red, Bold, and Italics
Start of Block: Screening

Are you at least 18 years of age and a United States Citizen?

o Yes
o No
Have you ever worked for an insurance company or a health provider?

o Yes
o No
Have you worked as a lawyer or for a law firm?

o Yes
o No
Have you suffered financial loss due to identity theft?

o Yes
o No
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What is your Mturk Worker ID?
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Screening
Start of Block: Default Question Block

EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH
Title of Project: Jurors’ liability assessments after cybersecurity breaches: the impact of
disclosure timeliness and the plausibility of management justifications
Principal Investigator: Patricia Navarro-Velez
Faculty Supervisor: Steve G. Sutton
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.
The purpose of this study is to explore how jurors make liability assessments.
You will assume the role of a juror in a court case involving a group of shareholders and a
corporation. In your role as a juror, you will read a summary of the trial testimony and answer
questions regarding your opinions related to the case.
This study will be administered online. We expect that it will take you approximately 30
minutes to complete this experiment.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints contact Patricia Navarro-Velez, Doctoral Candidate, UCF Accounting
Department at (407)823-5837 or Dr. Steve G. Sutton, Faculty Advisor, UCF Accounting
Department at (407)823-5857.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:
Research at the University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under
the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and
approved by the IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research,
please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &

Only participants who answer Yes to screening question 1 and No to questions 2-4 are
allowed to continue the survey.
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Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901.
Continuing on to the following pages indicates your permission to take part in this research.
End of Block: Default Question Block
Start of Block: Task Description

Page Break
You must complete this task in a single sitting. The task will take about 30 minutes to
complete. If you do not have approximately 30 minutes to complete the task right now, please
do not start the study.
It is also critical that you do not complete this study twice or discuss this study with
others. This is serious research of interest to financial regulators, and the results could be
compromised or ruined by you discussing this material with others.
End of Block: Task Description
Start of Block: Task Instructions

In this case, you will first read background information. Second, you will assume the role of a
juror in a court case involving a group of shareholders and a corporation. In your role as a juror,
you will read a summary of the trial and answer questions regarding your opinions related to
the case. There are no right or wrong answers to the case questions you will be asked.
It is important that you read all case materials carefully and answer the included questions
thoughtfully and honestly. Throughout the case you will answer the following three types of
questions:
Review Questions reflect whether you read and understand the presented material. These
questions will not be difficult if you read the materials carefully.
Case Questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts described in the
case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.
Wrap-Up Questions ask you some miscellaneous and demographic questions.
IMPORTANT: YOU MUST ANSWER 100% OF THE REVIEW QUESTIONS CORRECTLY TO BE
COMPENSATED.
Review Question:
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To be compensated, I must answer at least:

o 50% of the review questions correctly.
o 75% of the review questions correctly.
o 100% of the review questions correctly.
End of Block: Task Instructions
Start of Block: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BACKGROUND

Background Information – Disclosure of Cybersecurity Risks and Practices
The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. As such, the SEC
requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public.
Companies prepare financial statements for investors, lenders, and other users. Thus, investors
and lenders use financial statements to assess the financial “health” of the company to
determine whether to invest in or loan money to the company. Although there are no specific
SEC enforcements regarding cybersecurity disclosures, the federal securities laws require the
disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about material risks and events
relevant to an investment decision. Information is considered material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an investment
decision. The SEC establishes that disclosures about material risks and events, including
cybersecurity risks and incidents, may need to complement a company’s financial statements
and be included in the description of the company’s risk factors, Management Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A) section, or the disclosures (notes) to the financial statements.
When the disclosure of information about the company is in violation of securities laws
investors who have suffered economic injury file lawsuits (securities class action) to seek
compensation to recover the money they lost. When this occurs, jurors are chosen from the
general public to evaluate if it is more likely than not that the allegations against the company
are true. If the jury finds that it is more likely than not that the allegations against the company
are true, the company is held responsible for compensating the plaintiff (i.e. the investors who
lost money because of their reliance on the information disclosed). If the jury finds that it is not
likely that the allegations against the company are true, the company is not required to pay any
damages.
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Review Questions:

Investors and lenders use a company's financial statements when making decisions about
whether to invest in or loan money to that company.

o True
o False
Companies are required to disclose risks and events relevant to an investment decision.

o True
o False
Companies are required to disclose comprehensive and accurate information. However, the
timeliness of the disclosure is not relevant for compliance with federal securities laws.

o True
o False
When a company fails to disclose relevant information for investment decisions, investors often
sue the company to recover the money they lost.

o True
o False
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Not Timely Condition
Start of Block: CASE INFORMATION

Case Information
Aplus Insurance is a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange and is a
leading health and well-being company headquartered in California. Aplus Insurance is one of
the largest health benefits companies in the United States and delivers a variety of health
solutions, such as health care, dental, and vision plans, along with other specialty products,
such as life and disability insurance products. The 2015 financial statements for Aplus
Insurance disclosed net revenue of $2.6 billion. Following the release of the 2015 financial
statements, the stock price of the company continued on a positive trend.
On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in August of 2015 hackers executed a
sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized access to one of the company’s IT systems and
obtained personal information relating to customers and employees. The information accessed
included unencrypted personal information, such as names, birthdays, social security numbers,
street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income
data. According to Aplus Insurance, they became aware of the attack eight months after the
incident and disclosed the incident three months afterward. Following this announcement,
Aplus Insurance’s share price fell $4.40, or 4.94%, to close at $84.6.
As a result of the cyber-attack on Aplus Insurance, the aggregate investor losses are estimated
at $10 billion. Based on this, a securities class action lawsuit was filed by investors who bought
or sold Aplus Insurance's securities within the class period. The Class Period begins on
November 2015, when Aplus Insurance filed a Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the SEC,
announcing the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended September 30,
2015 (the “Q3 2015 10-Q”).
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Timely Condition
Case Information
Aplus Insurance is a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange and is a
leading health and well-being company headquartered in California. Aplus Insurance is one of
the largest health benefits companies in the United States and delivers a variety of health
solutions, such as health care, dental, and vision plans, along with other specialty products,
such as life and disability insurance products. The 2015 financial statements for Aplus
Insurance disclosed net revenue of $2.6 billion. Following the release of the 2015 financial
statements, the stock price of the company continued on a positive trend.
On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in November of 2015 hackers executed a
sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized access to one of the company’s IT systems and
obtained personal information relating to customers and employees. The information accessed
included unencrypted personal information, such as names, birthdays, social security numbers,
street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income
data. According to Aplus Insurance, they became aware of the attack eight months after the
incident and disclosed the incident three days afterward. Following this announcement, Aplus
Insurance’s share price fell $4.40, or 4.94%, to close at $84.6.
As a result of the cyber-attack on Aplus Insurance, the aggregate investor losses are estimated
at $10 billion. Based on this, a securities class action lawsuit was filed by investors who bought
or sold Aplus Insurance's securities within the class period. The Class Period begins on
February 2016, when Aplus Insurance filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K with the SEC,
announcing the Company’s financial and operating results for the year ended December 31,
2015 (the “2015 10-K”).

Review Question:

The class action lawsuit against Aplus Insurance alleges investors' losses of $10 billion.

o True
o False
End of Block: CASE INFORMATION
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Start of Block: Plaintiff Arguments

Not Timely Condition
Summary of the Plaintiff’s Arguments
The Complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants made materially false and
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Aplus Insurance failed to encrypt its users’ personal
information and/or failed to encrypt its users’ personal data with an up-to-date and secure
encryption scheme; (ii) consequently, sensitive personal account information from more than
70 million individuals was vulnerable to theft; (iii) a data breach resulting in the theft of
personal customer data would foreseeably cause a significant drop in user engagement with
Aplus Insurance services; and (iv) as a result, Aplus Insurance’s public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.
The plaintiff presented evidence of the annual (10K) and quarterly (10Q) reports released by
Aplus Insurance during the class period. The evidence presented shows that Aplus Insurance
failed to disclose the failure to encrypt its users’ personal information and personal data with
an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme.
The plaintiff argued that the disclosure of cybersecurity risks, within the annual and quarterly
reports, was limited to the following statement of risk factors:
“Delays or disruptions to our service, or the loss or compromise of data, could result from a
variety of causes, including cyber-attacks.”
The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus Insurance’s disclosures. The plaintiff
presented evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016, issued by Aplus Insurance in
which the company acknowledges that the breach was discovered three months before the
announcement, almost eight months after the event.
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Timely Condition
Summary of the Plaintiff’s Arguments
The Complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants made materially false and
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Aplus Insurance failed to encrypt its users’ personal
information and/or failed to encrypt its users’ personal data with an up-to-date and secure
encryption scheme; (ii) consequently, sensitive personal account information from more than
70 million individuals was vulnerable to theft; (iii) a data breach resulting in the theft of
personal customer data would foreseeably cause a significant drop in user engagement with
Aplus Insurance services; and (iv) as a result, Aplus Insurance’s public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.
The plaintiff presented evidence of the annual (10K) and quarterly (10Q) reports released by
Aplus Insurance during the class period. The evidence presented shows that Aplus Insurance
failed to disclose the failure to encrypt its users’ personal information and personal data with
an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme.
The plaintiff argued that the disclosure of cybersecurity risks, within the annual and quarterly
reports, was limited to the following statement of risk factors:
“Delays or disruptions to our service, or the loss or compromise of data, could result from a
variety of causes, including cyber-attacks.”
The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus Insurance’s disclosures. The plaintiff
presented evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016, issued by Aplus Insurance in
which the company acknowledges that the breach was discovered three days before the
announcement, almost eight months after the event.

Page Break
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Summary of the Defendant’s Arguments
In response to the allegations of the plaintiff, the defendant, Aplus Insurance, responds that
cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable business risk, and so Aplus Insurance discloses
cyber-attacks as a risk factor in their annual and quarterly reports. In addition, Aplus Insurance
presented evidence of actions taken to contain the damage promptly. Evidence included the
disclosure of the incident, creation of a dedicated website established to provide additional
information, including frequently asked questions, and provision of two years of free credit
monitoring and identity protection services to customers and employees.
The defendant establishes that the incident was disclosed three days after it was discovered, in
the most expedient time possible, and without unreasonable delay, as required by the
regulations of the state of California.

Page Break
Plaintiff Closing Statement
The attorney for the plaintiff revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case,
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should be held responsible for the class action financial
losses. The plaintiff argues that the company presented misleading financial reports as Aplus
Insurance failed to disclose its failure to encrypt users’ personal information and personal data
with an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme. The plaintiff alleges that Aplus Insurance’s
negligence resulted in aggregate investor losses estimated at $10 billion.
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Timely/Plausible Condition
The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast with other firms that have
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days. The disclosure
was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure.
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as, despite the incident
being disclosed three days after it was discovered, it took them another three months to
release comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the breach.
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff.
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Not Timely/Plausible Condition
The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast with other firms that have
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after about three months. The
disclosure was made 44 days later than the average disclosure.
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as it took them three
months to disclose the incident and to release comprehensive and accurate information about
the extent of the breach.
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff.
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Timely/Implausible Condition
The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast with other firms that have
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days. The disclosure
was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure.
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as it is unlikely that a
company would be able to gather comprehensive and accurate information and disclose the
information within three days of discovery.
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff.
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Not Timely/Implausible Condition
The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast with other firms that have
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after about three months. The
disclosure was made 44 days later than the average disclosure.
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as it took them three
months to disclose the incident and it took them another three months to release
comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the breach.
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff.
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Timely/Control Condition
The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast with other firms that have
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days. The disclosure
was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure.
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff.
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Not Timely/Control Condition
The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:

The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast with other firms that have
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after about three months. The
disclosure was made 44 days later than the average disclosure.
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff.

Page Break
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Timely/Plausible Condition
Defendant Closing Statement
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case,
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial
losses. The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay.
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the
impact of the breach. A press release was issued quickly to notify customers, so they could take
actions to protect their identities. Given the initial uncertainties, management was unable to
release accurate information about the extent of the breach at the time of the announcement.
A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information. After
gathering all the information, three months after the breach was disclosed, the company issued
additional press releases that included comprehensive and accurate information about the
extent of the breach.
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.
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Timely/Implausible Condition
Defendant Closing Statement
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case,
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial
losses. The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay.
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the
impact of the breach. A press release was issued quickly to notify customers, so they could take
actions to protect their identities.
The press release included comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the
breach. A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information.
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.

157

Not Timely/Plausible Condition
Defendant Closing Statement
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case,
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial
losses. The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay.
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the
impact of the breach. Given the initial uncertainties, management was unable to release
accurate information about the extent of the breach when the breach was
discovered. However, a press release was issued in the most expedient time possible to notify
customers, so they could take actions to protect their identities.
The press release included comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the
breach. A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information.
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.

158

Not Timely/Implausible Condition
Defendant Closing Statement
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case,
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial
losses. The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay.
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the
impact of the breach. Given the initial uncertainties, management was unable to release
accurate information about the extent of the breach when the breach was
discovered. However, a press release was issued in the most expedient time possible to notify
customers, so they could take actions to protect their identities.
A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information. After
gathering all the information, three months after the breach was disclosed, the company issued
additional press releases that included comprehensive and accurate information about the
extent of the breach.
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.
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Control Condition
Defendant Closing Statement
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case,
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial
losses. The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay.
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.
End of Block: Plaintiff Arguments
Start of Block: Judge's Instructions

Judge's Instructions to the Jury:
Before allowing the jury to deliberate and determine a verdict, the Judge provides instructions
to the jury:
It is your responsibility to determine the facts from the evidence presented to you. You will use
these facts and the law given in these instructions to decide the case. You should consider the
evidence in light of your observations and experiences in life. You may draw any reasonable
inferences from the proven facts. Also, keep in mind that statements made by attorneys are not
evidence.
The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. The level of proof required is the preponderance of
the evidence, which means that the allegations are more probably true than not true. To be
successful in a claim of liability, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations against Aplus Insurance. You should consider whether the defendant should be held
liable for the plaintiff losses. If you decide that the defendant, Aplus Insurance, should not be
held liable, you must find in its favor. If you decide that Aplus Insurance should be held liable,
you must find for the plaintiff.
If you decide for the plaintiff, you must then determine the amount of money that will
reasonably and fairly compensate the Class Members for its $10 billion loss resulting from the
stock transactions. The amount of money that you determine must be based on the principle of
proportional liability. The principle of proportional liability states that jurors must consider the
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extent to which the defendant was responsible for the allegations relative to other responsible
parties.

Review Question

It is my responsibility to determine the facts from the evidence presented to me. Statements
made by attorneys are not evidence.

o True
o False
End of Block: Judge's Instructions
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Start of Block: Case Questions

Case Questions
The following questions are intended to assess your views of the defendant's (Aplus
Insurance's) level of liability for the plaintiff’s alleged losses. There are no right or wrong
answers - these questions ask for your personal views. Please answer the following response
questions about the case openly and honestly.

Page Break
Assume that you are a juror on this case. Would you find Aplus Insurance (the defendant) liable
with regards to shareholders’ losses in connection with the cyber-attack to Aplus Insurance?

o Yes, Aplus Insurance is liable.
o No, Aplus Insurance is not liable.
How confident are you in your verdict?
Not
confident
at all

o

Somewhat
not
confident

o

Slightly
not
confident

Neither
not
confident
nor
confident

o

o

Page Break
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Slightly
confident

o

Somewhat
confident

o

Very
confident

o

DV1: Liability Assessment
How likely is it that Aplus Insurance is liable?
Extremely
Unlikely

Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

o

o

o

Neither
Unlikely
nor Likely

o

Likely

Very
Likely

o

o

Extremely
Likely

o

Page Break
Imagine that a majority of the jury has found Aplus Insurance liable and that you will be able to
impose damages on Aplus Insurance to pay to compensate Class Members for their $10 billion
loss. On the scale below, please indicate the percentage of damages, if any, you would be
willing to require that Aplus Insurance pays Class Members? (Remember that the principle of
proportional liability applies.)
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

o o o o o o o o o o o
Page Break
Do you believe Aplus Insurance was grossly negligent in disclosing the cyber-attack (i.e., Aplus
Insurance had extreme, reckless disregard for stakeholder’s rights to be notified of material
events)?

o Yes, Aplus Insurance was grossly negligent.
o No, Aplus Insurance was not grossly negligent.
Page Break
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How likely is it that Aplus Insurance was grossly negligent?
Extremely
Unlikely

Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

o

o

o

Neither
Unlikely
nor Likely

o

Likely

Very
Likely

o

o

Extremely
Likely

o

Page Break

You may assess punitive damages beyond the recoverable damages up to another $20 billion
on Aplus Insurance.
On the scale below, please indicate the percentage of punitive damages, if any, you would be
willing to require that Aplus Insurance pays Class Members?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

o o o o o o o o o o o
Page Break
Attention Check
For this question ONLY, please choose 1.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Page Break
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DV2: Causal Attribution
Based on the information that you have available, what do you think caused the delayed
disclosure of the cyber-attack to Aplus Insurance?
Two potential reasons for the timing of Aplus Insurance’s disclosure follow: 1) that the
disclosure timing was intentional and caused by Aplus Insurance’s intent to strategically
disclose the cyber-attack to portray the company in a favorable light, or 2) that the disclosure
timing was incidental and caused by Aplus Insurance’s difficulty in estimating the extent of the
breach due to the inherent uncertainty of the event.
On the scale below please indicate which reason is the most likely cause of the disclosure
timing:
Completely
incidental

o

Somewhat
more
incidental
than
intentional

o

Slightly
more
incidental
than
intentional

Equally
incidental
than
intentional

o

Slightly
more
intentional
than
incidental

o

o

Neither
not
confident
nor
confident

Slightly
confident

Somewhat
more
intentional
than
incidental

o

Completely
intentional

o

How confident are you in your assessment?
Not
confident
at all

o

Somewhat
not
confident

o

Slightly
not
confident

o

o

Page Break
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o

Somewhat
confident

o

Very
confident

o

To what extent do you believe the plaintiff (Class Members) must assume normal investment
risks when making investments, and therefore is responsible for its loss?
Completely
Not
Responsibl
e for Loss

Somewhat
not
Responsibl
e for Loss

Not
Responsibl
e for Loss

o

o

Neither not
Responsibl
e for Loss
nor
Responsibl
e for Loss

o

Somewhat
Responsibl
e for Loss

o

Responsibl
e for Loss

o

o

Completely
Responsibl
e for Loss

o

Page Break
Block: Case Questions
Start of Block: Case Questions 2

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
The order of the following questions is randomized

Class Members should have expected a cyber-attack.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Aplus Insurance cyber-attack was predictable by Class Members.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Companies in the health and well-being industry have a higher-risk of cyber-attack compared to
companies in other industries.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Manipulation Check - Timeliness
Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach in a timely manner.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Manipulation Check - Plausibility
Aplus Insurance’s justification for the disclosure timing is plausible.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

Somewhat
Agree

o

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Manipulation Check - Plausibility
Aplus Insurance’s justification for the timing of the disclosure is believable.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Manipulation Check - Plausibility
Aplus Insurance’s justification for the timing of the disclosure is credible.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Aplus Insurance’s was more concerned about disclosing comprehensive and accurate
information about the cyber-attack than in disclosing the information in a timely manner.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Aplus Insurance’s should have emphasized more on disclosing comprehensive and accurate
information about the cyber-attack than in disclosing the information in a timely manner.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the increased sophistication of
hacking techniques.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the complexity of determining the
scope of the breach.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

o

o

Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable even when a cyber-attack results in the
loss of identifiable information from customers or employees.
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Managers have more incentives to disclose bad news in a timely manner than incentives to
delay the disclosure of bad news.
Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Compared to companies with lower risk of cyber-attacks, companies with higher risk of cyberattacks are expected to have stronger controls for detecting and disclosing cybersecurity
incidents in a timely manner.
Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

End of Block: Case Questions 2
Start of Block: Thanks

Thanks for completing the task!
After completion of the following questionnaire you will receive a validation code to be used to
process your payment.

End of Block: Thanks
Start of Block: Demographics
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What is your gender?

o Male
o Female
What is your age?

o 18 to 28 years
o 29 to 38 years
o 39 to 48 years
o 49 to 58 years
o 59 to 69 years
o Over 70 years
Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from
extremely liberal (left) to extremely conservative (right). Where would you place yourself on
this scale?
Extremely
liberal
1

o

Somewhat
liberal

o

Slightly
liberal

o

Neither
liberal nor
conservative

o
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Slightly
conservative

o

Somewhat
conservative

o

Extremely
conservative

o

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?

o Less than high school degree
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
o Some college but no degree
o Associate degree in college (2-year)
o Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)
o Master's degree
o Professional degree (JD, MD)
o Doctoral Degree
If you studied beyond high school, what was your area of concentration?
________________________________________________________________
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What is your current employment status?

o Full-time employment
o Part-time employment
o Self-employed
o Full-time student
o Retired
o Not currently employed, but looking for work
o Not currently employed and not looking for work
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Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are employed?

o Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support
o Real estate or rental and leasing
o Mining
o Professional, scientific or technical services
o Utilities
o Management of companies or enterprises
o Construction
o Admin, support, waste management or remediation services
o Manufacturing
o Educational services
o Wholesale trade
o Health care or social assistance
o Retail trade
o Arts, entertainment or recreation
o Transportation or warehousing
o Accommodation or food services
o Information
o Other services (except public administration)
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o Finance or insurance
o Unclassified establishments
Information about income is very important to understand. Would you please give your best
guess?Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year)
before taxes.

o Less than $20,000
o $20,000 to $39,999
o $40,000 to $59,999
o $60,000 to $79,999
o $80,000 to $99,999
o $100,000 to $149,999
o $150,000 or more
Have you ever worked for an insurance company or a health provider?

o Yes
o No
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Have you ever worked as a lawyer or for a law firm?

o Yes
o No
Have you been a victim of identity theft?

o Yes
o No
Have you been a victim of a cybersecurity attack?

o Yes
o No
Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a company?

o Yes
o No
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Have you ever served on a jury before?

o Yes
o No
End of Block: Demographics
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APPENDIX H: STUDY TWO EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
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Comments to reviewers are made in Red, Bold, and Italics
Start of Block: Consent

EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH
Title of Project: Investors’ judgments and decisions
Principal Investigator: Patricia Navarro-Velez
Faculty Supervisor: Steven G. Sutton
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.
The purpose of this study is to explore how investors make valuation judgments. You will
receive one of several business contexts/situations.
You will assume the role of an investor to evaluate a company’s stock value in light of some
information that will be made available to you.
This study will be administered online. We expect that it will take you approximately 20
minutes to complete this experiment.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints contact Patricia Navarro-Velez, Doctoral Candidate, UCF Accounting
Department at (407)823-5837 or Dr. Steve G. Sutton, Faculty Advisor, UCF Accounting
Department at (407)823-5857.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:
Research at the University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under
the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and
approved by the IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research,
please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901. search.
End of Block: Consent
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Start of Block: Screening M Turk

Are you at least 18 years of age and a United States Citizen?

o Yes
o No
Are you a native English speaker?

o Yes
o No
Have you taken 2 or more Accounting or Financial courses at the college level?

o Yes
o No
Can you read and understand financial statements?

o Yes
o No
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Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a company?

o Yes
o No
End of Block: Screening M Turk
Start
Block: Instructions
Onlyofparticipants
who answer Yes to screening question 1-4 are allowed to continue the

You
must complete this task in a single sitting. The task will take about 20 minutes to
survey.
complete. If you do not have approximately 20 minutes to complete the task right now, please
do not start the study.
It is also critical that you do not complete this study twice or discuss this study with
others. This is serious research of interest to financial regulators, and the results could be
compromised or ruined by you discussing materials with others.
End of Block: Instructions
Start of Block: Instructions 2

Your task today is to evaluate a company, in light of selected information that will be made
available to you. The information you receive is not intended to include all the information that
you might desire. However, do your best in light of the information provided and please base
your answers to the questions on only the information provided. There are no right or wrong
answers to the case questions you will be asked.
It is important that you read all case materials carefully and answer the included questions
thoughtfully and honestly. Throughout the case you will answer the following three types of
questions:
Review Questions reflect whether you read and understand the presented material. These
questions will not be difficult if you read the materials carefully.
Case Questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts described in the
case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.
Wrap-Up Questions ask you some miscellaneous perception and demographic questions.
IMPORTANT: YOU MUST ANSWER 100% OF THE REVIEW QUESTIONS CORRECTLY TO BE
COMPENSATED.
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Review Question:
To be compensated, I must answer at least:

o 50% of the review questions correctly.
o 75% of the review questions correctly.
o 100% of the review questions correctly.
End of Block: Instructions 2
Start of Block: Task 1

Some initial background information on the company is provided below:
About Aplus Auto Care:
Headquartered in San Diego, California, Aplus Auto Care is a leading American corporation in
the car warranty and related solutions industry.
The company was founded in 1987 and serves over 74 million people throughout the United
States.

End of Block: Task 1
Start of Block: Case Question

DV1a: Initial Valuation
Case Question 1:
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.)
On the following scale, please indicate what you believe to be an appropriate common stock
valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high.
Given that you have very little information about Aplus up to this point, for now, you can
assume that an “average” common stock valuation for Aplus is appropriate. In other words, for
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this particular judgment, you should choose a value that is either at or very near ‘4’ on the scale
below.
Very
Low
The
appropriate
common
stock
valuation
for Aplus
is:

Moderately
Low

o

o

Slightly
Low

o

Neither
Low nor
High

o

Slightly
High

Moderately
High

o

o

Very
High

o

End of Block: Case Question
Start of Block: Financial Information
Relevant Financial Information:
Below you are provided with selected financial information taken from the Annual Reports of
Aplus Auto Care for the year ended December 31, 2016.
(in million dollars)
Net Assets
Net Income
Earnings per Share

2016
$65,083
$2,569
5.56

2015
$61,717
$2,560
4.82

2014
$61,676
$2,469
4.76

Following the release of the 2016 financial statements in February 2017, the stock price of the
company continued on a positive trend, and analysts considered this company to be a strong
investment.

Review Questions
As reported in the tabulated information included in Aplus’ annual report, there has been a
consistent ______ trend in total Net Assets, Net Income, and Earnings per Share (EPS).

o Positive
o Negative
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Following the release of the 2016 financial statements on February 2017, the stock price of the
company continued on a ______ trend.

o Positive
o Negative
End of Block: Financial Information
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Start of Block: Press Release Info

You also learned that a press release was issued by Aplus Auto Care. The press release that was
provided by Aplus Auto Care is presented on the next page.
Please take the time to thoroughly review the press release in order to answer the questions
that will follow. The success of this research depends on you paying careful attention to the
task.
End of Block: Press Release Info
Start of Block: Press Release

Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Investigation on Data Breach
LOS ANGELES, July 1, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- Statement regarding cyber-attack against Aplus
Auto Care, Inc.
Cyber attackers executed a very sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized access to our parent
company’s IT systems and have obtained personal information relating to customers and
employees. The information accessed includes names, birthdays, social security numbers,
street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income data. No
credit card information was compromised, nor is there evidence at this time that any other
information was targeted or obtained.
As soon as we learned about the attack, we immediately made every effort to close the security
vulnerability, contacted authorities and began fully cooperating with their investigation.
Aplus Auto Care will individually notify current and former members whose information has
been accessed. Credit monitoring and identity protection services will be provided free of
charge so that those who have been affected can have peace of mind.
The company has established a dedicated website (www.apbreach.com) where members can
access information, including frequently asked questions and answers.
We take consumers’ privacy very seriously and are doing everything in our power to make our
systems and security processes – and most importantly your data – more secure. In the
meantime, as we learn more, we will continue to provide updates.
End of Block: Press Release
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Start of Block: Assurance Info

Relevant Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Upon further investigation, you find that, cyber-attacks are considered a business risk which
organizations should address with a cybersecurity risk management program. You also find
that, in response to the increased threat of cyber-attacks to organizations, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has developed a cybersecurity risk
management reporting framework for organizations to provide users with information about
the processes and controls they have implemented to mitigate cybersecurity risks (e.g.
restricted access to unauthorized users). This framework is also used by Certified Public
Accountants (CPAs) to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls within an
organization and to report the results in a Service Organization Controls (SOC) report.
A SOC over cybersecurity is a report that includes a description of the company’s controls over
cybersecurity and that also includes an independent audit opinion over the operating
effectiveness of cybersecurity controls. For instance, a company describes how they restrict
access to information systems to only authorized users and the independent auditor reports
whether that control is operating effectively.
A clean opinion in a SOC report denotes that there is reasonable assurance that the
cybersecurity controls are in place and operating effectively. This independent auditor’s report
is desirable for companies with high risk from cyber-attacks.

Page Break
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Assurance Expected Condition
Additional Information:
You decided to do some additional research to find out about cybersecurity assurance practices
in this industry.
You found that cybersecurity assurance is voluntary but that most firms in this industry choose
to engage in cybersecurity assurance with an independent auditor.
Therefore, you expect that Aplus Auto Care, Inc. will choose to engage in cybersecurity
assurance with an independent auditor.

Assurance Not Expected Condition
Additional Information:
You decided to do some additional research to find out about cybersecurity assurance practices
in this industry.
You found that cybersecurity assurance is voluntary but that most firms in this industry do not
choose to engage in cybersecurity assurance with an independent auditor.
Therefore, you expect that Aplus Auto Care, Inc. will not choose to engage in cybersecurity
assurance with an independent auditor.

Page Break
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Assurance/Conform to Expectancies Condition
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in
place and operating effectively.
In addition, you noticed that, consistent with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto
Care voluntarily engaged an Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the
effectiveness of Aplus’ cybersecurity controls during 2016 (the year before Aplus Auto Care
learned about the data breach).
Aplus Auto Care’s auditor issued a clean opinion in their SOC report in January 2017 (before
Aplus Auto Care learned about the data breach).

No Assurance/Conform to Expectancies Condition
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in
place and operating effectively.
However, you noticed that, consistent with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto Care
has not engaged an Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the
effectiveness of their cybersecurity controls.

Additional Analysis – No CRM/Conform to Expectancies Condition
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
You noticed that, consistent with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto Care does not
have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and has not engaged an Independent
Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their cybersecurity
controls.
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Additional Analysis – No CRM/Violate Expectancies Condition
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
You noticed that, in contrast with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto Care does not
have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and has not engaged an Independent
Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their cybersecurity
controls.

No Assurance/Violate Expectancies Condition
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in
place and operating effectively.
However, you noticed that, in contrast with the rest of the firms in the industry, which have
engaged in cybersecurity assurance services, Aplus Auto Care has not engaged an Independent
Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their cybersecurity
controls.

Assurance/Violate Expectancies Condition
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in
place and operating effectively.
In addition, you noticed that, in contrast with the rest of the firms in the industry, that have not
engaged in cybersecurity assurance services, Aplus Auto Care voluntarily engaged an
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their
cybersecurity controls during 2016 (the year before Aplus Auto Care learned about the data
breach).
Aplus Auto Care’s auditor issued a clean opinion in their SOC report in January 2017 (before
Aplus Auto Care learned about the data breach).
End of Block: Assurance Info
Start of Block: Case Questions
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Case Questions:
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.)
DV1b: Final Valuation
Considering the new information provided, please indicate what you believe to be an
appropriate common stock valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high.

Very
Low
The
appropriate
common
stock
valuation
for Aplus is:

Moderately
Low

o

Slightly
Low

o

Neither
Low nor
High

o

o

Slightly
High

o

Moderately
High

o

Very
High

o

DV2a: Management Credibility / Competence
How competent or incompetent do you believe the management of Aplus to be?
Very
Incompetent

o

Incompetent

o

Somewhat
Incompetent

Neither
Incompetent
nor
Competent

o

o

Somewhat
Competent

o

Competent

o

Very
Competent

o

DV2b: Management Credibility / Trustworthiness
How trustworthy or untrustworthy do you believe the management of Aplus to be?
Very
Untrustworth
y

o

Untrustworth
y

o

Somewhat
Untrustworth
y

Neither
Untrustworth
y nor
Trustworthy

o

o

End of Block: Case Questions
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Somewhat
Trustworth
y

o

Trustworth
y

o

Very
Trustworth
y

o

The order of the following questions is randomized
Case Questions:
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

192

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

“Independent
cybersecurity
audits are
necessary to be
able to
substantiate
professional
care”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

“Independent
cybersecurity
audits are
beneficial, as
the auditor can
be used as a
codefendant in
case of
litigation”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

“Independent
cybersecurity
audits are
beneficial, as
the auditor and
the company
share an
interest to
protect both of
their
reputation in
case of
litigation”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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“Independent
cybersecurity
audits are
beneficial, as
the auditor
shares a
portion of the
company’s
legal
responsibility
in case of
litigation”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

“Aplus Auto
Care was
expected to
engage in
cybersecurity
assurance
before the data
breach.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

“I am worry
about Aplus
Auto Care's
cybersecurity
risks.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

“It is very
difficult
for Aplus Auto
Care
management
to use their
skill and
diligence to
control (limit)
the company's
cybersecurity
risks.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

“Aplus Auto
Care is a
company with
high
cybersecurity.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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“Aplus Auto
Care's
cybersecurity
risks are likely
to be
catastrophic.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

"Accountants
have significant
experience
auditing
information
security and
cybersecurity
controls."

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

"Accountants
spend a
significant
portion of their
time auditing
information
security and
cybersecurity
controls.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

"Accountants
receive
significant
combined
informal and
formal training
in relation to
information
security and
cybersecurity
controls.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

"Accountants
have a high
level of
information
security and
cybersecurity
controls
expertise.”

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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For this
questions,
select "4".

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Case Questions 2
Start of Block: Manipulation Checks

Review Questions:
Manipulation Check -CRM
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Auto Care has their own cybersecurity
risk management program in place and operating effectively.

o True
o False
Manipulation Check - Assurance
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Auto Care voluntarily engaged an
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their
cybersecurity controls.

o True
o False
Manipulation Check – Assurance Expectancies
Based on the case information, most firms in the car warranty and related solutions industry
choose to engage in cybersecurity assurance services with an independent auditor.

o True
o False
End of Block: Manipulation Checks
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Start of Block: Thanks

Thanks for completing the task! After completion of the following questionnaire you will
receive a validation code to be used to process your payment.
End of Block: Thanks
Start of Block: Demographics

What is your gender?

o Male
o Female
What is your age?

o 18 to 28 years
o 29 to 38 years
o 39 to 48 years
o 49 to 58 years
o 59 to 69 years
o Over 70 years
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What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?

o Less than high school degree
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
o Some college but no degree
o Associate degree in college (2-year)
o Bachelor's degree in college (4 years)
o Master's degree
o Professional degree (JD, MD)
o Doctoral degree
If you studied beyond high school, what was your area of concentration?
________________________________________________________________
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What is your current employment status?

o Full-time employment
o Part-time employment
o Self-employed
o Full-time student
o Retired
o Not currently employed, but looking for work
o Not currently employed and not looking for work
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Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are employed?

o Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support
o Real estate or rental and leasing
o Mining
o Professional, scientific or technical services
o Utilities
o Management of companies or enterprises
o Construction
o Admin, support, waste management or remediation services
o Manufacturing
o Educational services
o Wholesale trade
o Health care or social assistance
o Retail trade
o Arts, entertainment or recreation
o Transportation or warehousing
o Accommodation or food services
o Information
o Other services (except public administration)
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o Finance or insurance
o Unclassified establishments
Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year)
before taxes.

o Less than $20,000
o $20,000 to $39,999
o $40,000 to $59,999
o $60,000 to $79,999
o $80,000 to $99,999
o $100,000 to $149,999
o $150,000 or more
Approximately, how many years of personal investment experience do you have?

o Less than one year
o More than one year but less than three years
o More than three years but less than five years
o More than five years
o No experience
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Approximately, how many times have you purchased common stock of a company as a personal
investment?
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Demographics
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APPENDIX I: STUDY THREE EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
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Comments to reviewers are made in Red, Bold, and Italics
Start of Block: Screening M Turk

Are you at least 18 years of age and a United States Citizen?

o Yes
o No
Are you a native English speaker?

o Yes
o No
Have you taken 2 or more Accounting or Financial courses at the college level?

o Yes
o No
Can you read and understand financial statements?

o Yes
o No
Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a company?

o Yes
o No
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Please provide your Mturk ID:
________________________________________________________________

Only participants who answer Yes to screening question 1-4 are allowed to continue the

End
of Block: Screening M Turk
survey.
Start of Block: Consent

EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH
Title of Project: Investors Valuation Judgments
Principal Investigator: Patricia Navarro-Velez
Faculty Supervisor: Steve G. Sutton, PhD
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.
Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. Before you begin, please note that the
data you provide may be collected and used by Amazon as per its privacy agreement. This
agreement shall be interpreted according to United States law.
The purpose of this study is to explore how investors make valuation judgments. You will
receive one of several business contexts/situations. You will assume the role of an investor to
evaluate a company’s stock value in light of some information that will be made available to
you.
This study will be administered online. We expect that it will take you approximately 20
minutes to complete this experiment. After successful completion of the study, you will be
compensated with $2.50. Compensation will be processed through your Mturk account.
You must be 18 years of age or older, a United States citizen, native English speaker that have
taken two or more accounting or financial courses at the college level, and that can read and
understand financial statements to take part in this research study. You must also have
completed at least 1,000 Mturk HITs with over 98% approval rate.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints: Patricia Navarro-Velez, Doctoral Candidate, UCF Accounting
Department at (407)823-5837 or Dr. Steve G. Sutton, Faculty Advisor, UCF Accounting
Department at (407)823-5857.
IRB contact about your rights in this study or to report a complaint:
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or have concerns about the
conduct of this study, please contact Institutional Review Board (IRB), University of Central
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Florida, Office of Research, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901, or email irb@ucf.edu.
End of Block: Consent
Start of Block: Instructions

You must complete this task in a single sitting. The task will take about 20 minutes to
complete. If you do not have approximately 20 minutes to complete the task right now, please
do not start the study.
It is also critical that you do not complete this study twice or discuss this study with
others. This is serious research of interest to financial regulators, and the results could be
compromised or ruined by you discussing materials with others.
End of Block: Instructions
Start of Block: Instructions 2

Your task today is to evaluate a company, in light of selected information that will be made
available to you. The information you receive is not intended to include all the information that
you might desire. However, do your best in light of the information provided and please base
your answers to the questions on only the information provided. There are no right or wrong
answers to the case questions you will be asked.
It is important that you read all case materials carefully and answer the included questions
thoughtfully and honestly. Throughout the case you will answer the following three types of
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questions:
Review Questions reflect whether you read and understand the presented material. These
questions will not be difficult if you read the materials carefully.
Case Questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts described in the
case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.
Wrap-Up Questions ask you some miscellaneous perception and demographic questions.
IMPORTANT: YOU MUST ANSWER 100% OF THE REVIEW QUESTIONS CORRECTLY TO BE
COMPENSATED.
Review Question:
To be compensated, I must answer at least:

o 50% of the review questions correctly.
o 75% of the review questions correctly.
o 100% of the review questions correctly.
End of Block: Instructions 2
Start of Block: Task 1

Some initial background information on the company is provided below:
About Aplus Insurance:
Headquartered in San Diego, California, Aplus Insurance is a leading American corporation in
the health and well-being industry.
The company was founded in 1987 and serves over 74 million people throughout the United
States.

Page Break
End of Block: Task 1
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Start of Block: Case Question

DV1a: Initial Valuation
Case Question 1:
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.)
On the following scale, please indicate what you believe to be an appropriate common stock
valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high.
Given that you have very little information about Aplus up to this point, for now, you can
assume that an “average” common stock valuation for Aplus is appropriate. In other words, for
this particular judgment, you should choose a value that is either at or very near ‘4’ on the scale
below.
The appropriate common stock valuation for Aplus is:
Very
Low

Moderately
Low

o

o

Slightly
Low

Neither
Low nor
High

o

o

End of Block: Case Question
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Slightly
High

o

Moderately
High

o

Very
High

o

Start of Block: Financial Information
Relevant Financial Information:
Below you are provided with selected financial information taken from the Annual Reports of
Aplus Insurance for the year ended December 31, 2016.
(in million dollars)
Net Assets
Net Income
Earnings per Share

2016
$65,083
$2,569
5.56

2015
$61,717
$2,560
4.82

2014
$61,676
$2,469
4.76

Following the release of the 2016 financial statements in February 2017, the stock price of the
company continued on a positive trend, and analysts considered this company to be a strong
investment.

Review Questions
As reported in the tabulated information included in Aplus Insurance’s annual report, there has
been a consistent ______ trend in total Net Assets, Net Income, and Earnings per Share (EPS).

o Positive
o Negative
Following the release of the 2016 financial statements on February 2017, the stock price of the
company continued on a ______ trend.

o Positive
o Negative
End of Block: Financial Information
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Start of Block: Press Release Info

You also learned that a press release was issued by Aplus Insurance. The press release that was
provided by Aplus Insurance is presented on the next page.
Please take the time to thoroughly review the press release in order to answer the questions
that will follow.
End of Block: Press Release Info
Start of Block: Press Release

Timely Condition
Aplus Insurance, Inc. Investigation on Data Breach
LOS ANGELES, July 15, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- Statement regarding cyber-attack against Aplus
Insurance, Inc.
On November 2016 cyber attackers executed a very sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized
access to our parent company’s IT systems and have obtained personal information relating to
customers and employees. The information accessed includes names, birthdays, social security
numbers, street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income
data. No credit card information was compromised, nor is there evidence at this time that any
other information was targeted or obtained.
As soon as we learned about the attack, three days ago, on July 13, 2017, we immediately made
every effort to close the security vulnerability, contacted authorities and began fully
cooperating with their investigation.
Aplus Insurance will individually notify current and former members whose information has
been accessed. Credit monitoring and identity protection services will be provided free of
charge so that those who have been affected can have peace of mind.
The company has established a dedicated website (www.apbreach.com) where members can
access information, including frequently asked questions and answers.
We take consumers’ privacy very seriously and are doing everything in our power to make our
systems and security processes – and most importantly your data – more secure. In the
meantime, as we learn more, we will continue to provide updates.

Page Break
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Not Timely Condition
Aplus Insurance, Inc. Investigation on Data Breach
LOS ANGELES, July 15, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- Statement regarding cyber-attack against Aplus
Insurance, Inc.
On August 2016, cyber attackers executed a very sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized
access to our parent company’s IT systems and have obtained personal information relating to
customers and employees. The information accessed includes names, birthdays, social security
numbers, street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income
data. No credit card information was compromised, nor is there evidence at this time that any
other information was targeted or obtained.
As soon as we learned about the attack, three months ago, on April 15, 2017, we immediately
made every effort to close the security vulnerability, contacted authorities and began fully
cooperating with their investigation.
Aplus Insurance will individually notify current and former members whose information has
been accessed. Credit monitoring and identity protection services will be provided free of
charge so that those who have been affected can have peace of mind.
The company has established a dedicated website (www.apbreach.com) where members can
access information, including frequently asked questions and answers.
We take consumers’ privacy very seriously and are doing everything in our power to make our
systems and security processes – and most importantly your data – more secure. In the
meantime, as we learn more, we will continue to provide updates.
End of Block: Press Release
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Start of Block: Assurance Info

Timely Condition
Relevant Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Upon further investigation, you find that, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach promptly,
compared with other firms that have experienced a cybersecurity incident. You also find that
cyber-attacks are considered a business risk which organizations should address with a
cybersecurity risk management program. You also find that, in response to the increased threat
of cyber-attacks to organizations, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
has developed a cybersecurity risk management reporting framework for organizations to
provide users with information about the processes and controls they have implemented to
mitigate cybersecurity risks (e.g. restricted access to unauthorized users). This framework is
also used by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity
controls within an organization and to report the results in a Service Organization Controls
(SOC) report.
A SOC over cybersecurity is a report that includes a description of the company’s controls over
cybersecurity and that also includes an independent audit opinion over the operating
effectiveness of cybersecurity controls. For instance, a company describes how they restrict
access to information systems to only authorized users and the independent auditor reports
whether that control is operating effectively.
A clean opinion in a SOC report denotes that there is reasonable assurance that the
cybersecurity controls are in place and operating effectively. This independent auditor’s report
is desirable for companies with high risk from cyber-attacks.

Page Break
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Not Timely Condition
Relevant Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Upon further investigation, you find that, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach late, compared
with other firms that have experienced a cybersecurity incident. You also find that cyberattacks are considered a business risk which organizations should address with a cybersecurity
risk management program. You also find that, in response to the increased threat of cyberattacks to organizations, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has
developed a cybersecurity risk management reporting framework for organizations to provide
users with information about the processes and controls they have implemented to mitigate
cybersecurity risks (e.g. restricted access to unauthorized users). This framework is also used
by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls
within an organization and to report the results in a Service Organization Controls (SOC)
report.
A SOC over cybersecurity is a report that includes a description of the company’s controls over
cybersecurity and that also includes an independent audit opinion over the operating
effectiveness of cybersecurity controls. For instance, a company describes how they restrict
access to information systems to only authorized users and the independent auditor reports
whether that control is operating effectively.
A clean opinion in a SOC report denotes that there is reasonable assurance that the
cybersecurity controls are in place and operating effectively. This independent auditor’s report
is desirable for companies with high risk from cyber-attacks.

Page Break
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Assurance Condition
Aplus Insurance, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Aplus Insurance reports that they have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and
operating effectively. In addition, you noticed that during 2016 Aplus Insurance voluntarily
engaged an Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of
their cybersecurity controls during 2016 (the year before Aplus Insurance learned about the
data breach). Aplus Insurance’s auditor issued a clean opinion in their SOC report on January
2017 (before Aplus Insurance learned about the data breach).

No Assurance Condition
Aplus Insurance, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:
Aplus Insurance reports that they have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and
operating effectively. However, you noticed that Aplus Insurance has not engaged an
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their
cybersecurity controls.

Page Break
End of Block: Assurance Info
Start of Block: Case Questions
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Case Questions:
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.)
DV1b: Final Valuation
Your initial stock valuation for Aplus was ${DV1A/ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnswers}.
Considering the new information provided, please indicate what you believe to be an
appropriate common stock valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high.

Very
Low

Moderately
Low

o

Neither
Low nor
High

Slightly
Low

o

o

o

Slightly
High

o

Moderately
High

o

Very
High

o

DV2a: Management Credibility / Competence
How competent or incompetent do you believe the management of Aplus to be?
Very
Incompetent

o

Incompetent

o

Somewhat
Incompetent

Neither
Incompetent
nor
Competent

o

o

Somewhat
Competent

o

Competent

o

Very
Competent

o

DV2b: Management Credibility / Trustworthiness
How trustworthy or untrustworthy do you believe the management of Aplus to be?
Very
Untrustworth
y

o

Untrustworth
y

o

Somewhat
Untrustworth
y

Neither
Untrustworth
y nor
Trustworthy

o

o

End of Block: Case Questions
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Somewhat
Trustworth
y

o

Trustworth
y

o

Very
Trustworth
y

o

Start of Block: Manipulation Checks

Review Questions:
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Insurance has their own cybersecurity
risk management program in place and operating effectively.

o True
o False
Manipulation Check: Assurance
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Insurance voluntarily engaged an
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their
cybersecurity controls.

o True
o False
End of Block: Manipulation Checks
Start of Block: Case Questions 2

Case Questions:
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.)
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

The order of the following questions is randomized
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“Independent cybersecurity audits are necessary to be able to substantiate professional care”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

o

o

“Independent cybersecurity audits are beneficial, as the auditor can be used as a codefendant
in case of litigation”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

o

o

“Independent cybersecurity audits are beneficial, as the auditor and the company share an
interest to protect both of their reputation in case of litigation”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

o

o

“Independent cybersecurity audits are beneficial, as the auditor shares a portion of the
company’s legal responsibility in case of litigation”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

Manipulation Check - Timeliness
“Aplus Insurance disclose the breach on a timely manner.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“I am worry about Aplus Insurance's cybersecurity risks.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“It is very difficult for Aplus Insurance management to use their skill and diligence to control
(limit) the company's cybersecurity risks.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Aplus Insurance is a company with high cybersecurity risk.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Aplus Insurance's cybersecurity risks are likely to be catastrophic.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

o

o

"Accountants have significant experience auditing information security and cybersecurity
controls."
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

o

o

"Accountants spend a significant portion of their time auditing information security and
cybersecurity controls.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

"Accountants receive significant combined informal and formal training in relation to
information security and cybersecurity controls.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

"Accountants have a high level of information security and cybersecurity controls expertise.”
Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

For this question, select "4".
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

"Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the increased sophistication of
hacking techniques."
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the complexity of determining the
scope of the breach.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

220

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

o

o

“Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable even when a cybersecurity attack
results in the loss of identifiable information from customers or employees.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Managers have more incentives to disclose bad news on a timely basis than incentives to delay
the disclosure of bad news.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Companies in the health and well-being industry have a higher-risk of cyber-attack compared
to companies in other industries.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Compared to companies with lower risk of cyber-attacks, companies with higher risk of cyberattacks are expected to have stronger controls for detecting and disclosing cybersecurity
incidents on a timely basis.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

Somewhat
Agree

o

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of litigation.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of lost business.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o

Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

“Timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident is the right thing to do.”
Strongly
Disagree

o

Somewhat
Disagree

o

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

o

o
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Slightly
Agree

o

Somewhat
Agree

o

Strongly
Agree

o

End of Block: Case Questions 2
Start of Block: Thanks

Thanks for completing the task! After completion of the following questionnaire you will
receive a validation code to be used to process your payment.
End of Block: Thanks
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Start of Block: Demographics

What is your gender?

o Male
o Female
What is your age?

o 18 to 28 years
o 29 to 38 years
o 39 to 48 years
o 49 to 58 years
o 59 to 69 years
o Over 70 years
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What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?

o Less than high school degree
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
o Some college but no degree
o Associate degree in college (2-year)
o Bachelor's degree in college (4 years)
o Master's degree
o Professional degree (JD, MD)
o Doctoral degree
If you studied beyond high school, what was your area of concentration?
________________________________________________________________
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What is your current employment status?

o Full-time employment
o Part-time employment
o Self-employed
o Full-time student
o Retired
o Not currently employed, but looking for work
o Not currently employed and not looking for work
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Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are employed?

o Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support
o Real estate or rental and leasing
o Mining
o Professional, scientific or technical services
o Utilities
o Management of companies or enterprises
o Construction
o Admin, support, waste management or remediation services
o Manufacturing
o Educational services
o Wholesale trade
o Health care or social assistance
o Retail trade
o Arts, entertainment or recreation
o Transportation or warehousing
o Accommodation or food services
o Information
o Other services (except public administration)
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o Finance or insurance
o Unclassified establishments
Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year)
before taxes.

o Less than $20,000
o $20,000 to $39,999
o $40,000 to $59,999
o $60,000 to $79,999
o $80,000 to $99,999
o $100,000 to $149,999
o $150,000 or more
Approximately, how many years of personal investment experience do you have?

o Less than one year
o More than one year but less than three years
o More than three years but less than five years
o More than five years
o No experience
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Approximately, how many times have you purchased common stock of a company as a personal
investment?
________________________________________________________________

Have you suffered financial loss due to a cybersecurity breach?

o Yes
o No
End of Block: Demographics
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APPENDIX J: IRB APPROVALS

230

231

232

233

